RE: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure

["Metalitz, Steven" <met@xxxxxxx>]

Of course, the FTC's own study showed the opposite of what EPIC stated
-- that Whois is not a significant contributor of e-mail addresses for
spamming purposes.
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/spamalrt.shtm Another study
by the Center for Democracy and Technology reached the same conclusion.
See http://www.cdt.org/speech/spam/030319spamreport.shtml  {"We tested
how much spam would be received to an address provided in the WHOIS
database. Contrary to our expectations, just one spam e-mail was
generated in the six months that our project was operational.") And the
other testimony presented to Congress at the hearing where EPIC
testified is well worth reviewing, including the statements of the
Federal Trade Commission about how they rely upon access to Whois data
to enforce laws that protect consumer privacy, and on how consumer
access to Whois data also assists the FTC in its consumer and privacy
protection mission.  See
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/071806eh.pdf  (All the
hearing testimony is compiled at
http://financialservices.house.gov/archive/hearings.asp@formmode=detail&;
hearing=491.html)  

Steve Metalitz

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Robin Gross
Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2007 2:00 PM
To: jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx; gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure

Indeed.  Let's not forget that in 2006, the US Federal Trade Commission 
stated that online data mining is the number one crime in the United 
States.  Privacy experts at EPIC, testified before US Congress that 
databases such as whois are among the most significant contributors to 
this problem:
  http://www.epic.org/privacy/whois/phishing_test.pdf



jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

>Dan and all,
>
>  To sum up what you seem to ge getting at is that allowing
>banks regardless of which one ergo blanket access, is a bad
>and possibly a dangerous idea.  And I amongst a growing number
>or knowledgable consumers, registrants, and even LEA's, agree.
>In fact according to the DOJ fraud, misuse, and other financial
>illegal scheme's by banks, financial institutions, and auditing
>firms has more than doubled sense 2002.
>
>-----Original Message-----
>  
>
>>From: Dan Krimm <dan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>Sent: May 11, 2007 11:20 PM
>>To: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>>Cc: gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
>>Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert
procedure
>>
>>Hope,
>>
>>I am not saying that phishing is not a problem that needs to be dealt
with.
>>I am simply saying that it should be dealt with in a measured way and
with
>>proper controls.  And, that there are other serious problems that crop
up
>>    
>>
>Regards,
>
>Jeffrey A. Williams
>Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
>"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
>   Abraham Lincoln
>
>"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is
very
>often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
>
>"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability
>depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
>P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
>United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
>===============================================================
>Updated 1/26/04
>CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security IDNS.
div. of
>Information Network Eng.  INEG. INC.
>ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 E-Mail
jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Registered Email addr with the USPS Contact Number: 214-244-4827
>
>
>
>Regards,
>
>Jeffrey A. Williams
>Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
>"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
>   Abraham Lincoln
>
>"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is
very
>often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
>
>"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability
>depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
>P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
>United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
>===============================================================
>Updated 1/26/04
>CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security IDNS.
div. of
>Information Network Eng.  INEG. INC.
>ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 E-Mail
jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Registered Email addr with the USPS Contact Number: 214-244-4827
>
>
>
>gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>
>  
>
>>when the method of dealing with it is not measured and does not have
proper
>>controls.
>>
>>Secondly, our deliberations here are about more than just banks, even
if
>>Palmer's suggestion was constrained to banks.
>>
>>My comment about consumers versus customers is about the fact that
giving
>>blanket access to banks for all Whois data provides access to personal
>>information about consumers who are not their direct customers, and
the
>>banks are not regulatorily restricted from using data about consumers
that
>>are not their direct customers, as they are with regard to their own
direct
>>customers.
>>
>>Example:  I have an account with bank A.  I do not have an account
with
>>bank B.  If bank B has blanket access to Whois data in order to find
>>phishers, because I am an Internet domain registrant, bank B gets my
>>personal data from Whois even if I am not a phisher.  Bank B is
regulated
>>in many cases with respect to its own customers, as bank A is
regulated
>>with regard to personal data it collects from me by virtue of being a
>>customer.  But bank B is not regulated with respect to the data about
me
>>that it gleans from sources such as Whois, because I am not a customer
of
>>bank B.  I cannot opt-out of bank B using my personal data for
anything it
>>wishes the way I can opt-out of bank A using my personal data in that
way.
>>
>>Personally, that bothers me, because I don't believe that "banks are
not
>>interested in information about millions upon millions (of) people" --
if
>>they can make a buck off of it, why wouldn't they be?  If they have
access
>>to that data, they can build a business selling it to people who use
it for
>>marketing (or other) purposes, just as they used to do with their
>>customers' information before regulation allowed some customers in
some
>>jurisdictions to opt out from those uses.
>>
>>Just because the anti-fraud departments of banks are not interested in
the
>>broad range of data doesn't mean that the ancillary-business
departments
>>(connected to marketing, etc.) of banks are not interested in the
data.
>>They'd be dumb not to be interested, where there's money to be made.
They
>>already have big businesses built on (currently) legal use of personal
data
>>collected from their customers.  It's only because of regulation that
I
>>have the option to opt-out of that use in some cases today.  It's not
like
>>the banks have been particularly trustworthy actors in this arena:
they
>>have done only what has been forced down their throats by law,
typically
>>nothing more, and even that much has not been without a fight.
>>
>>As a consumer, I am as alarmed as anyone about the problems of misuse
of
>>data leading to fraud and ID theft, etc.  The problem with granting
blanket
>>access to private entities without meaningful enforcement against
abuse is
>>that this creates a systematic incentive for misuse of data in
precisely
>>the way that can lead secondarily to ID theft, etc.  Example:  Bank B
sells
>>my personal data to someone posing as a marketer who then tries to
scam me.
>>Bank B may not have done the deed directly, but their "legitimate
marketing
>>data business" leads to misuse by others in a fraudulent manner.
Unless we
>>place enforceable limits on what banks may do with all this data, this
>>potential remains large.  I don't see anything in Palmer's proposal
that
>>suggests meaningful enforcement procedures to prevent this sort of
thing,
>>or even demonstrates that meaningful enforcement is possible.
>>
>>I support providing legitimate anti-fraud efforts what they need to do
>>their jobs, but no more than that.  Blanket access proposals without
due
>>process go *way* beyond the specific needs required to get the bad
guys,
