Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] elaboration on the Blob topology

[Dan Krimm <dan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I would think this is a prime opportunity to get input from Bertrand, as
our observing GAC member.  I believe Bertrand is very well informed on many
of these items, and can gather additional information in cases where he
does not have the specific answer himself.

While GNSO is not formally bound by any specific policy positions taken by
GAC, relevant factual information would definitely be useful to take into
account in this context, I would think.

Dan



At 11:52 AM -0400 5/10/07, Carole Bird wrote:
>One approach to ponder to simply ask the GAC these questions.
>
>Many of these issues run into the diplomatic realm and as such they may
>well be in the best position to recommend or identify the way ahead.
>
>Carole
>
>>>> "Anthony Harris" <harris@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> 05/10/07 11:21 AM >>>
>This is very interesting. There are however a couple of
>points the WG may need to ponder:
>
>1) The question of which parties have the need to access
>WHOIS data has been, in my opinion, quite well
>summarized in the GAC comments on WHOIS which
>emerged during the ICANN Lisbon meeting. See:
>http://gac.icann.org/web/communiques/gac27com.pdf
>
>2) I hesitate to imagine who would supervise access of
>law enforcement agencies in countries with 'a history of
>miscreant behaviour'...Who would decide on this, the United
>Nations?
>
>3) The core of this long-running discussion on WHOIS
>is the registrant privacy concern. The instruments for
>protecting privacy are determined by national laws,
>and these in some instances may occur even in those
>countries with 'a history of miscreant behaviour'. IOW
>countries make up their own minds about privacy
>protection, and they also run their own law enforcement
>agencies as they feel appropriate.
>
>Tony Harris
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Jeff Williams" <jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>To: <gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx>
>Cc: <contactustr@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>Sent: Thursday, May 10, 2007 2:36 AM
>Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] elaboration on the Blob topology
>
>
>> Dan and all sgb members,
>>
>>  Excellent reverse logic analysis here.  And one that I indirectly
>> eluded to with respect what type if entities should and should not
>> be considered for third party access.  My examples were for
>> entities that should not become third parties for access were:
>> Law firms, trade associations or trade related organizations,
>> educational institutions, financial institutions of any sort,
>> auditing/accounting firms, or private security firms.
>>
>>  Additionally SOME law enforcement entities, including a few
>> which are INTERPOL members should also NOT have
>> unsupervised access to any private/protected registrant
>> Whois data.  I consider as a guide line for determining
>> which of the law enforcement entities whom should NOT have
>> unsupervised access to any private/protected registrant
>> Whois data, the USTR 301 list which I provided the
>> link for.  The countries in which these law enforcement entities
>> serve, have a history of miscreant behavior as well as in far
>> too many instances, engaged in criminal activity on a number
>> of fronts which gives me a far less than comfortable feeling.
>>
>> Dan Krimm wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Paul and registrars,
>>>
>>> Due to time constraints I didn't follow up with this on today's phone
>>> call,
>>> but perhaps you can elaborate here on email.
>>>
>>> My question with respect to the Blob proposal is: how many keys would be
>>> involved, and how would they correspond with what data and what users,
>>> specifically?
>>>
>>> I assume that encryption for any specific blob is limited to a single
>>> key,
>>> and once encrypted and distributed broadly (and publicly, given that it
>>> is
>>> included with all queries on that domain) that key will work on that blob
>>> forever.
>>>
>>> So, in the event of a breach of the key into the general public, or at
>>> least into a broader population than is properly certified for access,
>>> there is no mechanism for further protection of the encrypted data in the
>>> blob.
>>>
>>> Given the statistics on the failings of human beings, one must expect
>>> that
>>> a certain number of breaches will inevitably happen over time.  And, we
>>> will not know about many of them (if they are contained to private but
>>> uncertified entities).
>>>
>>> In the May 2 call, it was suggested that perhaps there could be multiple
>>> keys. so that a single public breach does not open up the entire set of
>>> all
>>> blobs to public access (or at least to unauthorized access).
>>>
>>> Can you explain how a topology of multiple keys might work?  How many
>>> blobs
>>> would a single key provide access to, and do different LEAs get different
>>> keys or do they all share the same key(s)?
>>>
>>> It seemed to me that the simplest case was that a single key would
>>> provide
>>> access to all blobs across all registrars.  In the opposite extreme, each
>>> blob would be uniquely encrypted for each individual real-time query, but
>>> then distribution of keys would be a major undertaking, and one may as
>>> well
>>> set up a password-access database system anyway.
>>>
>>> One particular concern I have is that some wealthy entity that wants to
>>> do
>>> data mining could build up a database that combines both unencrypted as
>>> well as encrypted data, and simply await an opportunity to acquire a key
>>> or
>>> keys to be able to decrypt the blobs that are stored in an integrated
>>> database.  If a single key would unlock all encrypted data in that
>>> database, then that key would become quite valuable, and that increases
>>> the
>>> incentive (and thus the chance) of a breach in return for quite
>>> substantial
>>> payment under the table.  This seems to constitute a sort of "time bomb"
>>> given the potential for a single breach across the full realm of
>>> certified
>>> individuals in all LEAs assigned access across the globe.
>>>
>>> This would almost be worse than a fully public breach, because it would
>>> presumably be mostly unknown, and it would place such wealthy entities at
>>> a
>>> great advantage in gaining unauthorized access.
>>>
>>> So, while this scheme would seem to work as long as everyone with access
>>> behaves properly, I would suggest that we need to consider the real
>>> potentials for breaches and what the ramifications would be in such
>>> cases.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Dan
>>>
>>> PS -- Today you pointed out that with this scheme there would be no trace
>>> of specific use of the keys to gain access to specific data.  However, if
>>> indeed there is consideration of Bertrand's suggestion of creating an
>>> individualized audit trail of queries into the private data in order to
>>> provide post-facto accountability for data use, this might present an
>>> impediment to enforcement of any laws against abuse of the privileged
>>> data
>>> by particular individuals, including those legitimately certified for
>>> access initially.
>>
>> Regards,
>> --
>> Jeffrey A. Williams
>> Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
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>>   Abraham Lincoln
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>> P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
>> United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
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