A RESPONSE AND MORE SUPPORT FOR THIS CHARTER!
I am responding to the comments of Sanford Duryee, at http://forum.icann.org/lists/cyber-safety-petition/msg00282.html. Mr. Duryee refers to the CSC charter, section 2.2.1, providing for a meeting of CSC members during ICANN public meetings. There are many constituencies. Each of the separate constituencies has its own internal meeting during ICANN events. Such meetings have been part of the ICANN public meeting days for years. No ICANN policy decisions are made at these individual meetings. Besides, the CSC membership "reflect(s) the functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and decision-making." See the member roster at https://st.icann.org/data/workspaces/ncsg-commons/attachments/cybersafety_constituency_proposed:20090323232038-0-23383/original/Membership%20Roster%20(23%20Mar%202009).pdf Dr. Duryee also refer to subsection c., which permits the replacement of a member of the executive committee “who prevents the execution of tasks and duties required by this Charter." The executive committee (EC) mentioned is the internal administrator of just this constituency. The EC of the CSC must adhere to its own charter. Each of many constituencies has its own EC that administer its separate charter. Constituencies are like separate states, each of which can send a representative to Congress. Then representatives from each constituency come together in the GNSO council. The councilors work together to establish working groups on particular issues and drafting committees. They evaluate this work and vote upon recommendations. The ICANN Board considers the recommendations and makes a decision “applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness." For good or for ill, the ICANN model is already based on separate constituencies representing different kinds of stakeholders. ICANN has specifically requested the formation of many new constituencies as part of the GNSO restructure. The CSC is only one of those. It will impose no different financial burden and have no greater influence than any of the other constituencies. Next Mr. Duryee refers to section 5.1.2 (Ineligible Organizations) and complains that commercial interests cannot be members of the CSC. The CSC is within the non-commercial users’ house. There are also commercial users’ constituencies, and suppliers’ constituencies, etc. ICANN rules specifically prohibit commercial entities in the non-commercial stakeholder house, no matter what our charter provides. Finally, Mr. Duryee refers to section 9.1.1 (Recruiting Emphasis) and suggests that, “The CSC intends to dominate ICANN with a membership unable to fulfill the Corporation's mission, which is ‘related to ... technical functions.’” First, there is no chance the CSC will dominate anything. Second, these charter provisions have been reviewed by ICANN staff and fall within the ambit of the intended restructure of the GNSO. Ralph Yarro