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[gnso-dt-wg] Rework of motion
- To: "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@xxxxxxxxx>, <gnso-dt-wg@xxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [gnso-dt-wg] Rework of motion
- From: "Rosette, Kristina" <krosette@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2008 09:49:58 -0500
Thanks, Alan.
AG: Now for future suggestion. We launched the PDP with a
supermajority vote (even though it wasn't needed), and I would really
like to see any result adopted that way as well. It will make it much
harder to the Board to fiddle with or more likely just toss it back to
Council.
KR: I agree that it would be preferable to have a supermajority.
Having said that, this is - for once - an issue on which I believe we
have a majority even if the Registries and Registrars all vote "no."
Given the global interest in and concern about this issue at the
community, business and governmental levels, I personally would be
stunned if the Board would reject a policy recommendation that is
intended to stop tasting.
AG: I believe that the addition, currently in square brackets requiring
reporting of exceptions is going to make it very to pass. The regular
report will already show the number of AGP deletes and net adds. So
exceptions (or non-free adds) will stick out like a sore thumb. Do we
really wasn't to push for report?
KR: Yes. I strongly believe that any exception to the application of
consensus policy - and that is what we're talking about, not just
contractual terms - must be transparent and documented. Registrants are
entitled to know if registrars are seeking exemptions, if registries are
granting them, and for the granted ones - why.
AG: Despite the many negative comments, I think that we have done
sufficient consultation.
KR: I agree.
AG: On the other hand, I am not at all sure that we have sufficiently
listened to it. Specifically, the very strong registry statement that
they could not support a one-size-fits-all approach, which is what we
produced.
KR: Consensus policy is a one-size-fits-all approach. There's no way
around that. Dealing with this issue on a
per-registry-contractual-amendment-basis will not solve the problem
(unless VeriSign steps up and I'm not holding my breath on that one). I
keep reminding myself that we've potentially got 900 new gTLDs -- all of
which will be ripe for tasting - coming down the pike.
AG: Specifically, our approach penalizes PIR who have already took
measures against tasting, and would surely do so again if their current
change proved ineffective.
KR: Can you elaborate on this point? How does it penalize them?
AG: We are also assuming the since 10% was a good fit for NeuStar and
Afilias (by their own admission), the it is a good fit for VeriSign
(perhaps it is, but I don't know).
KR: I've never wanted 10% but agreed in the spirit of compromise. I do
not understand how we can have a % in a consensus policy and not have it
apply across the board.
AG: I like the approach that Mike suggested at the Thursday Council
meeting (which was met with no enthusiasm, perhaps because of the entire
AGP elimination alternative). What if we make this motional apply only
to registries that do not already have "effective"
mechanisms in place to combat/eliminate domain tasting? This would
exempt PIR, and presumably NeuStar and Afilias. It lets other registries
and particularly VeriSign pick their own tasting poisin, but with the
requirement that it be demonstrably effective? Obviously we would need
to craft the "effective mechanisms" statement carefully. One thing I
like about this idea is that it is addressing tasting, not just the AGP,
which could be effective at prohibiting a registry that want registrars
to taste (using preferential pricing perhaps) from doing so.
KR: I am interested in how we can make this work without having
loopholes or too many details.
AG: Lastly on a less substantive issue, I think the motion would be
stronger it had far fewer Whereas's. Perhaps an opinion not shared.
KR: No strong feelings. Given the context in which we put this
forward, I thought it appropriate to have the full recitation.
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-gnso-dt-wg@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-gnso-dt-wg@xxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Alan Greenberg
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 10:23 PM
To: gnso-dt-wg@xxxxxxxxx
Subject: [gnso-dt-wg] Rework of motion
Here is the revised draft. I do not believe that I have changed the
intent of it at all. I did make one change to the 5th Whereas, which I
believe was in error, and I reworded the body of the motion to make it
clear that it only applies to those contracts that include an AGP , to
include the onerous details of the exception, and to remove the
suggested contract wording.
Now for future suggestion. We launched the PDP with a supermajority
vote (even though it wasn't needed), and I would really like to see any
result adopted that way as well. It will make it much harder to the
Board to fiddle with or more likely just toss it back to Council.
- I believe that the addition, currently in square brackets requiring
reporting of exceptions is going to make it very to pass. The regular
report will already show the number of AGP deletes and net adds. So
exceptions (or non-free adds) will stick out like a sore thumb. Do we
really wasn't to push for report?
- Despite the many negative comments, I think that we have done
sufficient consultation. On the other hand, I am not at all sure that we
have sufficiently listened to it. Specifically, the very strong registry
statement that they could not support a one-size-fits-all approach,
which is what we produced. Specifically, our approach penalizes PIR who
have already took measures against tasting, and would surely do so again
if their current change proved ineffective.
We are also assuming the since 10% was a good fit for NeuStar and
Afilias (by their own admission), the it is a good fit for VeriSign
(perhaps it is, but I don't know).
- I like the approach that Mike suggested at the Thursday Council
meeting (which was met with no enthusiasm, perhaps because of the entire
AGP elimination alternative). What if we make this motional apply only
to registries that do not already have "effective"
mechanisms in place to combat/eliminate domain tasting? This would
exempt PIR, and presumably NeuStar and Afilias. It lets other registries
and particularly VeriSign pick their own tasting poisin, but with the
requirement that it be demonstrably effective? Obviously we would need
to craft the "effective mechanisms" statement carefully. One thing I
like about this idea is that it is addressing tasting, not just the AGP,
which could be effective at prohibiting a registry that want registrars
to taste (using preferential pricing
perhaps) from doing so.
- Lastly on a less substantive issue, I think the motion would be
stronger it had far fewer Whereas's. Perhaps an opinion not shared.
OK, I think that I have tossed out enough potentially unpopular ideas
for one e-mail.
Regards, Alan
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