Additional Concluding Remarks from the Petitioner: Response to IP constituency

["S. Subbiah" <subbiah@xxxxxxxxx>]

In light of the recent submission by the IP constituency (IPC) submitted 
by S. Metalitz, as principal petitioner I add a quick response to my 
earlier concluding remarks.
First we appreciate the appreciation shown by the IP constituency for 
the proposed IDNgTLD constituency's "frustrating" plight trying to fit a 
square peg in a round hole. Nevertheless I regret that their decision is 
a negative one. The reasoning they give while more detailed, is in 
essence the same as the ISP and Business constituencies, which I have 
already addressed as being logically untenable in light of  long-known 
and ongoing precedents for much overlap and potential "double dipping" 
between exisiting constituencies. In view of the fact that we already 
agree with the IPC thesis that creativity will be needed, we add the 
that while we left membership open in general, we do not have existing 
contracted registries in our present founding membership and we are 
internally open to restrict future membership of contracted registries 
and registrars. That is, if the IDNgTLD petition is approved, contracted 
parties could be disallowed  or forced to choose only one home. Also 
please note that we had already allowed for only limited and transparent 
cross-memberships (in contrast to today's effective potential for 
cross-membership through opaque convoluted complex relationships between 
large multi-national corporations for example). While we limited it to 3 
cross-memberships the potential exists to reduce it to 2.
So as the IPC points out the, the more Black/White divide between 
contracted and non-contracted parties, can be potentially creatively 
overcome in the main.
On the issue of direct government representation, again our current 
founding group does not include direct government representation but 
rather government-related agencies, for example the one from China 
(which has independently made its views on this matter clear through an 
earlier post on this Public Comment). Again compromise is potentially 
possible, by creatively limiting direct government involvement - no 
different in principle from the current situation of a nationally-owned 
ISP/telco happily joining the existing ISP Constituency.
The separation of commercial members from non-profits and individuals - 
while all being on the same side of the GNSO house will be harder to 
bridge, as that would dilute the focus and de facto return us to the 
status quo and the  history and consequences of the past 10 years  as 
described in our earlier email.
While the IPC is right in pointing out that the existing flat GNSO 
constituency structure is more suitable for the current IDNgTLD proposal 
to fit in, closer examination suggets it does not solve all the problems 
of fitting in neatly either. But then again, as pointed out earlier, the 
status quo structure already has fairly unlimited rooom for "double 
dipping" and "overlap" of members between constituencies.
The IPC also raises 2 other points.

The first is the assumption that the IDNgTLD constituency will rely 
soley on monies raised from ICANN etc.
This is not true and is a misperception. The charter already discusses 
membership levies and fully intends to raise money from any and all 
parties. If the GNSO or ICANN is ever in a position to partly fund the 
activities, the charter allows for the reciept of those funds, that's all.
In addition, ICANN by merely even now providing rooms at ICANN 
meeting-hotels for a constituency to meet, is by definition funding that 
constituency and the charter needs to allow for acceptance of such 
"funds" (while not directly in cash).
Second, an explanation regarding members holding elected office in two 
different constiutuencies. As noted by IPC the Chair and the GNSO 
representatives to Council are barred from soing so by the charter 
already. A further limitation of all office-holders was not prescribed 
in the charter largely in light of of the elected roles of those 
handling lesser more mundane duties - like web-master for communication 
etc. If this is a problem, clearly  there is scope for  limiting  all 
elected officers  to not occupy any elected  positions elsewhere.
Finally, it is clear from the IPCs lengthy and detailed discourse that 
every single existing charter group/constituency within the old GNSO 
structure (now-positioned to be within different houses) is in essence 
blocking any other new party from entering its fold. Amusing as that is, 
the logical conclusion is that the current exercise of a GNSO 
restructuring is simply a GNSO re-shuffling. Not one of change where 
change agents bring new peoples and new ideas inside.
Little wonder then that as ICANN sleeps, debates and then bickers 
internally on the IDN wheel for a decade, the forces that can control 
their own destinies within sovereign borders continue to deploy and 
implement "testbeds", commercial and governmental deployments that now 
alraedy span half or more of the truly IDN gTLD needy  peoples of the 
world. Sad but true.
And given the current emerging resistance - structural and otherwise - 
for a voice within ICANN for IDNgTLDs  inertia suggests more 
entrenchment of existing views on all sides unless the Board acts to 
enforce the change it desires and overide existing internal views.
S. Subbiah
Chief Pettitoner for the Formation of the IDNgTLD Constituency
i-DNS.net INc.