

**STATEMENT OF DISSENT ON RECOMMENDATION #20 &
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES F, H, & P IN THE
GNSO NEW GTLD COMMITTEE'S FINAL REPORT
FROM THE
NON-COMMERCIAL USERS CONSTITUENCY (NCUC)**

RE: DOMAIN NAME OBJECTION AND REJECTION PROCESS

25 July 2007

Text of Recommendation #20:

“An application will be rejected if an expert panel determines that there is substantial opposition to it from a significant portion of the community to which the string may be explicitly or implicitly targeted.”

Text of Implementation Guideline F:

If there is contention for strings, applicants may:

- i) resolve contention between them within a pre-established timeframe
- ii) if there is no mutual agreement, a claim to support a community by one party will be a reason to award priority to that application. If there is no such claim, and no mutual agreement a process will be put in place to enable efficient resolution of contention and;
- iii) the ICANN Board may be used to make a final decision, using advice from staff and expert panels.

Text of Implementation Guideline H:

External dispute providers will give decisions on complaints.

Text of Implementation Guideline P:

The following process, definitions, and guidelines refer to Recommendation 20.

Process

Opposition must be objection based.

Determination will be made by a dispute resolution panel constituted for the purpose.

The objector must provide verifiable evidence that it is an established institution of the community (perhaps like the RSTEP pool of panelists from which a small panel would be constituted for each objection).

Guidelines

The task of the panel is the determination of substantial opposition.

a) substantial

In determining substantial the panel will assess the following: significant portion, community, explicitly targeting, implicitly targeting, established institution, formal existence, detriment.

b) significant portion:

In determining significant portion the panel will assess the balance between the level of objection submitted by one or more established institutions and the level of support provided in the application from one or more established institutions. The panel will assess significance proportionate to the explicit or implicit targeting.

c) community

Community should be interpreted broadly and will include for example an economic sector, a cultural community, or a linguistic community. It may also be a closely related community which believes it is impacted.

d) explicitly targeting

Explicitly targeting means there is a description of the intended use of the TLD in the application.

e) implicitly targeting

Implicitly targeting means that the objector makes an assumption of targeting or that the objector believes there may be confusion by users over its intended use.

f) established institution

An institution that has been in formal existence for at least 5 years. In exceptional cases, standing may be granted to an institution that has been in existence for fewer than 5 years. Exceptional circumstances include but are not limited to reorganisation, merger, or an inherently younger community. The following ICANN organizations are defined as established institutions: GAC, ALAC, GNSO, ccNSO, ASO.

g) formal existence

Formal existence may be demonstrated by: appropriate public registration, public historical evidence, validation by a government, intergovernmental organization, international treaty organisation or similar.

h) detriment

<< A >> Evidence of detriment to the community or to users more widely must be provided.

<< B >> [A likelihood of detriment to the community or to users more widely must be provided.]

Recommendation #20

The Non-Commercial Users Constituency (NCUC) Dissenting Statement on Recommendation #20 of the New GTLD Committee's Final Report¹ should be read in combination with Implementation Guidelines F, H & P, which detail the implementation of Recommendation #20. This statement should also be read in conjunction with its statement² of 13 June 2007 on the committee's draft report.

¹ Available at: <http://forum.icann.org/lists/gtld-council/pdfOOqgaRNrXf.pdf>

² Available at: <http://ipjustice.org/wp/2007/06/13/ncuc-newgtld-stmt-june2007/>

NCUC cannot support the committee's proposal for ICANN to establish a broad objection and rejection process for domain names that empowers ICANN and its "experts" to adjudicate the legal rights of domain name applicants (and objectors). The proposal would also empower ICANN and its "experts" to invent entirely new rights to domain names that do not exist in law and that will compete with existing legal rights to domains.

However "good-intentioned", the proposal would inevitably set up a system that decides legal rights based on subjective beliefs of "expert panels" and the amount of insider lobbying. The proposal would give "established institutions" veto power over applications for domain names to the detriment of innovators and start-ups. The proposal is further flawed because it makes no allowances for generic words to which no community claims exclusive "ownership" of. Instead, it wants to assign rights to use language based on subjective standards and will over-regulate to the detriment of competition, innovation, and free expression.

