[npoc-voice] Fwd: [Ncsg-iana] oversight of IANA function

[Olévié Kouami <olivierkouami@xxxxxxxxx>]

Hi !
Dear NPOCers,

This is for your information for some of you and follow up for others
and also to share your view with our fellows NCSGers.
Cheers !
-Olevie-

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Amr Elsadr <aelsadr@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 13:50:12 +0100
Subject: Re: [Ncsg-iana] oversight of IANA function
To: "ncsg-iana@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <ncsg-iana@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Hi,

I'm not sure that the gap between the two models suggested by Milton
and Avri are as different as they are being made out to be. Avri can
correct me if I'm mistaken, but what she is suggesting as an
accountability mechanism is the availability of an option for an
enforceable means of redress. I don't see this to being very different
than the proposed role of the DROC as a contractual authority.

The main difference, of course, is in the membership/representation.
IMHO, if the policy development process of ICANN (+ its accountability
and transparency mechanisms) are clearly delineated as being a
separate issue from the mandate of the DROC, I don't see any harm in
expanding the membership of the contracting authority of IANA. This
should provide protection against the IANA function being tampered
with via special interests of the various actors involved. Even (and I
say this grudgingly) the GAC's.

Thanks.

Amr

On Oct 29, 2014, at 1:46 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@xxxxxxx> wrote:

> Matt:
> I think people are slinging around the concept of "oversight council" in a 
> way that encompasses two possible models: a contracting authority of the type 
> that we (IGP) have proposed, and a more ATRT-like council of the type Avri 
> seems to favor.
>
> I think when people use the term "oversight council" or "oversight body" at 
> this stage they do not have anything more specific in mind.
>
> For example, our proposal refers to the proposed contracting authority as a 
> "DNS Root Oversight Committee" (DROC)" 
> http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2408226
>
> I, Brenden, and several others I've talked to agree that the IANA functions 
> operator should be accountable primarily to the direct customers of IANA, 
> although we included 2 GAC appointees and 2 civil society reps as a way of 
> 'keeping them honest' and of increasing political support. But any 
> contracting authority will need to conduct 'oversight' of some kind to ensure 
> that the contractor is performing their duties properly, right?
>
> From: Ncsg-iana [mailto:ncsg-iana-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Matthew 
> Shears
> Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 7:00 AM
> To: ncsg-iana@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [Ncsg-iana] oversight of IANA function
>
> There is a suggestion on the CWG-Stewardship list that there be some sort of 
> "oversight council" (whatever that means) on the IANA function and 
> deliverables that would includeGAC/government representation.  I am curious 
> to know if folks on this list believe that it is necessary for there to be an 
> external "oversight council" for the IANA functions at all, and if there is a 
> need why should it replicate the existing stakeholder groupings within ICANN. 
>  Seems to me that the IANA function (team/operational role) is responsible to 
> the parties that are contracted with it.  (The issue of accountability and 
> the role of the USG in the IANA function had nothing to do with the IANA 
> function itself but more to act as a backstop should ICANN's policy processes 
> go off the rails and propose changes to the root that would have endangered 
> the USG's national interests).  Surely the oversight should be on the policy 
> developing entities (ICANN) and not the IANA function.  If there is some sort 
> of oversight it should be a "review board" of sorts - populated by affected 
> party representatives - that occasionally meets to assess the performance of 
> the IANA team/function in meeting its contractual obligations.  Oversight of 
> the IANA function is overkill I would have thought.  If mischief should it 
> occur would be in the policies that allow for dangerous propoosed root 
> changes and that lies squarely with ICANN.  When there is a suggestion for 1) 
> some sort of GAC represenation on 2) an oversight board for the IANA 
> functions I start to worry on both counts.
>
> Would welcome your views
>
> Matthew
>
> _______________________________________________
> Ncsg-iana mailing list
> Ncsg-iana@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://mailman.ipjustice.org/listinfo/ncsg-iana




-- 
Olévié Ayaovi Agbenyo KOUAMI
Responsable du projet CERGI-EDUCATON à CERGI Banking Services
Directeur Général de GiDa-OKtetS (Représentations commerciales et négoces)
Directeur Exécutif et CEO de l'INTIC4DEV (Institut des TIC pour le
développement)
SG de ESTETIC  - Association Togolaise des professionnels des TIC (
http://www.estetic.tg)
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