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RE: [gnso-acc-sgb] Focusing on access proposals
- To: <gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: RE: [gnso-acc-sgb] Focusing on access proposals
- From: "Natris, Wout de" <W.deNatris@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 15 May 2007 16:56:51 +0200
Dear all,
Milton's analyses is correct. There is a difference between a procedure
in preventing damage to companies and costumers and an investigation of
a case with all the leads that come up on as well as off line in order
to prosecute.
Palmer c.s. need information and/or a procedure in order to shut down a
(fraud)site. Probably and unfortunately we have to face the fact that
most phishers or copyists are not going to be arrested. But, if we
manage to take away their economic incentive, being income, they will
take their business elsewhere. OPTA managed to do so with sms fraud
"congratulations you won XX. Call this PRS number". OPTA was not able to
issue a single fine on sms spam, the spammers being abroad, but by
having the Dutch PRS numbers closed down by the operator within hours of
the first complaints, their business case came to an end. Sms spammers
are still spamming the rest of Europe, but since January 2005 the
Netherlands has seen the last of it. 7 months after the anti spam law
came in place.
For banks, etc. the focus should be on taking away the economic
incentives or at least frustrate the income of the phishers/fraudsters
or have it taken away by an agreement with the government or their ISP.
After that criminal investigations can start.
In short different levels of access are to be proposed here.
Regards,
Wout
-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
Van: owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx]
Namens Milton Mueller
Verzonden: zaterdag 12 mei 2007 7:04
Aan: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
Onderwerp: [gnso-acc-sgb] Focusing on access proposals
I am deliberately restricting this post to sgb, the access group.
>>> "Palmer Hamilton" <PalmerHamilton@xxxxxxxxxxx> 5/11/2007 2:44:00 PM
>>>
>For example, one of my banks had a case in which it had to use local
>police in a foreign country to visit the physical address of the
>website owner to get the site taken down.
Palmer: To make progress, we need to tie all these arguments to specific
access proposals. Otherwise we're just beating each other over the head
with the same arguments we've been making for years.
The biggest problem I have with your argument here, is that its seems to
be based on the premise of the need for unlimited access to all Whois
data. It does not do anything to tell us who access should be restricted
to and how it should be restricted.
And that is the conversation we are supposed to be having.
A good aspect of your bank proposal was that it seemed to identify a
specific third party, governmentally chartered banks, which could be
easily certified as such. But it also seemed to imply that banks should
have the same unlimited access to all whois records as they do now, and
to put banks on the same par with LEAs.
But banks are not alone in being subject to internet abuse. In fact,
almost any industrial sector that deals with information could have
similar problems. And so could individuals for that matter. So just as
you make a "special" claim for banks, so could others make a special
claim for trademark owners, e-commerce companies, etc., etc. and since
they are subject to abuse as well there is no basis for a distinction.
If providing open access to Whois data only meant that it was used
exclusively for fighting abuses, we wouldn't be having this debate.
Everything would be simple. what you seem to be overlooking is that in
order to get access to pursue the .01% of Internet users or domains that
are problematic, you are by definition opening up the other 99.99% to
the data harvesting and unlimited use by anyone, for any purpose.
Obviously, a complete open access solution is not a proportionate, just
or effective response to the problems you identify. This just seems so
obvious to me.
We have to talk about restrictions on access. And we have to design
those restrictions in a way that optimially filters out the potential
for abuse of openness while efficiently providing access when it is
needed.
As long as discussion proceeds on the presumption that open access to
whois data is a desirable and possible thing, we will make no progress.
Even those who favor the status quo must realize that there are growing
legal and business factors that render it nonviable.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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