Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] query-screening paradigm

["Palmer Hamilton" <PalmerHamilton@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Dan,

There may be a way to ceate a system along the lines you suggest.  I think it 
is worth further exploration.

In terms of banks, it would seem that bank regulators, as far as access for 
banks, would be the logical entities to perform the role you envision of LEAs.

In that regard, let me address some concern that has been expressed.  Bank 
regulators are not private sector entities.  They are governmental entities, 
just like LEAs.  In fact, if an LEA is defined as Milton defined it the other 
day in our conference cal, bank regulators would be LEAs.  

If members of our subgroup have any questions about bank regulators, I would be 
happy to address them.

Carole's point is certainly an issue, though, in terms of our developing a 
workable plan.  I imagine there could be some resistance by the regulators to 
their assuming the role you suggest.  Also, it might take legislation.  This is 
something that will take some research.  But I think your proposal is certainly 
worth further consideration.  

Thanks, Palmer




-----Original Message-----
From: owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx <owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx>
To: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx <gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Sat May 26 15:56:14 2007
Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] query-screening paradigm

Carole,

Are there alternative provisions in those national laws for certain kinds
of data delivery, perhaps by judiciary rather than law enforcement?

Perhaps there is a modification that can be made in those cases, to have
judiciary operate the platform instead of LEAs.

Or, perhaps in those countries the law enforcement should do all the actual
law enforcement, and maybe the privacy laws should be respected and
non-LEAs should not be conducting private investigations in the first
place.  Each nation is a unique case study in the end.

Bottom line, let's look at the details and aim to design a way to make it
work, with some sort of query-screening due process and an audit trail.
This is really all about accommodating legitimate needs while retaining
some meaningful preventative accountability along the way.

The access platform proposed here could be used by LEAs simply as a tool
for greater efficiency within the LEAs, kind of like the Dutch web site to
submit fraudulent emails that Wout pointed us to.  That is, non-LEAs could
submit evidence to LEAs to get LEAs to investigate them.

And ultimately, if things don't quite add up in a country here and there,
can't we suggest that the responsibility rests with that country to get its
act together?  We can't fix all of the world's problems from inside ICANN.
Let's make the best good-faith effort we can, but let's not take on all the
imperfections of the globe on our shoulders unilaterally.

