RIR Response to Evolution and Reform Committee

[Geoff Huston <gih@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Dear Sirs,

I have been requested by the Boards of the Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs) to submit this to ICANN on behalf of the  RIRs as a formal response to 
the Evolution and Reform Committee's recent Update Regarding RIR Submissions.

Regards,

Geoff Huston
Secretary,
APNIC Executive Council

--------

To:  Vint Cerf, Alejandro Pissanty, Stuart Lynn
From:  APNIC, ARIN, RIPE NCC
Subject:  RIR Response to Evolution and Reform Committee

25 September 2002

The RIRs have considered the material provided in the Committee on ICANN
Evolution and Reform Update Regarding RIR Submissions.

The Update contained commentary on the ICANN Evolution and Reform process
in terms of the position of the RIRs in the process, and added additional
commentary relating to the proposals submitted by the RIRs.

     The RIRs acknowledge this response as being the first substantive
     response from the ICANN Evolution and Reform Committee to the RIRs, and
     while the RIRs are not necessarily in agreement with the perspectives
     contains in the update, do regard this exchange of views as an
     essential component of a process that can achieve a mutually agreeable 
     outcome.

The Update notes that the Evolution and Reform Committee has paid careful
attention to RIR submissions and statements and has incorporated some of
the suggestions in their recommendations.

     This is not a perspective that is shared by the RIRs.  The ICANN
     Evolution and Reform activity has been regarded by the RIRs as a timely
     initiative on the part of ICANN. The initial admissions of failure on
     the part of ICANN in undertaking various roles was a perspective that
     was shared by the RIRs, and shaped the RIRs thinking on the entire
     Evolution and Reform activity. Not only has this reform process offered
     ICANN itself the ability to objectively reassess its objectives and
     reassess the means to effectively and efficiently achieve these
     objectives, it has also offered the opportunity for stakeholders in the
     various ICANN roles to reassess their roles and their means of
     interaction and relationship with ICANN, with a view to also initiating
     reform that will produce more effective and efficient outcomes.

     It was in this spirit that the RIRs have participated in this reform
     process, and in this spirit the RIRs have attempted to engage the ICANN
     Evolution and Reform Committee in a dialogue on the very substantive
     issues of evolution and reform.

     Also, while some of our perspectives may have been incorporated in
     successive iterations of the Evolution and Reform proposals, matters
     that are more crucial to achieving substantive and effective outcomes
     that are more important from the RIRs perspective have not been
     incorporated into the Evolution and Reform Committee's proposals. The
     RIRs do not believe that a metric of a tally of proposals and the rate
     by which such proposals are incorporated into the Evolution and Reform
     blueprint is an effective way to judge whether a stakeholder's input
     has been considered within the process. It is more appropriate in the
     RIRs' view to consider the overall framework and desired outcomes, and
     attempt to identify changes to roles and responsibilities that would
     enable enhanced outcomes to the benefit of both ICANN and its
     stakeholders.


The Update notes that the workload associated with the Evolution and Reform
process has not permitted ICANN to respond to every individual comment and
submission.

     To note that, having initiated this evolution and reform process,
     ICANN, and this committee in particular, was then in no position to
     manage the consequent input raises concerns regarding the ability of
     ICANN to understand the intent of that input and incorporate it as
     appropriate into ICANN's evolution. Previous experience of similar
     exercises in the past has indicated a strong level of interest in this
     area, and the lack of preparedness on the part of ICANN to adequately
     manage this process is not an encouraging signal.

     The evolution process itself was initiated by full and frank admissions
     from the ICANN CEO that ICANN itself was failing and that a substantive
     process of evaluation of ICANN's mission and the way in which ICANN is
     to undertake this mission was necessary. To  claim that the input from
     a major stakeholder in one of ICANN's core missions was not to be
     responded to due to pressure of overwork is not an adequate message to
     the ICANN stakeholder community relating to ICANN's ability to
     correctly or competently manage open and inclusive policy development
     processes.

     From the perspective of the RIR community, it would appear that the
     careful consideration of issues that impinge on matters drawn from the
     true breadth and scope of ICANN's role have, once more, been subsumed
     by the necessarily intricate and voluminous details of balancing
     various constituencies of the domain name activity. Part of the RIRs'
     concern over the entire ICANN process, and part of the basis upon which
     the RIRs were able to agree with the initial statements of failure of
     ICANN, is based on the observation that the address resource management
     area receives scant attention from ICANN. The RIRs have proposed to
     open a dialogue with ICANN on the ways and means by which this area of
     activity could receive the necessary levels of administrative attention
     and coordination of open and inclusive policy consideration.

It is evident that the Update illustrates a number of misunderstandings
relating to the ICANN Evolution and Reform process, the RIRs, the ASO and
the open policy process that is coordinated by the RIRs.

The first misunderstanding is on the part of the RIRs due to confusion as
to how dialogue within the ICANN Evolution and Reform process would be
undertaken.

     The RIRs assumed the reform and evolution process would be implemented
     as an open dialog between ICANN and its stakeholders.  To date, this
     has not been the case.  From the perspective of the RIRs, the process
     used by ICANN has been less open and more rigid, with little by way of
     feedback that would be typically associated with a dialog.

     Specifically, the RIRs did not request that its recommendations simply
     be included into the ERC recommendations, and indeed did not make
     submissions that were intended to be included per se. The RIRs in their
     original submission expressed concern over a number of matters and
     indicated a willingness to discuss with ICANN the ways in which these
     concerns may be properly addressed to a level of mutual satisfaction
     and to the satisfaction of a broader open process of consideration of
     reform measures.

