<<<
Chronological Index
>>> <<<
Thread Index
>>>
[gnso-ff-pdp-may08] Comments: Category 3
- To: "Fast Flux Fast Flux" <gnso-ff-pdp-may08@xxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [gnso-ff-pdp-may08] Comments: Category 3
- From: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 05 May 2009 08:32:12 -0700
Team:
My approach to comment analysis is:
1. Read comment thoroughly, identify commenter's key positions.
2. Revisit FF Draft Report, and determine if this information is
already present, or represents unconsidered information.
2a. If already present, identify location.
2b. If not, suggest possible point of inclusion
3. Rinse, repeat.
------------------------------
Category 3:
------------------------------
3a: The root problems are compromised / unpatched personal machines on
the Internet and criminal behavior. These types of problems are not
fully addressed by technical solutions. Propose blacklist of infected
IP addresses, and an artificial delay between domain registration and
DNS activation. Possible whitelist of trusted individuals or IP
addresses
Recommendation:
Concepts are thoroughly discussed throughout the report, including
sections on Background and Discussion of the Charter Questions.
Blacklists are also discussed as a component of the Charter Questions
(registrar, registrant, and technical measures subsections).
*******
3b: Fast Flux has many legitimate uses, and any attempts to control its
use will negatively impact these, without having a positive impact on
criminal uses. Proposes various methods of employing and sharing
blacklists.
Recommendation:
Legitimate uses of Fast Flux are discussed, primarily in response to the
"Who Benefits" charter question. Blacklists are discussed as a
component of the Charter Questions (registrar, registrant, and technical
measures subsections)
*******
3c: This issue is an example of trying to address a use / application
issue by enforcing changes at the network layer. Critical applications
(banks and investments) employ unreliable security measures. Human
judgement will always be the weakest link in any chain of trust.
Recommendation:
Addressed in Section 7(a): "Challenges."
*******
3d: Commenter makes several points, including that Fast Flux is just
one aspect of the technical vulnerabilities of DNS, many of which are
outside the scope of ICANN. Fast Flux optimizes the use of a resource,
and mitigating it will only affect legitimate use, with little impact on
criminal behavior. The balance of the comment then offers insights on
previously submitted comments, and a recap of early WG activity.
Recommendation:
EBW was an early participant in the WG. As a result, many of his
comments are addressed, to some degree, in various places in the report.
Developing a technical response to mitigate criminal intent is covered
in Section 7(a), while questioning the scope of ICANN is mentioned in
Section 7(b). Legitimate uses are discussed in response to the "Who
Benefits?" charter question.
<<<
Chronological Index
>>> <<<
Thread Index
>>>
|