Dan



At 11:43 AM -0400 5/26/07, Carole Bird wrote:
>Hi Eric,
>
>Let me clarify the point as I think I didn't articulate it well.
>
>In one of the email exchanges,  I believe that someone indicated that one
>of the options might be for 3rd parties to request information from the
>WHOIS database from LEAs.  The LEA may not legally be allowed to provide
>the information to the 3rd party - I'm not saying there is anything wrong
>with that ( I agree that it protects privacy, etc ) nor am I say the law
>should be changed.
>
>What I'm saying is that if we are looking at a proposed option based on
>the premise that police or an LEA could act as a conduit for access to the
>information particularly where there may not be a concurrent investigation
>by the police or the LEA, the premise for that option may be flawed.  We
>may be asking LEAs to do something they simply cannot do.
>
>Carole
>
>>>> Hugh Dierker <hdierker2204@xxxxxxxxx> 05/26/07 10:56 AM >>>
>Interesting points here Carole. The first one is just life. And it is
>further the result of each autonomous governments right to secure the
>privacy of its citizens.But the way I understand it, it is the 3rd party
>passing on the info to the LEA that is important. And certainly if it
>first flowed in one direction it can then flow back.
>
>  The second is the same, each country will have to decide what an
>affidavit is. For instance I believe some still require an oath to God.
>Most just want who, what, when, where and how with reasonable specificity
>and an oath that it is true. More often they are called by their more
>descriptive name "declaration".
>
>  Bare Bones is a term I like and should be the standard for recipients.
>Operators of Whois data basis should have a norm minimum requirement from
>here.
>
>  Eric
>
>Carole Bird <Carole.Bird@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>  Hi Dan,
>
>When you say "LEA-operated system" what do you have in mind? My concern
>here is that, as we discussed at the last teleconference, there are
>countries where LEAs are not legally allowed to "pass-on" or distribute
>information from someone else's database unless the LEA is itself
>conducting an investigation into the matter. Even then, the LEA may not be
>able to "pass-on" the information but only use it for it's only police
>investigation.
>
>Also could you clarify what your definition of an Affidavit is? (I don't
>want to assume that it is the same definition everywhere or that the
>elements of an affidavit are the same everywhere.)
>
>Thanks,
>
>Carole.
>
>
>
>>>> Dan Krimm 05/25/07 10:54 PM >>>
>Jeff,
>
>Not sure if I fully understand the question re "institution by institution
>basis" but let me guess -- I would suggest that non-LEA query eligibility
>be certified and verified for individual natural persons at appropriate
>individual institutions for specific "purpose domains" appropriate to the
>individual institution's legitimate need to obtain instances of the private
>Whois information.
>
>And then of course, individual queries from eligible account holders would
>go through the application procedure as described. So to reiterate, this
>is a two-stage process:
>
>(1) Certify/verify individuals' eligibility to make queries through the
>LEA-operated system for certain instances of private Whois information.
>Institutional affiliation will certainly be of some importance here.
>(Review certification periodically, perhaps roughly annually. That
>periodicity is open to comment, IMHO, but I think a one-time cert would not
>be sufficient. Also, when individuals leave positions where performing
>such queries are in their job descriptions, their certifications must be
>removed immediately.)
>
>(2) Case-specific affidavit/application process with well-defined approval
>protocols allowed for eligible accounts in the system, with fully
>individualized audit trail.
>
>
>More detailed criteria need to be defined as to whom would qualify to be
>certified for query eligibility, but I'm not sure that institutions or
>industries as a *category* would necessarily be certified as a group,
>though membership in a group whose members typically satisfy the criteria
>would probably indicate that approval for certification would be likely.
>But I would not suggest defining "eligible groups" so much as certify
>"eligible individuals in individual eligible institutions" according to
>specific demonstrated need.
>
>I see no need for institution-*type*-based categorization, as in Susan's
>proposal. I think it would be better to proceed directly from actual
>need-based criteria, and define those needs as clearly as we can.
>
>Frankly, I think the question deserves further exploration. Nevertheless,
>my own instinct is not to create an unnecessary layer of potentially
>spurious categorization that will confuse the accuracy of the certification
>process. Legitimacy should be based on the specific use/need, not the
>"type" of institution, I think. This keeps the process closer to "due
>process" which is the aim here.
>
>Dan
>
>
>
>At 8:58 PM -0500 5/25/07, jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>>Dr. Dierker, Dan and all,
>>
>> I like Dans approach here as it gives third parties what they need while
>>also giving
>>reasonable privacy protection, and anti spaming/reverse phishing.
>>
>> The only part of what Dan is recomending is is what he is proposing on a
>>institution by insititution basis or broader, i.e. all whom may apply? Dan,
>>can you clarify that?
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Hugh Dierker
>>Sent: May 25, 2007 7:43 PM
>>To: Dan Krimm , gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>>Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] query-screening paradigm
>>
>>Yes it will take some effort to get this set up but it should be implemented.
>>The extreme bottom line on this is that it leads an accountability paper
>>trail and then can be checked later if something ontoward happens with the
