<<<
Chronological Index
>>> <<<
Thread Index
>>>
Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure
- To: Carole Bird <Carole.Bird@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure
- From: Hugh Dierker <hdierker2204@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 16 May 2007 20:11:36 -0700 (PDT)
Carole,
I am afraid you answered a bit like a politician ;-) But I am sure you knew
that.
Clearly each situation is unique. Sometimes things are acceptable in court
and sometimes not.
Reality is somewhere between third parties as agents and merely witnesses. Of
course victims and perpetrators fit in there somewhere.
So the only fair conclusion is that, using the theory of; doing the "legwork"
for Law enforcement as a reason to justify business access to personal private
data is fallacious.
We can fairly write this concept off as a reason to keep private data public.
Or am I wrong?
Eric
Carole Bird <Carole.Bird@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Hi Eric,
Sorry for the delay in getting back to you. I wanted to discuss the question
you were posing with some of my colleagues.
In short, this may well vary from country to country in terms of who is law
enforcement, how law enforcement interacts with the private sectors and what
kind of information is admissable in their courts. The reason the latter is
important is that it dictates when/whether the police can accept information
from someone where the information comes from another "source of information"
not under the person's purview or control.
Carole
>>> Hugh Dierker 05/15/07 10:03 AM >>>
If think the FTC as usual spoke volumes in what they left unsaid.
Where did the concept of banks doing the "legwork" come from.
I would especially like to hear from the Law Enforcement members on that.
Carole what are your thoughts on this "doing legwork for law enforcement"
concept.
Eric
Jeff Williams wrote:
Steven and all sgb members,
It is far more important to recognize what the FTC's own study
did NOT indicate. Ergo that there was no mention of access
to PRIVATE Whois data in order to perform their function
effectively. Hence, why we are here and at the crux of what,
who, and how we need to focus upon. The FTC's own study
also did NOT indicate a need for banks to do the "leg work"
for their study or perform their function.
Metalitz, Steven wrote:
> Of course, the FTC's own study showed the opposite of what EPIC stated
> -- that Whois is not a significant contributor of e-mail addresses for
> spamming purposes.
> http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/spamalrt.shtm Another study
> by the Center for Democracy and Technology reached the same conclusion.
> See http://www.cdt.org/speech/spam/030319spamreport.shtml {"We tested
> how much spam would be received to an address provided in the WHOIS
> database. Contrary to our expectations, just one spam e-mail was
> generated in the six months that our project was operational.") And the
> other testimony presented to Congress at the hearing where EPIC
> testified is well worth reviewing, including the statements of the
> Federal Trade Commission about how they rely upon access to Whois data
> to enforce laws that protect consumer privacy, and on how consumer
> access to Whois data also assists the FTC in its consumer and privacy
> protection mission. See
> http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/071806eh.pdf (All the
> hearing testimony is compiled at
> http://financialservices.house.gov/archive/hearings.asp@formmode=detail&
> hearing=491.html)
>
> Steve Metalitz
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:owner-gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Robin Gross
> Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2007 2:00 PM
> To: jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx; gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure
>
> Indeed. Let's not forget that in 2006, the US Federal Trade Commission
> stated that online data mining is the number one crime in the United
> States. Privacy experts at EPIC, testified before US Congress that
> databases such as whois are among the most significant contributors to
> this problem:
> http://www.epic.org/privacy/whois/phishing_test.pdf
>
> jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>
> >Dan and all,
> >
> > To sum up what you seem to ge getting at is that allowing
> >banks regardless of which one ergo blanket access, is a bad
> >and possibly a dangerous idea. And I amongst a growing number
> >or knowledgable consumers, registrants, and even LEA's, agree.
> >In fact according to the DOJ fraud, misuse, and other financial
> >illegal scheme's by banks, financial institutions, and auditing
> >firms has more than doubled sense 2002.
