Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] query-screening paradigm
- To: <gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] query-screening paradigm
- From: "Carole Bird" <Carole.Bird@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 26 May 2007 08:25:47 -0400
When you say "LEA-operated system" what do you have in mind? My concern here
is that, as we discussed at the last teleconference, there are countries where
LEAs are not legally allowed to "pass-on" or distribute information from
someone else's database unless the LEA is itself conducting an investigation
into the matter. Even then, the LEA may not be able to "pass-on" the
information but only use it for it's only police investigation.
Also could you clarify what your definition of an Affidavit is? (I don't want
to assume that it is the same definition everywhere or that the elements of an
affidavit are the same everywhere.)
>>> Dan Krimm <dan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> 05/25/07 10:54 PM >>>
Not sure if I fully understand the question re "institution by institution
basis" but let me guess -- I would suggest that non-LEA query eligibility
be certified and verified for individual natural persons at appropriate
individual institutions for specific "purpose domains" appropriate to the
individual institution's legitimate need to obtain instances of the private
And then of course, individual queries from eligible account holders would
go through the application procedure as described. So to reiterate, this
is a two-stage process:
(1) Certify/verify individuals' eligibility to make queries through the
LEA-operated system for certain instances of private Whois information.
Institutional affiliation will certainly be of some importance here.
(Review certification periodically, perhaps roughly annually. That
periodicity is open to comment, IMHO, but I think a one-time cert would not
be sufficient. Also, when individuals leave positions where performing
such queries are in their job descriptions, their certifications must be
(2) Case-specific affidavit/application process with well-defined approval
protocols allowed for eligible accounts in the system, with fully
individualized audit trail.
More detailed criteria need to be defined as to whom would qualify to be
certified for query eligibility, but I'm not sure that institutions or
industries as a *category* would necessarily be certified as a group,
though membership in a group whose members typically satisfy the criteria
would probably indicate that approval for certification would be likely.
But I would not suggest defining "eligible groups" so much as certify
"eligible individuals in individual eligible institutions" according to
specific demonstrated need.
I see no need for institution-*type*-based categorization, as in Susan's
proposal. I think it would be better to proceed directly from actual
need-based criteria, and define those needs as clearly as we can.
Frankly, I think the question deserves further exploration. Nevertheless,
my own instinct is not to create an unnecessary layer of potentially
spurious categorization that will confuse the accuracy of the certification
process. Legitimacy should be based on the specific use/need, not the
"type" of institution, I think. This keeps the process closer to "due
process" which is the aim here.
At 8:58 PM -0500 5/25/07, jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>Dr. Dierker, Dan and all,
> I like Dans approach here as it gives third parties what they need while
>reasonable privacy protection, and anti spaming/reverse phishing.
> The only part of what Dan is recomending is is what he is proposing on a
>institution by insititution basis or broader, i.e. all whom may apply? Dan,
>can you clarify that?
>From: Hugh Dierker
>Sent: May 25, 2007 7:43 PM
>To: Dan Krimm , gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] query-screening paradigm
>Yes it will take some effort to get this set up but it should be implemented.
>The extreme bottom line on this is that it leads an accountability paper
>trail and then can be checked later if something ontoward happens with the
>data. Of course there is no way to tell for sure in most instances.
>It is important to realize that "you cannot legislate morality" and "any
>law is made to be broken" With this type of safegaurd I am in favor of
>third party access.
>The idea is not to make it impossible, which you cannot do anyway as
>courts have something to say about it. It is to make access accountable
>and not bulk and safe enough to keep mass abuse from occurring.
>Dan Krimm <dan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>At 12:58 PM -0500 5/25/07, wrote:
>>I wouldn't be opposed to the idea of some type of "pre-screening"
>>process for private companies to be able to access the protected data
>>for anti-fraud efforts, but this would need to be done on a one-time
>>basis or maybe on some time of bi-annual renewal basis instead of every
>>time the company has to investigate a fraud. Many of these large
>>companies like Bank of America are the target of a phishing attack
>>multiple times each day. It's not unusual for them to be working 25-50
>>separate and distinct fraudulent sites in a given day. If they needed
>>to go through a "screening" process each time, it would be extremely
>>detrimental to the anti-fraud efforts.
>Okay, seems that it may be worth putting this idea out there in more
>detail, at this juncture.
>What I imagined possibly happening was: (1) a certification process to
>designate an entity to be eligible to query for private Whois data (i.e.,
>to approve the establishment of a verified account in a system operated by
>LEAs), and then (2) a case-specific application process to get data for
>As long as the query-screening process is well-defined so that all
>requirements for approval of the query are known beforehand in an explicit
>protocol that is available to all certified entities, then I think it need
>not impose an onerous time cost on the query process.
>Provide the evidence of wrongdoing (that has to come to one's attention
>somehow, so it should be readily at hand), state the purpose to be confined
>to addressing that specific wrongdoing, identify an individual (a natural
>person) at the entity who is responsible for use of the data (or perhaps
>individualize the certified accounts up front) -- something along those
>If the evidence checks out (i.e., the statement of purpose matches the
>operative URL(s) in the evidence -- perhaps a domain in the extended header
>in a forwarded phishing email, or an independent browser retrieval from a
>pharming URL), then approval could even be essentially automatic at the
>LEAs (perhaps even algorithmically programmable in a SW application without
>explicit human intervention, providing a report of automatic approvals to
>the LEAs, as all applications and approved queries through the LEA
>authority would presumably be fully logged in an audit trail -- this could
>address Margie's scalability issues).
>A single query application could designate a request for private Whois data
>for all domains for a single registrant, if appropriate -- where it makes
>sense, there need not be a strict single-domain-only constraint, while not
>extending to full unrestricted access.
>Then upon approval, the actual private data would be retrieved by the LEA
>and provided to the private entity as requested (if under the operation of
>a SW-driven system where the affidavit of purpose can be structured with an
>input form, this presumably could often be completed without human
>Bottom line: there are ways this could be streamlined while still providing
>an initial query-screening step with some substance. Granted, this would
>be distinctly imperfect as compared with strong due process before an
>independent judiciary (that's why going this far would already be a very
>significant compromise from the privacy advocacy standpoint) partly because
>it may be possible to falsify data in a query application (such as
>providing a falsified phishing email as evidence), but a full and permanent
>audit trail would provide some additional deterrent on top of that, as any
>falsification could come back to haunt the individual falsifier personally,
>as well as the legal person s/he represents.
>That is, in order for post-facto deterrence to be significantly effective,
>the audit trail has to be robust and independently controlled. That's what
>the query-screening step would basically be for. If you are following the
>well-defined protocol, I don't see that this has to be significantly
>time-consuming. If not, then the post-facto punishment may actually have
>enough teeth to serve as deterrence that constitutes more than just talk
>with a little nudge-nudge-wink-wink, times being what they are.
>I would like to ask Bertrand in the case of .fr Afnic Whois that he
>recently posted to the full WG list, how does access to privately withheld
>Whois data work? That might provide us with another model in addition to
>the Dutch Govcert process for comparison. The more working precedents we
>have to consider, the better.
>Jeffrey A. Williams
>Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
>"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
> Abraham Lincoln
>"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
>often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
>"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
>depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
>P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
>United States v. Carroll Towing (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
>CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security IDNS. div. of
>Information Network Eng. INEG. INC.
>ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 E-Mail jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Registered Email addr with the USPS Contact Number: 214-244-4827