

The following table contains a **summary of the comments received to the external Consultants' Final Report on the RSSAC review**. These comments were received during public presentation at the Mexico City ICANN meeting (March 2009), presentation to the RSSAC community at their meeting in San Francisco (March 2009) and during a public comment period (25 February to 17 April 2009).

In preparing the summary of the comments received, any care has been used as to reflect as accurately and objectively as possible the different and sometimes diverging opinions that have been expressed; however this summary does not substitute in any way the original contributions that were received; for full reference, public comments and comments received in Mexico are available respectively at <http://forum.icann.org/lists/rssac-report/> and <http://mex.icann.org/files/meetings/mexico2009/transcript-rssac-review-04mar09-en.txt> The opinions below summarized are solely those of their authors, and do not necessarily coincide with official positions of ICANN or with individual views of the author of the summary.

We would like to thank each and all of the participants to these consultations for their precious contribution to this crucial phase of the Organizational Review process of the RSSAC.

**Contributions received:**

BM	Bill Manning	MK	Mark Kosters
BT	Bruce Tonkin	PV	Paul Vixie
DK	Daniel Karrenberg	RIPE	RIPE NCC
EBW	Eric Brunner-Williams	SC	Steve Crocker
INEG	Jeffrey A. Williams, INEGroup	SW	Suzanne Wolf

**A) General comments on Consultants' report**

Comment
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(DK) <i>'This is an excellent piece of work. While I have a number of detailed nits, I am very impressed with the analysis and the clear and carefully reasoned recommendations. Well done!'</i></li> <li>(EBW) Substantial lack of transparency in the data gathering process: unclear number of interviewees, questions asked. Observing RSSAC during their normal working activities would have added more evidence to allow conclusions. Unclear if any inputs from general public arrived. Contamination with SSAC review is lamented. These problems should have been prevented with prior publication of format of interviews, standard question sets. Some factual mistakes are remarked in the narrative part of the report; please refer to the original text for full reference.</li> <li>(RIPE) <i>'We would like to thank Westlake Consulting Limited for providing a thorough review and balanced recommendations and hope that our suggestions will help to make the Committee more focused and effective.'</i></li> </ul>

**B) Comments on specific sections of the WG report**

BCG Recommendation	In favor	Against
<p>1: <i>That the RSSAC be relaunched as a strategy group, run jointly by ICANN and the Root Server Operators.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(SC) This requires cooperation from Root Server Operators, no Board decision on this area can be implemented without consensus.</li> <li>(SW) Consensus is a key issue. RSSAC was created and tasked without getting preliminary consensus from Root Server Operators.</li> <li>(SW) ICANN is just one of the different clients of Root Server Operators; in this sense the proposal for a dual</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(INEG) Strong disagreement with dual accountability, this would lead to <i>'serious security and integrity problems that would be very difficult and expensive to correct at a later time, and equally would perhaps be detrimental to any consistent or relatively so, operation of the Root servers.'</i></li> </ul>

BCG Recommendation	In favor	Against
	<p>accountability is positive. Problems can be envisaged in getting from this community the necessary cooperation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (PV) Achieving the needed Root Server Ops consensus (speaking with a single voice) will be challenging.</li> <li>• (DK) <i>'I like the idea to re-invent RSSAC explicitly as a body of both ICANN and root name server operators. This is very useful both as a conduit between the two and as a vehicle to communicate'</i> on Root Server-related issues to the wider internet community. However, the proposed mechanisms looks biased in favor of ICANN and need to be reconsidered.</li> <li>• (RIPE) Re-launching of RSSAC as a joint strategy, coordination group is most important. It should be adequately resourced by both ICANN and the Root Server Operators, and equally accountable to both. A new name should be adopted to mark the difference with RSSAC. Dual accountability to be adequately safeguarded (annual reports and recommendations presented at the same time to both ICANN and the Root Server Operators, coordination nature to be enshrined in ToR of the Committee).</li> </ul>	
<p>2: <i>That the substance of the RSSAC's 'Terms of Reference' as laid out in the Bylaws should be amended to set out RSSAC's new purpose (omissis)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p>3: <i>That the RSSAC should initially be reconstituted with a membership of 9, as follows:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>4 Root Server Operators, appointed by the operators;</i></li> <li>• <i>1 appointed by IANA; and</i></li> <li>• <i>4 appointed by the Board / Nominating Committee of ICANN.</i></li> </ul> <p><i>Members must have strong technical understanding of the root server system.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (DK, EBW) It is a sound idea to have a member from IANA, but this cannot be considered as a neutral member, as IANA is operated by ICANN.</li> <li>• (RIPE) Agreement with IANA in the new committee, but two more members from Root Server Ops and one ICANN Board Member should be added.</li> <li>• (DK) Deadlocks are not to be feared, as they signal that there is a problem to be solved. Consider instead to have a 2/3 rough majority for any significant RSSAC decision.</li> <li>• (Unattributed) Achieving consensus has not been a critical issue in the past, an IETF-alike model (i.e. no real opposition in the room) can be anyhow adopted</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (SW) Unsure whether reduction of size in itself is an appropriate objective. Rationale for the present composition exists, even if badly documented.</li> <li>• (BM) A too small group would become untenable; this is a working committee with people participating on specific issues of their interest.</li> <li>• (EBW) About the proposal to change the present composition of RSSAC: <i>'The consultant arrives at the conclusion 'that it would be useful to replace some of the current RSSAC members with people with no operational involvement in the root servers, with a sprinkling of "strategy" verbiage to sparkle things up. I hope the Board will have the good sense to pass on the opportunity to change some part of ICANN that doesn't function in a political fashion, and make it more like the rest of ICANN.'</i></li> <li>• (SW) Doubts about the suitability of proposed members to be appointed by ICANN (<i>it refers to the formulation of the draft report, the final version of the</i></li> </ul>

