NomCom Review, Section 2

[Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

This is the second of two, or perhaps three, comments for the record on 
the Draft Report (DR) of the NomCom Revew Finalization Working Group. 
This comment is directed to the text of the DR, Section 2.
There are 17 recommendations.

Recommendation 1, staffing. I'm puzzled by the "Moreover" observation in 
the WG non-adoption of the staffing recommendation that "it would 
conflict with the Board review recommendation to focus the Board on 
non-managment issues." The NomCom is not a Board activity, it is an 
activity created by the Board, according to the bylaws. The logical 
closure of what appears to be the rational offered, that staff tasked 
with bylaw-specific function ought not be responsible to the Board 
except through the general staff, reduces the value of the bylaws as a 
source of specific authorization.
Fundamentally, it seems that the issue is shall the NomCom have 
independent means, in particular, a fractional FTE, and while the better 
choice is "yes", the recommendation appears to be "no".
Recommendation 2, candidates. If I write a 3rd comment, this will be the 
subject matter.
Recommendation 3, requirements. A formal procedure for eliciting the 
views of each body (Board, GNSO C, CCNSO C, ALAC, and others perhaps) on 
the requirements each may have for NomCom appointees may be useful, but 
the fundamental requirement is the independence of the NomCom in forming 
its own requirements and making informed, independent appointments.
The discussion of gender is a step towards fundamental diversity, 
however economic diversity, and infrastructure accessibility are germane.
Recommendation 4, recruitment. ICANN lacks a minor league system, and 
below that, a farm team system, to identify talented contributors and 
advance them as they mature to greater responsibilities. The idea that 
the NomCom can "recruit" for a half-dozen senior slots per year, and 
"reach out to encourage participation" is absurd. The WG, and its 
anticeedents, profoundly err on the problem of recruitment.
Recommendation 8, interest. The NomCom appointed component to the GNSO 
Council is a fundamental challenge to the mutually destructive postures 
of the two dominant blocks which have deadlocked over trivia for the 
past decade. The NomCom appointed component to the CCNSO Council is a 
fundamental challenge to the notions that iso3166 allocations may be 
repurposed arbitrarily, and that iso3166 exhausts the requirement for 
entities other than for-profit corporations to engage in registry 
operations. Abandonment of either, or both, of these assertions of 
independence from narrow, and destructive advocacy interests would be 
unfortunate.
Recommendation 10, scaling. The Board decision that no new stakeholder 
groups be recognized (as the designated rep. for the City applicants to 
the OSC's OWT, tasked with "Draft Proposal for GNSO Organizational 
Structure", this subject is rather close) makes this section in need of 
substantial reworking.
Recommendation 11, lottery. Here I observer that when the selection of 
the Registrar Constituency's member of the NomCom was discussed, I urged 
that as ICANN had no real "Business Constituency", just the perpetual 
Philip-Shepard-and-Mike-Rodenbaugh show, that the RC should try and get 
people representing real businesses appointed by the NomCom. My view 
hasn't changed. Fundamental to the independence of the NomCom is its 
ability to have purpose, to attempt to act with specific purpose, rather 
than to operate a lottery. If the process can't get business people 
appointed, neither registry/registrar nor IPC notions of "the net as 
business", then the NomCom can. New business models must be able to 
enter the ICANN process.
I've considered each Recommendation not discussed here and none rise to 
the level of these above.

This concludes my comments on Section 2.

Eric Brunner-Williams
in a personal capacity