>>and place orders of magnitude more good guys at unnecessary risk of
abuse
>>(without recourse, if the source of the abuse cannot be traced).
>>
>>Blanket access is easy for banks, but it goes too far and thus
endangers
>>many others in the process.  Our job should not be exclusively to make
>>things easy for banks at the expense of significant costs to other
>>stakeholders.  Banks should be able to get the job done, but with
>>enforceable controls and appropriate pre-screening.  Just like any
other
>>private entities that are involved in anti-fraud activities.
>>
>>Dan
>>
>>
>>
>>At 8:59 PM -0500 5/11/07, Hope.Mehlman@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>>    
>>
>>>Dan,
>>>
>>>I glad that you are able to recognize a phishing email when you see
one,
>>>unfortunately,  not everyone is able to do so. We wouldn't have a
problem
>>>if that were the case.  The fraudsters have become more and more
>>>sophisticated every day and I have seen highly educated people not be
able
>>>to recognize phishing emails or be confused as to whether an email is
>>>legitimate or not. For example, people are often times confused or
fall
>>>for fraudulent emails when their bank merges with another bank. The
>>>phishing emails address the merger and request.  Information stating
that
>>>it necessary for conversion purposes. Of course, this seems legitmate
to
>>>customers because they know their bank is in the process of merging
and in
>>>combination with legitimate advertising or communications via regular
>>>mail, television or print, even highly sophisticated individuals
fall for
>>>these schemes.
>>>
>>>Secondly, I am not sure why you are mixing Credit. Reporting Agencies
with
>>>banks, these are separate and distinct industries.
>>>
>>>Finally, I am not sure I understand the connection  with  regard to
your
>>>comment that  banks should not have access to Whois information
because
>>>they have enough information about their customers.  One has nothing
to do
>>>with the other.   Banks are not interested in information about
millions
>>>upon millions people but instead are interested in the Whois
information
>>>specifically related to domains used to perpetrate fraud upon
millions of
>>>innocent victims. Banks  use Whois information in order to combat
fraud
>>>and identity theft which results from phishing emails. Again, banks
aren't
>>>looking at information of anyone who is not a fraudster. If you have
the
>>>opportunity to speak with someone who has been  a victim of identity
theft
>>>or fraud, I would encourage you to do so.
>>>
>>>
>>>----- Original Message -----
>>>From: Dan Krimm [dan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
>>>Sent: 05/11/2007 05:32 PM MST
>>>To: <gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>Cc: <gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert
procedure
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>I'll let Eric speak for himself with regard to the email he receives,
but
>>>the phishing scams I get are easily recognized and discarded.  (The
first
>>>one I ever got -- before it had become prevalent, and before there
was a
>>>word coined for it -- I was temporarily confused, but I was alert
enough to
>>>check out the domain before supplying any info.  I have been
personally
>>>immune ever since.)
>>>
>>>While I opt-out of all uses of my info by financial institutions that
I can
>>>(and in California I can opt out of more than in other states or
countries,
>>>because of consumer-friendly state regulation), I am still troubled
by
>>>information collected by credit reporting agencies and other sources
that I
>>>do not know about.  I refuse to allow DoubleClick to place cookies on
my
>>>browsers.  And still I know this is not enough to be secure in the
>>>knowledge that data about me is not being used against my interests,
>>>usually by private entities out to make a buck.
>>>
>>>Banks already get a lot of personal information from their immediate
>>>customers.  There is no reason to give them unsupervised blanket
access to
>>>all information in the Whois database about millions upon millions of
>>>people who are not their direct customers.
>>>
>>>Information used for legitimate anti-fraud efforts needs to be
>>>well-targeted as much as possible, and checks and balances need to be
in
>>>place to assure appropriateness of access as a rule, since recourse
is not
>>>always available in the case of abuse (and thus deterrence may be
>>>ineffective).
>>>
>>>If ICANN is not in position to become a fully-functional public law
>>>enforcement entity in and of itself, with all of the due process and
>>>accountability that such a role calls for (and it seems pretty clear
that
>>>it is not), then that dynamic needs to be in the system somewhere,
somehow,
>>>and it needs to be designed with some serious effectiveness, not just
as a
>>>cosmetic ruse.
>>>
>>>Dan
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>At 5:54 PM -0500 5/11/07, Hope.Mehlman@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>>>      
>>>
>>>>Those 20 or so spam emails are likely phishing emails or scams.
Banks do
>>>>not send spam emails. These emails you are referring to are not
legitmate
>>>>emails, and this is exactly what banks are trying to prevent in
order to
>>>>protect consumers from identity theft and fraud.  Your email
highlights
>>>>how significant and prevalent this problem is.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>----- Original Message -----
>>>> From: Hugh Dierker [hdierker2204@xxxxxxxxx]
>>>> Sent: 05/11/2007 03:26 PM MST
>>>> To: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>>>> Cc: gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
>>>> Subject: RE: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert
procedure
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>This really assumes alot.  Hypothetical "who done its".  Does not
justify
>>>>giving out confidential information to banks.  I get 20 or so spams
a day
>>>>        
>>>>
>>>>from Banks. Junk mail another 5 a day- credit cards galore.
>>>      
>>>
>>>>I do not buy that "banks" want my info for purely secure reasons.
>>>>
>>>>Eric
>>>>
>>>>Palmer Hamilton <PalmerHamilton@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Dan,
>>>>
>>>>The problem is a practical one. Law enforcement has limited
resources.
>>>>We might wish that were not the case, but it is, and, realistically,
it
>>>>will always be the case. Law enforcement, as I set out in my earlier
>>>>emails to Milton, expects banks to do the legwork before it will
act.
>>>>Maybe it should be otherwise, but this is not the case nor will it
ever
>>>>be the case. In various roles, both in government and working on the