     In examining the Update Response there appears to be an assumption that
     the anticipated mode of operation of the evolution and reform process
     was that various stakeholders were anticipated to submit proposals
     regarding roles and functions through recommendations within such
     submissions. It appears to have been assumed that the Evolution and
     Reform Committee was then to arbitrate between such claims and
     proposals without any form of negotiation of dialogue with the affected
     parties.

     It would seem apparent that such a process often becomes unduly
     adversarial and places the Evolution and Reform Committee in a position
     of both being a source of recommendations in itself and attempting to
     impose a judgment on the recommendations of others, without a due
     process of dialogue and without a visible attempt to reach a shared
     understanding of the issues being addressed. It is always a challenging
     exercise to ensure that such a process can operate effectively,
     irrespective of the personal intentions and efforts the individuals
     involved.

     As an attempt to engage in dialogue with stakeholders in order to reach
     a shared understanding of appropriate and necessary evolution and
     reform measures any objective judgment of the process would conclude
     that it falls far short of an effective, open, inclusive and fair
     process.

The second misunderstanding is that the Update claims that the RIRs are of
the view that "the ASO is the ICANN body responsible for developing (as
distinct from approving) policies with respect to addressing".

     This is not the case. The first submission to the Evolution and Reform
     Committee noted that "The RIRs are not necessarily committed to the
     continued existence of an Address Council and an Address Supporting
     Organization in any future structure of ICANN." In the second
     submission the RIRs noted an interest in discussing a structure where
     "the ASO undertakes the responsibility for formal adoption of global
     RIR policies, allowing for open review of such policies as part of its
     function of review and evaluation".

     The RIRs are of the view that the strength of the entire address
     community policy process is the highly active involvement by the
     address community in the open inclusive policy meetings that are hosted
     by the RIRs. The RIRs are of the view that policy development in this
     deregulated industry structure is best undertaken through open
     processes that engage the participation of all interested parties, and
     through a process that is driven to strive for consensus between the
     interested parties.

     The RIRs are of the view that the RIRs are responsible for hosting this
     open process and documenting its outcomes, and coordinating this
     activity across the individual RIRs.

The third area of misunderstanding is that the ICANN response appears to
take the view that there is some fundamental distinction between global and
regional address allocation policies and that there is some fundamental
alteration of constituencies when considering these two domains of policy.

     The RIRs have been careful to construct a policy development process
     that is open, accessible, transparent and fair.

     Policy is developed within venues that admit any interested party,
     regardless of membership status, and consensus is developed within this
     broader community as a necessary precursor to the adoption of RIR
     policy.

     Where there is a requirement for commonality in policy across the RIRs,
     there has been a consistent effort to ensure that the considerations
     and perspectives aired within one venue are clearly communicated to the
     other venues, so that the process of building a broad consensus of
     support for such policies is one that is open and well-informed.

     The RIRs cannot accept the assertion that they are, by their very
     nature, not "suitably structured to receive, evaluate, and develop
     consensus positions on those address policies that truly take into
     account all interests affected by global concerns". Furthermore, the
     RIRs assert that far from being unsuited to the role, this precise
     function of hosting the open policy process for the broader address
     community has been an RIR role since the inception of the RIRs.

     Such assertions of unsuitability on the part of the RIRs, and an
     associated contrast to the assumed role of ICANN, have no foundation in
     experience. The attempts by ICANN to take up agendas relating to narrow
     sector interests in address policy have been abortive, and such matters
     have been ultimately resolved within the realm of the RIRs' open policy
     meetings.

It is also evident that there is some level of misunderstanding of the RIR
position relating to the proposed changes to the management of the
unallocated address pool.

     At no stage have the RIRs indicated that the objective test regarding
     allocation of address space from the unallocated number pool to the
     RIRs should be abandoned or changed. Because it is an objective test
     rather than a subjective judgment, then in the interests of efficiency
     and stability of operation the RIRs are arguing that there is no need
     for this function to be undertaken by ICANN. Given that the operational
     process is objective, then the RIRs are interested in ensuring
     efficiency and robustness of the operation of the process.


In sum, we believe that the appropriate solid foundational base for the
development of address-related policy in a deregulated private-sector
environment is through the use of open inclusive processes where there is a
focus on establishing common points of agreement directly within the
stakeholder community, rather than a process that solely involves the
imposition of policies and rules onto the community or a process that
relies solely of adversarial advocacy. The RIRs have been responsible for
hosting this policy process for many years, and consider that they
have the broad support of the address community in continuing in this role.

The RIRs do not see it as stable or in the best interests of the community
that policies duly and responsibly developed by the addressing community
must be subject to further review and potential alteration in ICANN-related
forums. The risks of hijacking a community's consensus position by narrow
sector interests are always present in such a scenario. ICANN has not been
successful in achieving any tangible level of engagement with the broad
address community, and to assert that ICANN can offer the process a level
of review from a broader interested community is not well founded within
ICANN's activity profile to date.

The RIRs remain of the view that the assertions of failure of ICANN at the
start of 2002 were indeed based on a refreshingly direct and objective
summary of the situation. The RIRs are proposing a number of changes to the
existing roles and responsibilities that would address aspects of these
failures while still ensuring that the essential characteristics of direct
open participation in the RIRs' address policy development process is
preserved.

We would encourage both the ICANN Evolution and Reform Committee, and the
ICANN community to consider the RIR proposals as a positive contribution to
not only address some of these admitted failures of ICANN, but to ensure
that ICANN and its stakeholder community are not faced with a similar
admission of failure in the future.

Sincerely yours,


Paul Wilson
Director General
APNIC

Raymond A. Plzak
President & CEO
ARIN

Axel Pawlik
Managing Director
RIPE NCC