Missing considerations

[Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@xxxxxxxxx>]

This proposal suffers from the same defect as its predecessor: although the
opening words pay lip service to the CWG's remit covering only naming functions,
the proposal as a whole fails to recognize and allow for the existence of the
other two equally important IANA functions (addressing and protocol parameters).

As just one example, consider this:
"The CSC, created to monitor the performance of the IANA Functions and
escalate non-remediated issues to the ccNSO and GNSO, should be incorporated
into the ICANN bylaws."

If the CSC is to monitor the performace of all IANA functions, the appropriate
escalation will be different in the other two cases. So this statement is
fundamentally incomplete. Also, the whole proposal to set up a theoretically
independent legal entity clearly requires the consent of the addressing and
protocol parameter communities. Therefore, the setting up of a Customer Standing
Committee also requires their consent. How is that to be obtained?

The CSC is not intrinsically a bad idea, but it isn't the naming community's
call alone.

My personal opinion is that setting up a theoretically independent legal
entity as a "wholly owned subsidiary" of ICANN is pointless. Its independence
would be absolutely illusory, as shown by the proposal to embed the CSC in the
ICANN by-laws. It would be overhead cost for no benefit. It would probably be
harmless, but complexity often has unexpected side effects.

Regards
   Brian Carpenter