>>data. Of course there is no way to tell for sure in most instances.
>>
>>It is important to realize that "you cannot legislate morality" and "any
>>law is made to be broken" With this type of safegaurd I am in favor of
>>third party access.
>>
>>The idea is not to make it impossible, which you cannot do anyway as
>>courts have something to say about it. It is to make access accountable
>>and not bulk and safe enough to keep mass abuse from occurring.
>>
>>Dan Krimm wrote:
>>
>>At 12:58 PM -0500 5/25/07, wrote:
>>
>>>I wouldn't be opposed to the idea of some type of "pre-screening"
>>>process for private companies to be able to access the protected data
>>>for anti-fraud efforts, but this would need to be done on a one-time
>>>basis or maybe on some time of bi-annual renewal basis instead of every
>>>time the company has to investigate a fraud. Many of these large
>>>companies like Bank of America are the target of a phishing attack
>>>multiple times each day. It's not unusual for them to be working 25-50
>>>separate and distinct fraudulent sites in a given day. If they needed
>>>to go through a "screening" process each time, it would be extremely
>>>detrimental to the anti-fraud efforts.
>>
>>
>>Okay, seems that it may be worth putting this idea out there in more
>>detail, at this juncture.
>>
>>What I imagined possibly happening was: (1) a certification process to
>>designate an entity to be eligible to query for private Whois data (i.e.,
>>to approve the establishment of a verified account in a system operated by
>>LEAs), and then (2) a case-specific application process to get data for
>>specific queries.
>>
>>As long as the query-screening process is well-defined so that all
>>requirements for approval of the query are known beforehand in an explicit
>>protocol that is available to all certified entities, then I think it need
>>not impose an onerous time cost on the query process.
>>
>>Provide the evidence of wrongdoing (that has to come to one's attention
>>somehow, so it should be readily at hand), state the purpose to be confined
>>to addressing that specific wrongdoing, identify an individual (a natural
>>person) at the entity who is responsible for use of the data (or perhaps
>>individualize the certified accounts up front) -- something along those
>>lines.
>>
>>If the evidence checks out (i.e., the statement of purpose matches the
>>operative URL(s) in the evidence -- perhaps a domain in the extended header
>>in a forwarded phishing email, or an independent browser retrieval from a
>>pharming URL), then approval could even be essentially automatic at the
>>LEAs (perhaps even algorithmically programmable in a SW application without
>>explicit human intervention, providing a report of automatic approvals to
>>the LEAs, as all applications and approved queries through the LEA
>>authority would presumably be fully logged in an audit trail -- this could
>>address Margie's scalability issues).
>>
>>A single query application could designate a request for private Whois data
>>for all domains for a single registrant, if appropriate -- where it makes
>>sense, there need not be a strict single-domain-only constraint, while not
>>extending to full unrestricted access.
>>
>>Then upon approval, the actual private data would be retrieved by the LEA
>>and provided to the private entity as requested (if under the operation of
>>a SW-driven system where the affidavit of purpose can be structured with an
>>input form, this presumably could often be completed without human
>>intervention).
>>
>>Bottom line: there are ways this could be streamlined while still providing
>>an initial query-screening step with some substance. Granted, this would
>>be distinctly imperfect as compared with strong due process before an
>>independent judiciary (that's why going this far would already be a very
>>significant compromise from the privacy advocacy standpoint) partly because
>>it may be possible to falsify data in a query application (such as
>>providing a falsified phishing email as evidence), but a full and permanent
>>audit trail would provide some additional deterrent on top of that, as any
>>falsification could come back to haunt the individual falsifier personally,
>>as well as the legal person s/he represents.
>>
>>That is, in order for post-facto deterrence to be significantly effective,
>>the audit trail has to be robust and independently controlled. That's what
>>the query-screening step would basically be for. If you are following the
>>well-defined protocol, I don't see that this has to be significantly
>>time-consuming. If not, then the post-facto punishment may actually have
>>enough teeth to serve as deterrence that constitutes more than just talk
>>with a little nudge-nudge-wink-wink, times being what they are.
>>
>>
>>I would like to ask Bertrand in the case of .fr Afnic Whois that he
>>recently posted to the full WG list, how does access to privately withheld
>>Whois data work? That might provide us with another model in addition to
>>the Dutch Govcert process for comparison. The more working precedents we
>>have to consider, the better.
>>
>>Thanks,
>>Dan
>>
>>
>>Regards,
>>
>>Jeffrey A. Williams
>>Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
>>"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
>> Abraham Lincoln
>>
>>"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
>>often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
>>
>>"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
>>depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
>>P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
>>United States v. Carroll Towing (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
>>===============================================================
>>Updated 1/26/04
>>CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security IDNS. div. of
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>
>
>
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