RE: [gnso-consensus-wg] Nom Comm appointee roles

["Gomes, Chuck" <cgomes@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I would like to know which NomCom appointee has tended to vote similarly
to business users.  I hadn't noticed a trend like that but wasn't really
looking for it either.  Maybe it is clear from Alan's message that I
have not read yet.
 
I do not understand the logic of saying "To make the case for the
specific value of a Nomcom presence, you would have to show that Nomcom
appointees _as a group_ coalesced with different constituencies or
groups of constituencies in strategic ways to overcome deadlocks or push
the outcome in a specific direction. I don't see that."  It seems to
assume a couple of things that do not appear to me to be correct; in
particular, it seems to assume that : 1) the only value nomcom reps add
is to overcome deadlocks; 2) overcoming deadlocks can only happen if the
nomcom reps coalesce as a group in agreement with a constituency or
group of constituencies.  Regarding 1), the nomcom reps add excellent
value in providing perspectives that may be unique from constituency
views and in some cases providing expertise that others on the Council
do not have.  With regard to 2), if the nomcom reps are indeed
independent as I believe the NomCom intends when they select them, I
would expect that it would not be at all uncommon for them to diverge
rather than converge in their views, and the fact that they have not in
some cases is a good sign.
 
Chuck


________________________________

        From: owner-gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Milton L Mueller
        Sent: Sunday, July 13, 2008 7:13 PM
        To: Alan Greenberg; gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx
        Subject: RE: [gnso-consensus-wg] Nom Comm appointee roles
        
        

        Alan:

        Anyone familiar with the specific personalities of the Nomcom
appointees covered by your chart knows that one of them tends to vote
similarly to NCUC and another tends to vote with the business users. 

         

        So tell me: how is having Nomcom appointees on the Council any
different from having one more Noncommercial vote and one more
Commercial vote? 

         

        To make the case for the specific value of a Nomcom presence,
you would have to show that Nomcom appointees _as a group_ coalesced
with different constituencies or groups of constituencies in strategic
ways to overcome deadlocks or push the outcome in a specific direction.
I don't see that. 

         

        
________________________________


        From: owner-gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg
        Sent: Sunday, July 13, 2008 5:27 PM
        To: gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx
        Subject: RE: [gnso-consensus-wg] Nom Comm appointee roles

         

        ALthough I agree with Tony that putting labels on groups is
likely to lead to problemes in many cases, I don't agree with his
conclusions. In particular, I don't understand 

        "Please don't lose sight of the fact that one of the
consequences of weighted voting was that if any one of the IP, BC or
ISPs ever voted separately, then they all lost!" 

        If they voted separately, they the both could not have lost!
        
        To try to understand the voting patterns better, I extracted the
28 non-unanimous votes from Olof's chart (only 27 of them were
hi-lighted in yellow) and colour coded them showing cases where there
were split votes within a constituency, and indicating if the
constituency won (has majority voting with the winning side). 
        
        Several interesting things. There are not a lot of split votes
within constituencies, the largest exception being the NomCom
appointees. Also interesting is that Registrars, despite their weighted
votes, lost almost half the time. I will let others reach their own
conclusions.
        
        The totals of who voted with who are a bit different from
Olof's, but not to a great extent. I'm sure there are some errors in
this colour coding, but interesting none-the-less.
        
        Alan
        
        
        At 13/07/2008 04:15 PM, tony.ar.holmes@xxxxxx wrote:
        
        
        

        For my part I've always struggled with the notion that the
nomcom should
        ever contemplate that their role is as a 'tie breaker' (where
did that
        come from?) I don't believe it was ever posited that way when
the
        initial approach was floated. All constituencies have equal
ability to
        be a tie breaker.
        
        If that is the way this is now envisaged then both the
nominating
        process and the criteria needs drastic amendment. Perhaps
there's a case
        that the noncom ONLY vote whenever there is a tie on a major
issues?
        
