Q8: To what extent is the experience gained from introducing
gTLDs in the 1980s applicable to present-day circumstances?The original gTLDs
were introduced in a small-scale, noncommercial environment. However, the commercialization
of the web in 1994 and 1995 led to an explosion of domain name registrations that
might be comparable to a worst-case scenario of introducing a new TLD. The most relevant
aspect of our experience with com/net/org was our inability from 1996 to the present
to allow the name space to grow in response to demand generated by commercial growth
of the Internet. This led to the dot com premium and encouraged people to view the
DNS as a search engine, which in turn led to name speculation, trademark disputes,
and reverse domain name hijacking. This disastrous experience is something we should
learn from. It indicates that artificial scarcity in TLDs is the chief driver of
the policy problems associated with domain names. ICANN is still maintaining artificial
scarcity.
Q9: To the extent it is applicable, what are the lessons to be learned
from that experience?
Lessons learned:
1. That the US government and later,
ICANN, allowed the exclusive NSI registry to build up momentum for far too long.
The monopoly and premium value associated with dot com is responsible for most if
not all name speculation, and the existence of name speculation is responsible for
the (short-sighted) demand of trademark owners to freeze the status quo.
2. That
we should have implemented draft-postel in 1996, and created 150 new top-level domains
operated on an exclusive basis. See http://www.newdom.com/archive/draft-postel-iana-itld-admin-01.txt
Name speculation as we know it would have been undermined. Competitors would have
had a chance to establish themselves before NSI totally dominated the market. The
scarcity value of domain names as locators would have been undermined (a good
thing). Registries and registrars could have privately contracted to create shared
TLDs that really worked, as in dot UK.
3. That end users will utilize names and
other aspects of the Internet in creative, unexpected ways. This is not something
to be afraid of; change and creativity are part of the Internet. Anyone who thinks
we need to stop change because of the risks belongs in a retirement home, not in
ICANN management.
Q10: What lessons, if any, can be learned regarding new gTLD
introductions from the experience of the ccTLD registries?
CcTLDs have been a successful
experiment with the broad diffusion of registration authority around the world. They
show that diverse policies, diverse business models, and diverse name strings are
beneficial to users and a good thing for the diffusion of the Internet. They are
a check upon undue centralization associated with NSI/ICANN/US Department of Commerce’s
control of the root. If we can have 240 ccTLDs, we can have 240 new gTLDs.
Q11:
Can lessons relevant to introduction of new TLDs be learned from the recent decisions
by a number of them to operate in a globally open manner? If so, what lessons?
Many
operators and customers perceive a demand for new gTLDs. CcTLDs with suitable name
strings (.cc, .tv, .md) are attempting to take advantage of this underserved market.
A large part of the market for domain names is global.
Their limited success indicates
that it will not be easy to undermine the mindshare of NSI’s com/net/org monopoly.
ICANN, NSI, and the trademark lobby have (perhaps inadvertently) acted in concert
to perpetuate that monopoly for far too long.
Q12: Is the Names Council's recommendation
that a "limited number of new top-level domains be introduced initially" a sensible
way to minimize risks to Internet stability?
The Name Council recommendation was
dictated by its desire to minimize costs to trademark owners and to minimize risks
to NSI’s global dominance of the registry business.
Any new TLD introduction in
the range of 10 - 500 poses no risks to "Internet stability." Jon Postel himself
proposed adding 300 new TLDs over a three year period and no fixed limit on the number
after that. (See draft-postel, referenced above).
Q14: Should a fixed time be established
for all the evaluations, or should the time allowed vary depending on the nature
of the TLD and other circumstances?
There should be a fixed time. This is necessary
to create a “stable” (!) climate for users and investors. People need to know what
to expect of ICANN. The evaluation should not be a political football kicked around
indefinitely by special interests jockeying for privileges or protection.
Q15:
Should choices regarding the types of TLDs included in the initial introduction seek
to promote effective evaluation of:
- the feasibilty and utility of different
types of new TLDs?
- the efficacy of different procedures for launching new TLDs?
- different policies under which the TLDs can be administered in the longer term?
- different operational models for the registry and registrar functions?
-
different institutional structures for the formulation of registration and operation
policies within the TLD?
- other factors?
Yes to all. In general, the larger
and more varied the initial introduction, the more information ICANN will have about
the results. This fact is in obvious conflict with the efforts of certain interests
to limit the introduction of TLDs to a very small number.
Q16: Should any particular
goal for, or limit on, the number of TLDs to be included in the initial introduction
be established in advance, or alternatively should the number included in the initial
introduction be guided by the extent to which proposals establish sound proofs of
concept of varied new TLD attributes?
Ideally, no limit should be established in
advance. Working Group C was willing to accept and specify a limit in order to obtain
the consensus of the broadest number of groups. But from a non-political standpoint,
any limit is artificial, and if sound proposals are received, ICANN should authorize
their implementation as quickly as possible.
Q17: In view of the current competitive
conditions, should the promotion of effective competition in the provision of registration
services continue to be a significant motivation for adding fully open TLDs?
Yes,
it should. There is no effective competition with the NSI registry in the gTLD market.
A variety of service-related innovations could be developed using DNS. NSI serves
a predominantly North American, English-speaking market.
Registrar competition
has had some salutary effects in customer service, but on the whole it is a regulatory
contrivance that does not introduce significant innovations in the quality or features
of registry services. The (surprisingly limited) price reductions achieved through
registrar competition were enabled by government regulation of the wholesale price
of the registry, not by any innovations or efficiencies introduced into the market.
We
reject any suggestion that the existence of a few successful ccTLDs alleviates the
need for registry competition. Most ccTLDs are saddled with two-letter codes that
are meaningless and unattractive to most of the world’s users. Few of them are private,
for-profit, publicly listed companies capable of competing with NSI on a global scale.
The tremendous growth in .com registrations from countries such as Korea and China
indicates a demand for generic TLDs. The longer ICANN delays introducing competition
the harder it will become for new registries to establish a presence. However, provided
other new, competitive registries are created in those countries, allowing ccTLD
registries to add a few new TLDs to their repertoire would be a good way to leverage
the growing expertise some of them are developing.
Q18: Should the desire for diverse
vendors of registry services in open TLDs be an important motivation in adding fully
open TLDs?
Yes, it should. ICANN should permit a variety of models, including exclusive,
non-shared TLDs.