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Re: [bc-gnso] here's a GREAT piece by Cory Doctorow which touches on many of the issues we like to discuss
- To: "Mike O'Connor" <mike@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [bc-gnso] here's a GREAT piece by Cory Doctorow which touches on many of the issues we like to discuss
- From: "Smith, Bill" <bill.smith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2012 11:18:16 -0700
Excellent piece Mikey!
I especially like the part that discusses how some have argued that DNS
Filtering is being used (and purportedly works) for some nation states,
therefore the United States should use it. I won't go into the many reasons why
this argument is flawed other than to say Spring 2011 provides more than enough
evidence that DNS filtering does not work.
On Jan 12, 2012, at 12:50 PM, Mike O'Connor wrote:
hi all,
this is a great thought-provoker piece -- kindof a unified field theory of why
things like SOPA and IP protection strategies in general don't work. it'll
make some of you cranky, and i'd really like to have a discussion about those
points.
http://boingboing.net/2012/01/10/lockdown.html
here's a teaser:
General-purpose computers are astounding. They're so astounding that our
society still struggles to come to grips with them, what they're for, how to
accommodate them, and how to cope with them. This brings us back to something
you might be sick of reading about: copyright.
But bear with me, because this is about something more important. The shape of
the copyright wars clues us into an upcoming fight over the destiny of the
general-purpose computer itself.
In the beginning, we had packaged software and we had sneakernet. We had floppy
disks in ziplock bags, in cardboard boxes, hung on pegs in shops, and sold like
candy bars and magazines. They were eminently susceptible to duplication, were
duplicated quickly, and widely, and this was to the great chagrin of people who
made and sold software.
Enter Digital Rights Management<http://boingboing.net/tag/DRM> in its most
primitive forms: let's call it DRM 0.96. They introduced physical indicia which
the software checked for—deliberate damage, dongles, hidden sectors—and
challenge-response protocols that required possession of large, unwieldy
manuals that were difficult to copy.
These failed for two reasons. First, they were commercially unpopular, because
they reduced the usefulness of the software to the legitimate purchasers.
Honest buyers resented the non-functionality of their backups, they hated the
loss of scarce ports to the authentication dongles, and they chafed at the
inconvenience of having to lug around large manuals when they wanted to run
their software. Second, these didn't stop pirates, who found it trivial to
patch the software and bypass authentication. People who took the software
without paying for it were untouched.
Typically, the way this happened is a programmer, with possession of technology
and expertise of equivalent sophistication to the software vendor itself, would
reverse-engineer the software and circulate cracked versions. While this sounds
highly specialized, it really wasn't. Figuring out what recalcitrant programs
were doing and routing around media defects were core skills for computer
programmers, especially in the era of fragile floppy disks and the
rough-and-ready early days of software development. Anti-copying strategies
only became more fraught as networks spread; once we had bulletin boards,
online services, USENET newsgroups and mailing lists, the expertise of people
who figured out how to defeat these authentication systems could be packaged up
in software as little crack files. As network capacity increased, the cracked
disk images or executables themselves could be spread on their own.
This gave us DRM 1.0. By 1996, it became clear to everyone in the halls of
power that there was something important about to happen. We were about to have
an information economy, whatever the Hell that was. They assumed it meant an
economy where we bought and sold information. Information technology improves
efficiency, so imagine the markets that an information economy would have! You
could buy a book for a day, you could sell the right to watch the movie for a
Euro, and then you could rent out the pause button for a penny per second. You
could sell movies for one price in one country, at another price in another,
and so on. The fantasies of those days were like a boring science fiction
adaptation of the Old Testament Book of Numbers, a tedious enumeration of every
permutation of things people do with information—and what might be
charged<http://boingboing.net/2011/12/28/wednesday-weird-bible-verse-1.html>
for each.
Unfortunately for them, none of this would be possible unless they could
control how people use their computers and the files we transfer to them. After
all, it was easy to talk about selling someone a tune to download to their MP3
player, but not so easy to talk about the the right to move music from the
player to another device. But how the Hell could you stop that once you'd given
them the file? In order to do so, you needed to figure out how to stop
computers from running certain programs and inspecting certain files and
processes. For example, you could encrypt the file, and then require the user
to run a program that only unlocked the file under certain circumstances.
But, as they say on the Internet, now you have two problems.
You must now also stop the user from saving the file while it's
unencrypted—which must happen eventually— and you must stop the user from
figuring out where the unlocking program stores its keys, enabling them to
permanently decrypt the media and ditch the stupid player app entirely.
Now you have three problems: you must stop the users who figure out how to
decrypt from sharing it with other users. Now you've got four problems, because
you must stop the users who figure out how to extract secrets from unlocking
programs from telling other users how to do it too. And now you've got five
problems, because you must stop users who figure out how to extract these
secrets from telling other users what the secrets were!
That's a lot of problems. But by 1996, we had a solution. We had the WIPO
Copyright Treaty<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html>,
passed by the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization. This
created laws that made it illegal to extract secrets from unlocking programs,
and it created laws that made it illegal to extract media (such as songs and
movies) from the unlocking programs while they were running. It created laws
that made it illegal to tell people how to extract secrets from unlocking
programs, and it created laws that made it illegal to host copyrighted works or
the secrets. It also established a handy streamlined process that let you
remove stuff from the Internet without having to screw around with lawyers, and
judges, and all that crap.
And with that, illegal copying ended forever, the information economy blossomed
into a beautiful flower that brought prosperity to the whole wide world; as
they say on the aircraft carriers, "Mission Accomplished".
That's not how the story ends, of course, because pretty much anyone who
understood computers and networks understood that these laws would create more
problems than they could possibly solve. After all, these laws made it illegal
to look inside your computer when it was running certain programs. They made it
illegal to tell people what you found when you looked inside your computer, and
they made it easy to censor material on the internet without having to prove
that anything wrong had happened.
In short, they made unrealistic demands on reality and reality did not oblige
them.
the article goes on to cover a bunch of stuff from there. enjoy.
mikey
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