Re: [bc-gnso] FW: The Affirmation of Commitments - What it Means

[George Kirikos <icann@xxxxxxxx>]

Hi again,

By the way, as a practical matter going forward, I think the BC
officers should in a timely manner raise at GNSO council the issue of
eliminating double-weighted voting for the registrars and registries
based on the language in paragraph 4 of the AOC, namely:

"4. ...... ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of
participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than
Internet users generally."

I'm sure everyone can read that as a clear reference to the registrars
and registries.

The elimination of that double-weighted voting by the contracted
parties would be an important step forward, to ensure that policy
outcomes truly reflect the public interest, and in particular small
and large businesses around the world who are neither registrars nor
registries (no wanna-be registries).

Sincerely,

George Kirikos
416-588-0269
http://www.leap.com/

On Wed, Sep 30, 2009 at 12:37 PM, George Kirikos <icann@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Hello,
>
> On Wed, Sep 30, 2009 at 11:31 AM, Marilyn Cade wrote:
>> I wouldn't get irrationally enthusiastic about the agreement. The proposed 
>> accountability mechanisms that were posted, even though delayed in comment 
>> deadline, were not by any measure meeting the Comments from the community. 
>> There is much yet to understand.
>
> As Marilyn suggests, one should temper any enthusiasm until one sees
> how ICANN operates in practice under the new document.
>
> For example, language like.
>
> 4. ....." To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and
> not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, ICANN
> commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and negative
> effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial impact
> on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the
> systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS."
>
> appears very positive to those like myself who believe in cost-benefit
> analysis of various decisions. However, the ICANN staff have taken the
> position routinely that the promised "economic studies" for new TLDs
> have been accomplished, even though most observers would find that
> they do not come close to satisfying the concerns of the public.
> Obviously better and more responsive staff are needed, and the
> existing organizational culture needs to change considerably.
>
> The DOC in some weighs tipped their hand in point #5 that they don't
> expressly support the current ICANN plan for new gTLDs, in much the
> same way they (with the DOJ) expressly failed to give immunity
> protection to VeriSign when the .com settlement was approved in 2006:
>
> http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/agreements/amend30_11292006.pdf
>
> "5. .... This approval is not intended to confer federal antitrust
> immunity on VeriSign with respect to the Registry Agreement."
>
> leaving the door wide open for the CFIT lawsuit to let a court
> determine whether the contract was anti-competitive.
>
> I was encouraged to see the language in 9.3.1 in regards to WHOIS.
>
> Ultimately, the DOC can terminate the agreement by providing 120 days
> notice. Given the IANA Function contract is more important, ICANN will
> hopefully be compelled to meet its promises. The IANA contract can be
> seen at:
>
> http://www.icann.org/en/general/iana-contract-14aug06.pdf
> http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/iana.htm
>
> and, if all options are exercised, comes up to be re-awarded in 2011.
> That's the critical contract that exercises control over the root zone
> file. So, one should not expect the political positioning and
> posturing to cease in the coming years. I expect the US government
> will never relinquish the IANA function permanently to ICANN, and I
> would support that continued control by the US as an important "check"
> to foil ICANN's tendency to "go rogue."
>
> Sincerely,
>
> George Kirikos
> 416-588-0269
> http://www.leap.com/
>