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >
> >
> >>From: Dan Krimm
> >>Sent: May 11, 2007 11:20 PM
> >>To: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
> >>Cc: gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
> >>Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert
> procedure
> >>
> >>Hope,
> >>
> >>I am not saying that phishing is not a problem that needs to be dealt
> with.
> >>I am simply saying that it should be dealt with in a measured way and
> with
> >>proper controls. And, that there are other serious problems that crop
> up
> >>
> >>
> >Regards,
> >
> >Jeffrey A. Williams
> >Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
> >"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
> > Abraham Lincoln
> >
> >"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is
> very
> >often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
> >
> >"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
> liability
> >depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
> >P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
> >United States v. Carroll Towing (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
> >===============================================================
> >Updated 1/26/04
> >CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security IDNS.
> div. of
> >Information Network Eng. INEG. INC.
> >ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 E-Mail
> jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >Registered Email addr with the USPS Contact Number: 214-244-4827
> >
> >
> >
> >Regards,
> >
> >Jeffrey A. Williams
> >Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
> >"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
> > Abraham Lincoln
> >
> >"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is
> very
> >often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
> >
> >"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
> liability
> >depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
> >P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
> >United States v. Carroll Towing (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
> >===============================================================
> >Updated 1/26/04
> >CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security IDNS.
> div. of
> >Information Network Eng. INEG. INC.
> >ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 E-Mail
> jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >Registered Email addr with the USPS Contact Number: 214-244-4827
> >
> >
> >
> >gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
> >
> >
> >
> >>when the method of dealing with it is not measured and does not have
> proper
> >>controls.
> >>
> >>Secondly, our deliberations here are about more than just banks, even
> if
> >>Palmer's suggestion was constrained to banks.
> >>
> >>My comment about consumers versus customers is about the fact that
> giving
> >>blanket access to banks for all Whois data provides access to personal
> >>information about consumers who are not their direct customers, and
> the
> >>banks are not regulatorily restricted from using data about consumers
> that
> >>are not their direct customers, as they are with regard to their own
> direct
> >>customers.
> >>
> >>Example: I have an account with bank A. I do not have an account
> with
> >>bank B. If bank B has blanket access to Whois data in order to find
> >>phishers, because I am an Internet domain registrant, bank B gets my
> >>personal data from Whois even if I am not a phisher. Bank B is
> regulated
> >>in many cases with respect to its own customers, as bank A is
> regulated
> >>with regard to personal data it collects from me by virtue of being a
> >>customer. But bank B is not regulated with respect to the data about
> me
> >>that it gleans from sources such as Whois, because I am not a customer
> of
> >>bank B. I cannot opt-out of bank B using my personal data for
> anything it
> >>wishes the way I can opt-out of bank A using my personal data in that
> way.
> >>
> >>Personally, that bothers me, because I don't believe that "banks are
> not
> >>interested in information about millions upon millions (of) people" --
> if
> >>they can make a buck off of it, why wouldn't they be? If they have
> access
> >>to that data, they can build a business selling it to people who use
> it for
> >>marketing (or other) purposes, just as they used to do with their
> >>customers' information before regulation allowed some customers in
> some
> >>jurisdictions to opt out from those uses.
> >>
> >>Just because the anti-fraud departments of banks are not interested in
> the
> >>broad range of data doesn't mean that the ancillary-business
> departments
> >>(connected to marketing, etc.) of banks are not interested in the
> data.
> >>They'd be dumb not to be interested, where there's money to be made.
> They
> >>already have big businesses built on (currently) legal use of personal
> data
> >>collected from their customers. It's only because of regulation that
> I
> >>have the option to opt-out of that use in some cases today. It's not
> like
> >>the banks have been particularly trustworthy actors in this arena:
> they
> >>have done only what has been forced down their throats by law,
> typically
> >>nothing more, and even that much has not been without a fight.
