RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Draft outcomes report v 1.6

["Scoville, Adam" <ascoville@xxxxxxxxx>]

Tom - 

 

... and the elimination of an obligation to include accurate contact
information for the registrant of a domain is likewise "a very big
change" in the legal environment that currently promotes accountability
and consumer protection on the Internet and facilitates the
enforceability of national laws. 

 

What we're talking about here is the kind of simple e-mail verification
and consent to terms that numerous on-line businesses, from
YouTube/Blogger/Google to FaceBook to PayPal (which of course also uses
more robust means of verification for financial information) use as a
prerequisite to signing-up for their on-line services... and as
previosly discussed, we've even conceded that it could happen afterward,
so as not to delay the registration of the domain. I find it hard to see
why this is such a technical or legal hardship for either registrars or
registrants. 

 

Of course, I would have thought that a robust and enforceable set of
OPoC responsibilities would be a small price to pay for a system that
had a chance of broader support. Put another way, I think there are ways
of making Whois more privacy protective/less vulnerable to spam that
could be acceptable to a broad spectrum of stakeholders. With that in
mind, insisting on making the regime maximally disruptive to the
operation of the rule of law on the Internet seems unlikely to move the
issue forward. 

 

Have a good weekend, everyone,

- Adam

 

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Thomas Keller
Sent: Friday, August 10, 2007 3:40 AM
To: Dan Krimm
Cc: gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [gnso-whois-wg] Draft outcomes report v 1.6

 

I agree with Dan. A formal recorded consent of the OPOC would, as

already pointed out by several of my registrar colleagues, be a 

very big change in the registration process of every registrar and

reseller. As the registrant is finally responsible for all contacts

attached to a registered name it should be in his sole responsibility

to make sure of the consent of the OPOC.

 

Best,

 

tom

 

Am 09.08.2007 schrieb Dan Krimm:

> At 6:43 PM -0400 8/9/07, Michael Warnecke wrote:

> 

> > ... If we cannot

> >agree, as a baseline proposition, that an OPOC must consent to being
an

> >OPOC, it calls into question the credibility of the OPOC system.

> 

> I don't at all see why this should be the case.

> 

> I can envision an OPoC *system* that is entirely credible without
requiring

> anyone (other than a registrant) to ensure consent of an OPoC.  If the

> registrant bears the responsibility and liability for the OPoC's
actions,

> then it is in the registrant's interest to choose an OPoC who consents
to

> fulfilling that role for the registrant.  If the registrant fails to
do so,

> the registrant can bear the full liability if and when the OPoC fails
to

> perform expected tasks.  If a registrant designates an OPoC in bad
faith,

> that can and will come back to haunt the registrant eventually, when
the

> OPoC fails to perform its tasks.

> 

> This consent requirement constitutes unnecessary and spurious
complexity

> that just bogs down the whole system and creates disagreement among
us.  If

> the mission here is to erode consensus, then it is quite effective.

> 

> Dan

> 

> PS -- In the event that anyone were to be held formally liable for
explicit

> (and perhaps formal) OPoC *consent* in and of itself, separate from
the

> *tasks* that an OPoC will perform, it is perfectly credible for the
system

> to assign that responsibility to the registrant exclusively.  But I
see no

> need for a formal consent requirement, because the functional
incentives

> can be enough to establish this if we design the rest of the system

> properly.

> 

> 

> 

 

Gruss,

 

tom

 

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