BCG Recommendation	In favor	Against
		<i>report addresses this comment already)</i>
<p>4: That the RSSAC should appoint its Chair from among its members (...) and that the term of appointment be two years with a limit of three consecutive two-year terms.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p>5: That the following non-voting liaison positions be established:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outward liaison from the RSSAC to the ICANN Board (as currently exists) and the SSAC;</li> <li>• Inward liaison to the RSSAC from IETF/IAB – this will provide additional technical input into the proceedings of the RSSAC, and the SSAC.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p>6: In relation to the RSSAC's meetings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• That the RSSAC should meet at each ICANN meeting, with provision for it to hold additional meetings in between these.</li> <li>• That its sessions be held in public, so that anybody who wishes may attend, but with provision for it to go into closed session for part of a meeting if a majority of the RSSAC members at the meeting believe it appropriate.</li> <li>• That all Root Server Operators and members of the ICANN Board be invited to attend meetings and have speaking rights (at the discretion of the Chair who will be responsible for managing the agenda).</li> <li>• That other attendees at RSSAC meetings may be granted speaking rights at the discretion of the Chair.</li> <li>• That, in the event that RSSAC went into closed session, subject to the Chair's discretion in case of exceptional circumstances, the Root Server Operators any members of the ICANN Board, formally-appointed Liaisons and technical staff would be invited to join the closed session.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (DK, RIPE) Meeting at ICANN meetings would move away RSSAC from Root Server Operators community; (DK) this option should be very well motivated (what are the advantages?) In absence of such a motivation, some RSSAC meetings can be organized at ICANN meetings while the others should remain as they are.</li> <li>• (RIPE) As an alternative, consider for RSSAC to meet at least once per year at an ICANN meeting and once per year at an IETF meeting.</li> </ul>
<p>7: That ICANN nominate two members of staff to</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>	

<b>BCG Recommendation</b>	<b>In favor</b>	<b>Against</b>
<p>support the RSSAC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Technical Fellow: The purpose of this role will be to do the research and drafting for reports on behalf of the RSSAC. This role will be separate from L-root operations.</i></li> <li>• <i>Administrative Support: the purpose of this role will be to provide the administrative role necessary for the effective operation of a group of part-time volunteer members.</i></li> </ul>		
<p>8: <i>That ICANN fund travel and accommodation for RSSAC members to and from ICANN meetings and other relevant technical meetings.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (DK) Yes, but Root Server Operators should find ways to counter-balance investments from ICANN in order to prevent risks of influencing the processes.</li> </ul>	

**C) Comments not directly related to reviewers' report recommendations**

<b>Comment</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (SW) There is a general flaw in the OR process, which is the fact that members of the community under review can participate to the process only as part of the general public, they should be more involved. This should and can be changed.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (BT) Appropriate for the Board's IANA Committee (and for the Risk Committee) to work more closely with RSSAC. It would be opportune for the Board to adopt a yearly work programme to make easier collaboration /coordination between these pieces of the organization.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (MK) Discussion about new organizations and succession planning was initiated by RSSAC and never finalized; this is not discussed in the report, but some suggestions on this issue would be useful. Important to clarify RSSAC respective ties with IANA (close working relations) and with ICANN (fewer interactions).</li> </ul>

Brussels, 6<sup>th</sup> May 2009

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