Re: [soac-newgtldapsup-wg] Re: JAS WG answers to questions from GNSO RyC and Wolf.

[ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Elaine wrote:

> We should answer this question directly:

>>  What happens if progress payments are not made on time?

> I propose "Pay as you go. If the applicant does not make the (staggered fee)
payment on time, they lose their 'slot:' [example omitted]" 

I have to disagree, on three grounds.

First, it assumes an outcome not yet present, that Kurt et al are able to
provide a "pay as you go" schedule of units-of-service-consumed payments,
and that the Board authorize this.

A comment:, though not a ground for objection to "pay as you go" as a means
to assist, through deferral, of applicant cost, it is less assistive than
a reduction of the unitary fee proposed by the JAS WG in MR2, and also
proposed by the GAC. I discussed this in notes to Sintra, to which the WG
was cc'd last week -- in brief, the utility of "pay as you go" is reduced
to a forth if the fee is reduced.

Second, it produces an adverse outcome for an "assisted" applicant that is
not produced for a "non-assisted" applicant.

Again, part of my note to Cintra pointed out that applicants have, in addition
to the estimated year to complete evaluation, an additional period in the DAG
(and I've not looked at the May draft DAG, but earlier it was a year's grace)
to complete the transition to delegation.

So a non-assisted applicant encountering any additional cost has a larger
margin of time to fund this planned, or unplanned but latent, hence my use
of the word "scheduled", fee (for extended eval, objection, etc.) that is
not available to an assisted applicant.

Third, it produces an adverse outcome for capital limited multi-applicant
cooperatives relative to deep-pocket investors. A deep pocket investor may
inform applicants that using a capital limited multi-applicant cooperative
risks that their entire application may be lost if the cooperative is not
able to meet a payment schedule the deep pocket investor offers that it is
able to meet. Whether such a risk actually exists (inability of the coop to
meet each "pay as you go" schedule) or such an mitigation of risk actually
exists actual deepness of pockets of the investor) or not, competeting 
platform operators will market their ability to manage even imaginary risk.
The form of assistance should not create new risk.

So we don't have consensus on this point, and the answer assumes some
conditions not yet given, and this answer has complications we've not
come to agreement upon.

Eric