There is no limitation on the type of objections that can be raised to kill a domain name, no requirement that actual harm be shown to deny an application, and no recourse for the wrongful denial of legal rights by ICANN and its experts under this proposal. An applicant must be able to appeal decisions of ICANN and its experts to courts, who have more competence and authority to decide the applicant's legal rights. Legal due process requires maintaining a right to appeal these decisions to real courts.

The proposal is hopelessly flawed and will result in the improper rejection of many legitimate domain names. The reasons permitted to object to a domain are infinite in number. Anyone may make an objection; and an application will automatically be rejected upon a very low threshold of "detriment" or an even lower standard of "a likelihood of detriment" to anyone. Not a difficult bar to meet.

If ICANN attempted to put this policy proposal into practice it would intertwine itself in general policy debates, cultural clashes, business feuds, religious wars, and national politics, among a few of the disputes ICANN would have to rule on through this domain name policy.

The proposal operates under false assumptions of "communities" that can be defined, and that parties can be rightfully appointed representatives of "the community" by ICANN. The proposal gives preference to "established institutions" for domain names, and leaves applicants' without the backing of "established institutions" with little right to a top-level domain. The proposal operates to the detriment of small-scale start-ups and innovators who are clever enough to come up with an idea for a domain first, but lack the insider-connections and financial resources necessary to convince an ICANN panel of their worthiness.

It will be excessively expensive to apply for either a controversial or a popular domain name, so only well-financed "established institutions" will have both the standing and financial wherewithal to be awarded a top-level domain. The proposal privileges who is awarded a top-level domain, and thus discourages diversity of thought and the free flow of information by

making it more difficult to obtain information on controversial ideas or from innovative newcomers.

Implementation Guideline F

NCUC does not agree with the part of Implementation Guideline F that empowers ICANN identified “communities” to support or oppose applications. Why should all “communities” agree before a domain name can be issued? How to decide who speaks for a “community”?

NCUC also notes that ICANN’s Board of Directors would make the final decisions on applications and thus the legal rights of applicants under proposed IG-F. ICANN Board Members are not democratically elected, accountable to the public in any meaningful way, or trained in the adjudication of legal rights. Final decisions regarding legal rights should come from legitimate law-making processes, such as courts.

“Expert panels” or corporate officers are not obligated to respect an applicant’s free expression rights and there is no recourse for a decision by the panel or ICANN for rights wrongfully denied. None of the “expert” panelists are democratically elected, nor accountable to the public for their decisions. Yet they will take decisions on the boundaries between free expression and trademark rights in domain names; and “experts” will decide what ideas are too controversial to be permitted in a domain name under this process.

Implementation Guideline H

Implementation Guideline H recommends a system to adjudicate legal rights that exists entirely outside of legitimate democratic law-making processes. The process sets up a system of unaccountable “private law” where “experts” are free to pick and choose favored laws, such as trademark rights, and ignore disfavored laws, such as free expression guarantees.

IG-H operates under the false premise that external dispute providers are authorized to adjudicate the legal rights of domain name applicants and objectors. It further presumes that such expert panels will be qualified to adjudicate the legal rights of applicants and others. But undertaking the creation of an entirely new international dispute resolution process for the adjudication of legal rights and the creation of new rights is not something that can be delegated to a team of experts. Existing international law that takes into account conflict of laws, choice of laws, jurisdiction, standing, and due process must be part of any legitimate process; and the applicant’s legal rights including freedom of expression rights must be respected in the process.

Implementation Guideline P

“The devil is in the details” of Implementation Guideline P as it describes in greater detail the proposed adversarial dispute process to adjudicate legal rights to top-level domain names in Recommendation #20. IG-P mandates the rejection of an application if there is “substantial opposition” to it according to ICANN’s expert panel. But “substantial” is defined in such a way so as to actually mean “insubstantial” and as a result many legitimate domain names would be rejected by such an extremely low standard for killing an application.

Under IG-P, opposition against and support for an application must be made by an “established institution” for it to count as “significant”, again favoring major industry players and mainstream cultural institutions over cultural diversity, innovative individuals, small niche, and medium-sized Internet businesses.

