Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] elaboration on the Blob topology

[Jeff Williams <jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Dan and all sgb members,

  Excellent reverse logic analysis here.  And one that I indirectly
eluded to with respect what type if entities should and should not
be considered for third party access.  My examples were for
entities that should not become third parties for access were:
Law firms, trade associations or trade related organizations,
educational institutions, financial institutions of any sort,
auditing/accounting firms, or private security firms.

  Additionally SOME law enforcement entities, including a few
which are INTERPOL members should also NOT have
unsupervised access to any private/protected registrant
Whois data.  I consider as a guide line for determining
which of the law enforcement entities whom should NOT have
unsupervised access to any private/protected registrant
Whois data, the USTR 301 list which I provided the
link for.  The countries in which these law enforcement entities
serve, have a history of miscreant behavior as well as in far
too many instances, engaged in criminal activity on a number
of fronts which gives me a far less than comfortable feeling.

Dan Krimm wrote:

> Hi Paul and registrars,
>
> Due to time constraints I didn't follow up with this on today's phone call,
> but perhaps you can elaborate here on email.
>
> My question with respect to the Blob proposal is: how many keys would be
> involved, and how would they correspond with what data and what users,
> specifically?
>
> I assume that encryption for any specific blob is limited to a single key,
> and once encrypted and distributed broadly (and publicly, given that it is
> included with all queries on that domain) that key will work on that blob
> forever.
>
> So, in the event of a breach of the key into the general public, or at
> least into a broader population than is properly certified for access,
> there is no mechanism for further protection of the encrypted data in the
> blob.
>
> Given the statistics on the failings of human beings, one must expect that
> a certain number of breaches will inevitably happen over time.  And, we
> will not know about many of them (if they are contained to private but
> uncertified entities).
>
> In the May 2 call, it was suggested that perhaps there could be multiple
> keys. so that a single public breach does not open up the entire set of all
> blobs to public access (or at least to unauthorized access).
>
> Can you explain how a topology of multiple keys might work?  How many blobs
> would a single key provide access to, and do different LEAs get different
> keys or do they all share the same key(s)?
>
> It seemed to me that the simplest case was that a single key would provide
> access to all blobs across all registrars.  In the opposite extreme, each
> blob would be uniquely encrypted for each individual real-time query, but
> then distribution of keys would be a major undertaking, and one may as well
> set up a password-access database system anyway.
>
> One particular concern I have is that some wealthy entity that wants to do
> data mining could build up a database that combines both unencrypted as
> well as encrypted data, and simply await an opportunity to acquire a key or
> keys to be able to decrypt the blobs that are stored in an integrated
> database.  If a single key would unlock all encrypted data in that
> database, then that key would become quite valuable, and that increases the
> incentive (and thus the chance) of a breach in return for quite substantial
> payment under the table.  This seems to constitute a sort of "time bomb"
> given the potential for a single breach across the full realm of certified
> individuals in all LEAs assigned access across the globe.
>
> This would almost be worse than a fully public breach, because it would
> presumably be mostly unknown, and it would place such wealthy entities at a
> great advantage in gaining unauthorized access.
>
> So, while this scheme would seem to work as long as everyone with access
> behaves properly, I would suggest that we need to consider the real
> potentials for breaches and what the ramifications would be in such cases.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Dan
>
> PS -- Today you pointed out that with this scheme there would be no trace
> of specific use of the keys to gain access to specific data.  However, if
> indeed there is consideration of Bertrand's suggestion of creating an
> individualized audit trail of queries into the private data in order to
> provide post-facto accountability for data use, this might present an
> impediment to enforcement of any laws against abuse of the privileged data
> by particular individuals, including those legitimately certified for
> access initially.

Regards,
--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
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