>>>>side of government, I have spent years working on the side of law
>>>>enforcement. I think it is fair to say that law enforcement's
approach
>>>>is virtually an immutable law of nature. And frankly from law
>>>>enforcement's standpoint, it must set priorities given its limited
>>>>resources.
>>>>
>>>>If banks do not have access to the necessary information, internet
users
>>>>and consumers will be put at much greater risk. It would be nice to
>>>>think that banks and consumers could simply lodge a complaint and
that
>>>>the complaint would be immediately acted upon. But this will never
>>>>happen. Law enforcement has too much on its plate. My banks can give
>>>>you page after page of examples to corroborate this. And remember
for
>>>>every hour that passes, millions can be lost, including life
savings.
>>>>
>>>>Please take another look at the example in my email to Milton
involving
>>>>the local police in a foreign jurisdiction that finally agreed to
act,
>>>>but only after the bank had exhausted all avenues and done all the
>>>>legwork. Realistically, absent bank access to the local address, it
is
>>>>unknown how many innocent consumers would have suffered losses
before
>>>>this fraudulent website was ever closed down.
>>>>
>>>>You are right that this is a question of balance. And I would argue
>>>>that consumer protection needs to be prominently considered, not
>>>>dismissed as unfortunate collateral damage.
>>>>
>>>>Banks are closely regulated and monitored entities with public
>>>>responsibilities. Those responsibilities are examined regularly by
bank
>>>>examiners. As a result, I would submit, consumer protection ought to
>>>>prevail in light of the protections from a privacy standpoint in the
>>>>existing regulatory structure.
>>>>
>>>>Palmer
>>>>
>>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>>From: owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx]
>>>>On Behalf Of Dan Krimm
>>>>Sent: Friday, May 11, 2007 3:43 PM
>>>>To: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>>>>Cc: gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
>>>>Subject: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure
>>>>
>>>>Palmer,
>>>>
>>>>If I may step in here (and shift this discussion over to the
Subgroup B
>>>>list where it properly belongs):
>>>>
>>>>At 1:44 PM -0500 5/11/07, Palmer Hamilton wrote:
>>>>
>>>>        
>>>>
>>>>>Just having the IP address and registrar is not sufficient. For
>>>>>example, one of my banks had a case in which it had to use local
police
>>>>>          
>>>>>
>>>>>in a foreign country to visit the physical address of the website
owner
>>>>>          
>>>>>
>>>>>to get the site taken down. The bank had tried to get the registrar
to
>>>>>          
>>>>>
>>>>>shut it down without success. The bank had also tried to stop the
site
>>>>>          
>>>>>
>>>>>with the administrative contact, the technical contact, the abuse
>>>>>contact, and the website owner, all with no success. The registrar
was
>>>>>          
>>>>>
>>>>>also not interested in working with the local police, but the local
>>>>>police agreed to assist AFTED the bank provided the police the full
>>>>>WHOIS information plus a synopsis of its takedown efforts.
>>>>>          
>>>>>
>>>>So the question here is, when the bank is involved in valid efforts
that
>>>>require access to Whois data that is designated as private there
>>>>certainly should be a process for that data to be engaged in the
>>>>process, so what should that process be? No one is suggesting that
the
>>>>bank never get any such information whatsoever. But some of us are
>>>>suggesting that private entities should not get direct access to the
>>>>Whois data, but rather get information from formally accountable
LEAs
>>>>who have direct access.
>>>>
>>>>It doesn't mean that private agents cannot contribute to the
>>>>investigation process, but that private agents need only be given
what
>>>>they need in a particular context rather than being given the full
range
>>>>of powers granted to publicly-accountable law enforcement. And, that
>>>>LEAs be responsible for providing appropriate information to private
>>>>agents that are participating in investigation processes. Once such
a
>>>>policy is well-defined, it is possible to build technological
systems
>>>>that adhere to those policies and operate efficiently without
>>>>unnecessary human intervention.
>>>>
>>>>And if ICANN jurisdiction is insufficient to resolve all structure
>>>>issues, that still may not be ICANN's responsibility to solve.
>>>>
>>>>At some point public law enforcement must step up to the plate to do
>>>>what needs to be done. ICANN cannot solve all the world's public
>>>>problems on its own, or even those problems that may relate
tangentially
>>>>to the technical operation of the Internet. ICANN is not a proper
venue
>>>>to determine and conduct public governance activities, or to
authorize
>>>>private execution of public governance.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>        
>>>>
>>>>>Having said this, the Dutch model could ultimately help fill a void
on
>>>>>the international level by leveraging international pressure on
>>>>>recalcitrant governments. But again, this is not really an
alternative
>>>>>          
>>>>>
>>>>>to what we are doing in Subgroup B, as I understand it.
>>>>>          
>>>>>
>>>>What exactly are we doing in subgroup B as you understand it?
>>>>
>>>>As I understand it, we are trying to reach some consensus on what
GNSO
>>>>should recommend to the ICANN Board with regard to determining to
whom
>>>>and how direct access to private Whois data under the OPoC paradigm
>>>>should be granted (by registries and/or registrars). This does not
>>>>speak to indirect access through authorized/certified LEAs.
>>>>
>>>>I have no expectation (or illusion) that what we come up with here
will
>>>>create a perfect world. It will certainly continue to be
systematically
>>>>imperfect from a privacy protection standpoint. If you are hoping to
>>>>find perfection, then that is undoubtedly beyond the scope of this
WG or
>>>>Subgroup B.
>>>>
>>>>We are not in a position to dictate a comprehensive and airtight
>>>>resolution to the full complexity of issues here. So at least *that*
is
>>>>*not* what we are doing here.
>>>>
>>>>Dan
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Need Mail bonding?
>>>>Go to the
>>>><http://answers.yahoo.com/dir/index;_ylc=X3oDMTFvbGNhMGE3BF9TAzM5NjU
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sk&sid=396546091>Yahoo!
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sk&sid=396546091>great
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>>>>        
>>>>
>
>  
>