> >>
> >>As a consumer, I am as alarmed as anyone about the problems of misuse
> of
> >>data leading to fraud and ID theft, etc. The problem with granting
> blanket
> >>access to private entities without meaningful enforcement against
> abuse is
> >>that this creates a systematic incentive for misuse of data in
> precisely
> >>the way that can lead secondarily to ID theft, etc. Example: Bank B
> sells
> >>my personal data to someone posing as a marketer who then tries to
> scam me.
> >>Bank B may not have done the deed directly, but their "legitimate
> marketing
> >>data business" leads to misuse by others in a fraudulent manner.
> Unless we
> >>place enforceable limits on what banks may do with all this data, this
> >>potential remains large. I don't see anything in Palmer's proposal
> that
> >>suggests meaningful enforcement procedures to prevent this sort of
> thing,
> >>or even demonstrates that meaningful enforcement is possible.
> >>
> >>I support providing legitimate anti-fraud efforts what they need to do
> >>their jobs, but no more than that. Blanket access proposals without
> due
> >>process go *way* beyond the specific needs required to get the bad
> guys,
> >>and place orders of magnitude more good guys at unnecessary risk of
> abuse
> >>(without recourse, if the source of the abuse cannot be traced).
> >>
> >>Blanket access is easy for banks, but it goes too far and thus
> endangers
> >>many others in the process. Our job should not be exclusively to make
> >>things easy for banks at the expense of significant costs to other
> >>stakeholders. Banks should be able to get the job done, but with
> >>enforceable controls and appropriate pre-screening. Just like any
> other
> >>private entities that are involved in anti-fraud activities.
> >>
> >>Dan
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>At 8:59 PM -0500 5/11/07, Hope.Mehlman@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>Dan,
> >>>
> >>>I glad that you are able to recognize a phishing email when you see
> one,
> >>>unfortunately, not everyone is able to do so. We wouldn't have a
> problem
> >>>if that were the case. The fraudsters have become more and more
> >>>sophisticated every day and I have seen highly educated people not be
> able
> >>>to recognize phishing emails or be confused as to whether an email is
> >>>legitimate or not. For example, people are often times confused or
> fall
> >>>for fraudulent emails when their bank merges with another bank. The
> >>>phishing emails address the merger and request. Information stating
> that
> >>>it necessary for conversion purposes. Of course, this seems legitmate
> to
> >>>customers because they know their bank is in the process of merging
> and in
> >>>combination with legitimate advertising or communications via regular
> >>>mail, television or print, even highly sophisticated individuals
> fall for
> >>>these schemes.
> >>>
> >>>Secondly, I am not sure why you are mixing Credit. Reporting Agencies
> with
> >>>banks, these are separate and distinct industries.
> >>>
> >>>Finally, I am not sure I understand the connection with regard to
> your
> >>>comment that banks should not have access to Whois information
> because
> >>>they have enough information about their customers. One has nothing
> to do
> >>>with the other. Banks are not interested in information about
> millions
> >>>upon millions people but instead are interested in the Whois
> information
> >>>specifically related to domains used to perpetrate fraud upon
> millions of
> >>>innocent victims. Banks use Whois information in order to combat
> fraud
> >>>and identity theft which results from phishing emails. Again, banks
> aren't
> >>>looking at information of anyone who is not a fraudster. If you have
> the
> >>>opportunity to speak with someone who has been a victim of identity
> theft
> >>>or fraud, I would encourage you to do so.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>----- Original Message -----
> >>>From: Dan Krimm [dan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> >>>Sent: 05/11/2007 05:32 PM MST
> >>>To:
> >>>Cc:
> >>>Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert
> procedure
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>I'll let Eric speak for himself with regard to the email he receives,
> but
> >>>the phishing scams I get are easily recognized and discarded. (The
> first
> >>>one I ever got -- before it had become prevalent, and before there
> was a
> >>>word coined for it -- I was temporarily confused, but I was alert
> enough to
> >>>check out the domain before supplying any info. I have been
> personally
> >>>immune ever since.)
