Supplemental comments on Root Zone KSK Rollover

[Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Dear ICANN staff members:

Given that the ISOC comment on the KSK rollover provides a clear 
articulation of the rationales for a proactive root KSK rollover program 
by ICANN, I see the need to provide an additional comment on the issue.
The arguments in my earlier comment are on the record and they are in 
many respects opposing the ISOC rationale elements.
The perspective of a successful root KSK rollover program is envisioned 
by ISOC in these terms:
"The end result of this initial period is that rolling the root zone KSK 
should become a routine operation that is regularly executed by ICANN 
without any impacts to the DNS and to DNSSEC validation. At the point 
that it becomes routine ICANN will then be ready to perform an 
unscheduled root zone KSK rollover should such an event ever become 
required."
In a security analysis with a key management focus, the new context 
would see a shift of the single point of failure from the DNS root KSK 
private key components to whatever private cryptographic key material 
(e.g. a standby private key component) would be required for performing 
a legitimate rollover operation. In the same line of thoughts as in my 
previous comment, I doubt the Internet community actually benefits from 
this mere shifting of focus for operational security measures 
surrounding a system-wide master key.
--
- Thierry Moreau