IG-P states that “community” should be interpreted broadly, which will allow for the maximum number of objections to a domain name to count against an application. It includes examples of “the economic sector, cultural community or linguistic community” as those who have a right to complain about an application. It also includes any “related community which believes it is impacted.” So anyone who claims to represent a community and believes to be impacted by a domain name can file a complaint and have standing to object to another’s application.

There is no requirement that the objection be based on legal rights or the operational capacity of the applicant. There is no requirement that the objection be reasonable or the belief about impact to be reasonable. There is no requirement that the harm be actual or verifiable. The standard for “community” is entirely subjective and based on the personal beliefs of the objector.

The definition of “implicitly targeting” further confirms this subjective standard by inviting objections where “the objector makes the assumption of targeting” and also where “the objector believes there may be confusion by users”. Such a subjective process will inevitably result in the rejection of many legitimate domain names.

Picking such a subjective standard conflicts with Principle A in the Final Report that states domain names must be introduced in a “predictable way”, and also with Recommendation 1 that states “All applicants for a new gTLD registry should be evaluated against transparent and predictable criteria, fully available to the applicants prior to the initiation of the process.” The subjectivity and unpredictability invited into the process by Recommendation #20 turn Principle A and Recommendation 1 from the same report upside down.

Besides the inherent subjectivity, the standard for killing applications is remarkably low. An application need not be intended to serve a particular community for “community-based” objections to kill the application under the proposal. Anyone who believed that he or she was part of the targeted community or who believes others face “detriment” have standing to object to a domain name, and the objection weighs in favor of “significant opposition”. This standard is even lower than the “reasonable person” standard, which would at least require that the belief be “reasonable” for it to count against an applicant. The proposed standard for rejecting domains is so low it even permits unreasonable beliefs about a domain name to weigh against an applicant.

If a domain name does cause confusion, existing trademark law and unfair competition law have dealt with it for years and already balanced intellectual property rights against free expression rights in domain names. There is neither reason nor authority for ICANN processes to overtake the adjudication of legal rights and invite unreasonable and illegitimate objections to domain names.

IG-P falsely assumes that the number of years in operation is indicative of one's right to use language. It privileges entities over 5 years old with objection rights that will effectively veto innovative start-ups who cannot afford the dispute resolution process and will be forced to abandon their application to the incumbents.

IG-P sets the threshold for harm that must be shown to kill an application for a domain name remarkably low. Indeed harm need not be actual or verified for an application to be killed based on "substantial opposition" from a single objector.

Whether the committee selects the unbounded definition for "detriment" that includes a "likelihood of detriment" or the narrower definition of "evidence of detriment" as the standard for killing an application for a domain name is largely irrelevant. The difference is akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. ICANN will become bogged down with the approval of domain names either way, although it is worth noting that "likelihood of detriment" is a very long way from "substantial harm" and an easy standard to meet, so will result in many more domain names being rejected.

The definitions and guidelines detailed in IG-P invite a lobby-fest between competing businesses, instill the "heckler's veto" into domain name policy, privilege incumbents, price out of the market non-commercial applicants, and give third-parties who have no legal rights to domain names the power to block applications for those domains. A better standard for killing an application for non-technical reasons would be for a domain name to be shown to be illegal in the applicant's jurisdiction before it can be rejected.

In conclusion, the committee's recommendation for domain name objection and rejection processes are far too broad and unwieldy to be put into practice. They would stifle freedom of expression, innovation, cultural diversity, and market competition. Rather than follow existing law, the proposal would set up an illegitimate process that usurps jurisdiction to adjudicate peoples' legal rights (and create new rights) in a process designed to favor incumbents. The adoption of this "free-for-all" objection and rejection process will further call into question ICANN's legitimacy to govern and its ability to serve the global public interest that respects the rights of all citizens.

NCUC respectfully submits that ICANN will best serve the global public interest by resisting the temptation to stray from its technical mandate and meddle in international lawmaking as proposed by Rec. #20 and IG-F, IG-H, and IG-P of the New GTLD Committee Final Report.