        However I also struggle with the notion that the other parts of
the GNSO
        fall in to two clear categories; contracted parties and
consumers.
        Sticking broad labels on those groups is one of the biggest
        misconceptions within ICANN. So far the IPC, BC and ISPs have
been
        called 'providers', 'IP Interest Group' and now linking with
both the
        NCUC and ALAC we all become 'consumers'. Its also worth saying
that not
        only have these terms been adopted by some parties when it suits
their
        interest, they're also dropped just as quickly when it suits as
well.
        The change in terminology used within the BCG process being a
prime
        example. The term 'providers' was dropped liked a hot brick
after it was
        repeatedly pointed out that the ISPs even have the word
'provider' in
        their name.
        
        The first step is to recognise there are separate and diverse
grouping
        within the GNSO. Attempting to put all the Constituencies in to
two
        groups except for the nomcom or 'the tie breakers' is a nonsense
and it
        isn't supported by the data either as Steve points out. Please
don't
        lose sight of the fact that one of the consequences of weighted
voting
        was that if any one of the IP, BC or ISPs ever voted separately,
then
        they all lost! Hardly an incentive, unless there was a very
strong case
        to do so.
        
        Tony
        
        -----Original Message-----
        From: owner-gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx
        [ mailto:owner-gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx
<mailto:owner-gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx> ] On Behalf Of Avri Doria
        Sent: 13 July 2008 18:09
        To: gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx
        Subject: Re: [gnso-consensus-wg] Nom Comm appointee roles 
        
        
        Hi,
        
        I do not agree with the conclusions you draw from your analysis.
        
        The main point is the nomcom provides the possibility for a tie
breaker
        should the vote break along the contracted party - consumer
lines.  And
        I believe this is necessary.
        
        I also do not agree the it is sufficient to give the nomcom's
outside
        voice a seat at the table while disenfranchising that voice.  I
believe
        that vote is critical in keeping the policy process from
becoming, or
        looking like, a trust of insiders who are constantly trading
advantage.
        I also believe that the logic that dictates that outside voices
are
        legally necessary in the Board's decisions also pertains in the
policy
        recommendation stage - especially since the GNSO can force by
its
        supermajority, the board into a supermajority voting
requirement.
        
        a.
        
        On 11 Jul 2008, at 18:05, Metalitz, Steven wrote:
        
        >
        > Reflecting on our useful discussion yesterday re role of Nom
Comm 
        > appointees to the GNSO council:
        > One reason given was a tie-breaking role in voting.  I went
back and 
        > looked at the "GNSO Council voting patterns 2005-2008"
document 
        > prepared by staff in Paris.  Of the "28 voting events taken by
roll 
        > call and showing identifiable votes per constituency, where
the 
        > outcome was not unanimous" (these were the shaded entries in
the 
        > document), I did not find any which would have been tie votes
but for 
        > the votes cast by Nom Comm appointees.
        > I did find two votes out of 28 in which (if I counted
correctly) the 
        > Nom Comm appointee votes created a 2/3 majority of those
voting which 
        > would not otherwise have existed.  Neither of these involved a

        > recommendation being sent to the Board where the presence of a
2/3 
        > supermajority on the Council would have made a difference. One
was a 
        > vote on whether to send a letter regarding travel funding (3
Jan 08); 
        > the other was a vote on one of the two proposed formulations
of the 
        > purpose of Whois, which was intended to guide future work on
policy 
        > development but not (at that
        > point) to be sent to the Board (12 April 06).
        > It is always possible that councillors changed the votes they
would 
        > otherwise have cast to avoid having the Nom Comm appointees
break a 
        > tie.
        > I don't know any examples of that; perhaps some of the council
members
        
        > on this list do.
        > I found the council voting patterns chart a bit hard to follow
(you 
        > need to double the votes in the first two columns to account
for 
        > weighted voting, abstentions are not noted, etc.) and I
certainly 
        > might have miscounted, so I would welcome anyone else checking
my 
        > work, but what I saw suggests that the tie-breaking role of
Nom Comm 
        > appointees has not been significant, at least for the past
four years.
        > This leaves the role of these appointees in "bringing new
voices" to 
        > the table, or in providing expertise that the Council needs
but that 
        > constituency reps cannot provide.  As we discussed to some
extent 
        > yesterday, if these roles are important, we should consider
whether 
        > they can be fulfilled in other ways, such as through
representation of
        
        > At-Large on the Council, or through appointed experts who
could serve 
        > on the council in a non-voting capacity.
        >
        > Steve
        >
        > -
        >
        >