[bc-gnso] RE: CCWG on ICANN Accountability: Work Stream 1 and the concept of Leverage

["Fares, David" <DFares@xxxxxxxx>]

Thanks, Steve.  It may also be helpful to highlight that we debated this issue 
within the CCWG drafting group and basically agreed that the CCWG should be 
empowered to address accountability across the whole of ICANN – this should be 
reflected in the transcripts.

From: owner-bc-gnso@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-bc-gnso@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of 
Steve DelBianco
Sent: 02 January 2015 23:05
To: BC List
Subject: [bc-gnso] CCWG on ICANN Accountability: Work Stream 1 and the concept 
of Leverage

First, Happy New Year!  And second, here’s an update from the Accountability 
CCWG<https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability>.

We had our 4th call on Tuesday (call 
notes<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51414982>).  The 
work team I am leading has 
documented<https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%205.1%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1419814534000&api=v2>
 many accountability mechanisms, placing them into one of 2 ‘work streams’ 
according to this rationale:

Work Stream 1 is designated for accountability enhancement mechanisms that must 
be in place [or firmly committed]
before IANA transition occurs.   All other consensus items could be in Work 
Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation 
of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board.

At this point the CCWG is debating that rationale, with some members fearing 
that ICANN's board might reject significant new accountability measures. Below 
is the response I gave to Alan Greenberg when he expressed that concern:

On 1/2/15, 5:12 PM, "Steve DelBianco" 
<sdelbianco@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:sdelbianco@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:

Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into 
Work Stream 1, saying,

"I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the 
direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be 
perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see 
the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to 
allow transition.”

In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition 
is neither required nor desirable.  Instead, the IANA transition is the 
community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s 
board.  The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not 
transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to 
the community once the IANA contract is gone.  And the internet community has 
indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and 
on Congress.

So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the 
leverage our CCWG holds in this process.  With that leverage comes the 
responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy 
making for decades to come.  And we must also get our work done without causing 
undue delay to the IANA transition process.

Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over 
ICANN’s board and and management.  As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to 
stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking 
enforceable public interest commitments 
(link<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16oct14-en.pdf>).
 ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns 
of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants.  The fear 
of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over 
delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs.    After all, the 
ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the 
community. (see Bylaws 
<https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI> Article 6, 
Section 7).

What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the 
community for this decision?  We have seen the futility of Reconsideration 
requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision.

This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold 
ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve.   Let's 
embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have.

—
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and 
http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/>
+1.202.420.7482


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