> >>>
> >>>While I opt-out of all uses of my info by financial institutions that
> I can
> >>>(and in California I can opt out of more than in other states or
> countries,
> >>>because of consumer-friendly state regulation), I am still troubled
> by
> >>>information collected by credit reporting agencies and other sources
> that I
> >>>do not know about. I refuse to allow DoubleClick to place cookies on
> my
> >>>browsers. And still I know this is not enough to be secure in the
> >>>knowledge that data about me is not being used against my interests,
> >>>usually by private entities out to make a buck.
> >>>
> >>>Banks already get a lot of personal information from their immediate
> >>>customers. There is no reason to give them unsupervised blanket
> access to
> >>>all information in the Whois database about millions upon millions of
> >>>people who are not their direct customers.
> >>>
> >>>Information used for legitimate anti-fraud efforts needs to be
> >>>well-targeted as much as possible, and checks and balances need to be
> in
> >>>place to assure appropriateness of access as a rule, since recourse
> is not
> >>>always available in the case of abuse (and thus deterrence may be
> >>>ineffective).
> >>>
> >>>If ICANN is not in position to become a fully-functional public law
> >>>enforcement entity in and of itself, with all of the due process and
> >>>accountability that such a role calls for (and it seems pretty clear
> that
> >>>it is not), then that dynamic needs to be in the system somewhere,
> somehow,
> >>>and it needs to be designed with some serious effectiveness, not just
> as a
> >>>cosmetic ruse.
> >>>
> >>>Dan
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>At 5:54 PM -0500 5/11/07, Hope.Mehlman@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>Those 20 or so spam emails are likely phishing emails or scams.
> Banks do
> >>>>not send spam emails. These emails you are referring to are not
> legitmate
> >>>>emails, and this is exactly what banks are trying to prevent in
> order to
> >>>>protect consumers from identity theft and fraud. Your email
> highlights
> >>>>how significant and prevalent this problem is.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>----- Original Message -----
> >>>> From: Hugh Dierker [hdierker2204@xxxxxxxxx]
> >>>> Sent: 05/11/2007 03:26 PM MST
> >>>> To: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
> >>>> Cc: gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
> >>>> Subject: RE: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert
> procedure
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>This really assumes alot. Hypothetical "who done its". Does not
> justify
> >>>>giving out confidential information to banks. I get 20 or so spams
> a day
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>from Banks. Junk mail another 5 a day- credit cards galore.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>I do not buy that "banks" want my info for purely secure reasons.
> >>>>
> >>>>Eric
> >>>>
> >>>>Palmer Hamilton
wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>Dan,
> >>>>
> >>>>The problem is a practical one. Law enforcement has limited
> resources.
> >>>>We might wish that were not the case, but it is, and, realistically,
> it
> >>>>will always be the case. Law enforcement, as I set out in my earlier
> >>>>emails to Milton, expects banks to do the legwork before it will
> act.
> >>>>Maybe it should be otherwise, but this is not the case nor will it
> ever
> >>>>be the case. In various roles, both in government and working on the
> >>>>side of government, I have spent years working on the side of law
> >>>>enforcement. I think it is fair to say that law enforcement's
> approach
> >>>>is virtually an immutable law of nature. And frankly from law
> >>>>enforcement's standpoint, it must set priorities given its limited
> >>>>resources.
> >>>>
> >>>>If banks do not have access to the necessary information, internet
> users
> >>>>and consumers will be put at much greater risk. It would be nice to
> >>>>think that banks and consumers could simply lodge a complaint and
REgards,
--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
"Obediance of the law is the greatest freedom" -
Abraham Lincoln
"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is
very often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security
IDNS. div. of Information Network Eng. INEG. INC.
ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402
E-Mail jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Registered Email addr with the USPS
Contact Number: 214-244-4827
---------------------------------
You snooze, you lose. Get messages ASAP with AutoCheck
in the all-new Yahoo! Mail Beta.
---------------------------------
Pinpoint customers who are looking for what you sell.
<<<
Chronological Index
>>> <<<
Thread Index
>>>
|