

# No Change

The case for retaining the basic policy  
of registry minority investment and  
control in registrars

# Assumptions

- 500 or more applications
- 1 in 5 are “community-based”
- Failure during evaluation is 1 in 4 (higher for “standard”, particularly those in contention sets where only 1 in N can survive)

1 to 2 or more applications to contracted status per week, 4-8 per month, 12-24 per quarter.

# Caps and Cohorts

- If the cap is unchanged (11.2% to 15%, but use 15%), then a cohort of “registrar lacking registries” sufficient to form a registrar is formed each week.
- If the cap is changed to 5%, cohort formation takes a few weeks.
- If the cap is changed to 1%, cohort formation takes several quarters.

# Benefits of cap created cohorts

- First, no necessity for “exceptionalism”, all registries start in the competitive registry regime, even if with only one, shared, RAA registrar.
- Second, EPP drift (gratuitous warts) is not encouraged
- Third, factor of 7 (or  $\text{sizeof}(1/\text{Cap})$ ) reduction of registry-registrar relationship complexity

# Who's left out?

- Registries with exotic technical requirements
- Registries with exotic policy requirements
- Communities which are not capable of entering into a shared sales channel agreement

# Example 7 “linguistic & cultural”

- .scot
- .cym
- .bzh
- .gal
- .eos
- .quebec
- .nai

# Example 7 “municipal”

- .berlin
- .bcn
- .paris
- .nyc
- .london
- .bxls
- .lagos

# Questions and Comments

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