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Re: [gnso-impl-irtpc-rt] Outstanding Issue from today's IRT Call (email/account holder)

  • To: "Mike O'Connor" <mike@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Subject: Re: [gnso-impl-irtpc-rt] Outstanding Issue from today's IRT Call (email/account holder)
  • From: "Mike O'Connor" <mike@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 07:41:35 -0600

i finally circled back to this and realized that i wrote language that is 
almost as flawed as the original.

basically, this is a use case and i’m not sure actual policy language is 
required — since we didn’t specify how the exchange of credentials was 
accomplished. since this customer is doing both sides of the transaction within 
the same registrar, it seems to me that the “independently verifiable” angle 
kicks in. here is what i propose 

3.4 In the case where an Account Holder wishes to update an email address they 
can no longer access and thus cause a Change of Registrant, the exchange of the 
Change of Registrant Credential as described in section 3.2 must be transacted 
and validated through other verifiable means.

change of registrant does NOT include change of registrar (that’s the whole 
underlying point of splitting these processes apart) — so their registrar can 
develop whatever processes that are needed to facilitate the exchange of 
credentials.  clearly email as the medium of exchange won’t work in this use 
case, something else will be needed instead.  but registrars already have 
processes that they use to verify people’s identity when email isn’t available 
(Simonetta rattled a few off on the call but i’ve forgotten what they were).  
isn’t that all that’s required?

On Dec 12, 2014, at 9:33 AM, Mike O'Connor <mike@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> oops - i forgot to attach the revised draft too.
> 
> <Draft Change of Registrant Policy_11Dec-MO1.docx>
> 
> On Dec 12, 2014, at 9:26 AM, Mike O'Connor <mike@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
>> hi all,
>> 
>> here’s a first-try at the revision:
>> 
>> 3.4 The 60-day transfer lock will be required if an Account Holder updates 
>> their email address, thus effectively causing a Change of Registrant and 
>> simultaneously rendering impossible the exchange of the Change of Registrant 
>> Credential as described in section 3.2.   If the Account Holder wishes to 
>> opt out of the lock, they can validate the change of address through other 
>> verifiable means.
>> 
>> On Dec 11, 2014, at 7:22 PM, Caitlin Tubergen <caitlin.tubergen@xxxxxxxxx> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> Please find the draft COR policy attached and accept my apologies for a 
>>> double email.
>>> 
>>> Kind regards,
>>> 
>>> Caitlin 
>>> 
>>> From: Caitlin Tubergen <caitlin.tubergen@xxxxxxxxx>
>>> Date: Thursday, December 11, 2014 at 5:00 PM
>>> To: "gnso-impl-irtpc-rt@xxxxxxxxx" <gnso-impl-irtpc-rt@xxxxxxxxx>
>>> Subject: Outstanding Issue from today's IRT Call (email/account holder)
>>> 
>>> Hi, All,
>>> 
>>> Thank you to everyone who attended the call;  it was a very robust 
>>> discussion.
>>> 
>>> For those who were unable to attend, I have attached instructions on how to 
>>> listen to the recording.  
>>> 
>>> At the start of the call, I presented a scenario whereby a Prior Registrant 
>>> would be unable to ACK/affirm a Change of Registrant request (COR) request 
>>> because their email account no longer exists. (Perhaps they left their 
>>> company, university, etc.)  Similarly, if someone were to move and suddenly 
>>> have a new address, telephone, email address, ISP provider, it would be 
>>> impossible to ACK a COR via email, postal mail, phone, etc.  While this is 
>>> narrow use case, ICANN staff and the IRT are trying to ensure that we are 
>>> not creating an unworkable scenario where a Prior Registrant cannot update 
>>> his or her email address.  
>>> 
>>> Section 3.4 of the draft COR Policy would allow a registrant to log into 
>>> their account and update their information via their verified account.  
>>> This gets around the non-existent email address issue, but some have 
>>> expressed concerns about the risk of hijacking since resellers, hosting 
>>> providers, et. al., may be an account holder.  
>>> 
>>> ICANN staff is currently seeking solutions to the problem mentioned above.  
>>> Specifically, we are looking for alternative authentication methods besides 
>>> the exchange of pin. 
>>> 
>>> A couple of suggestions mentioned on the call include:
>>>     • FOAs for change of registrant.  (The Prior Registrant would receive 
>>> an informative FOA at its email address (listed in Whois) and if it doesn’t 
>>> contact the registrar within a certain number of days, the email change 
>>> would go through.)
>>>     • Alternative authentication depending on the type of registrant 
>>> change, i.e., a different authentication method could be used if the name 
>>> is staying in the same account rather than a “push” between accounts
>>> Please feel free to elaborate on the above or provide new suggestions 
>>> entirely.  We discussed the difficulty with the resolution of this 
>>> particular problem and how this may need to back to the GNSO for more 
>>> guidance if it cannot be resolved within the IRT, particularly since the 
>>> IRT is not a representative body of the ICANN community.
>>> 
>>> Please provide any suggestions to me by COB Thursday, 18 December.  Thank 
>>> you in advance for your feedback.  
>>> 
>>> Kind regards,
>>> 
>>> Caitlin 
>>> <Draft Change of Registrant Policy_11Dec.docx>
>> 
>> 
>> PHONE: 651-647-6109, FAX: 866-280-2356, WEB: www.haven2.com, HANDLE: 
>> OConnorStP (ID for Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.)
>> 
> 
> 
> PHONE: 651-647-6109, FAX: 866-280-2356, WEB: www.haven2.com, HANDLE: 
> OConnorStP (ID for Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.)
> 


PHONE: 651-647-6109, FAX: 866-280-2356, WEB: www.haven2.com, HANDLE: OConnorStP 
(ID for Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.)

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