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RE: [gnso-arr-dt] Draft ARR Letter
- To: "William Drake" <william.drake@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, <gnso-arr-dt@xxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: RE: [gnso-arr-dt] Draft ARR Letter
- From: "Gomes, Chuck" <cgomes@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2010 17:31:36 -0500
You guys are good! Very well done.
I inserted a few comments below.
Chuck
________________________________
From: owner-gnso-arr-dt@xxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-gnso-arr-dt@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of William Drake
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2010 1:38 PM
To: gnso-arr-dt@xxxxxxxxx
Subject: [gnso-arr-dt] Draft ARR Letter
Hello,
Hope everyone's week end is going well...Following consultation
with Caroline and Zahid, below is a short initial draft that tries to
take on board the various points people have made on the call and
online. If it misses anything or you'd prefer other wording, have at it
and edit/amend/substitute to taste. If I recall correctly Chuck said we
should get this to Council by Wednesday, so we have a couple days to
whack it around...[Gomes, Chuck] Documents need to be distributed at
least 8 days before consideration so Wednesday would be the latest it
could be sent and preferably early on Wednesday. In the case of the
RySG, we have a meeting early Wednesday so it would really be helpful to
send it out on Tuesday. If possible, let's try to finalize it by COB on
Monday. All SGs will need to get feedback from their groups in advance
of the Council meeting so the more time we can allow for that the
better.
Cheers,
Bill
---------------
The GNSO Council largely supports the approach outlined in the
draft proposal on the Affirmation Reviews Requirements and
Implementation Processes. In the hope of strengthening the processes
and ICANN's ability to satisfy the AoC requirements, we would like to
offer the following observations and recommendations.
1. Size and Composition of the Review Teams
The draft argues that, "there is no doubt that the review teams
should be kept small. This self-evident assumption is confirmed by the
volume of literature on group dynamics. [sic] Also, the optimal size of
working, consensus-based groups is often considered to be between six
and eight individuals." Accordingly, the draft recommends teams of
that size. We have four concerns with this approach.
First, a broader review of the relevant literatures---e.g. on
negotiation analysis, collective action, and international
cooperation---would reveal that the relationship between group size and
effectiveness is highly indeterminate. Indeed, whether collaborative
decision-making processes succeed or fail depends on a variety of
contextual and other factors that are wholly unrelated to group size.
Second, larger groups successfully undertake consensus-based work in
ICANN and related institutional settings all the time, and the review
teams are likely to include people from the community that have
participated in such efforts and understand what is required to achieve
productive and well-supported outcomes.
Third, what really is self-evident is that the review teams will
need to perform a great deal of work on demanding schedules. This is
especially so with regard to the first review on accountability and
transparency. Even with the envisaged staff support, the members of
very small teams would likely be hard pressed to manage the work loads
alongside all their other responsibilities. Designating alternates
might reduce the risk of any members proving unable to fully participate
or handle the tasks at hand, but relying on alternates could raise other
process management issues.
Fourth, selecting just one member from each relevant of the
AC/SOs (or less, in the case of Security, Stability and Resiliency team)
seems especially problematic. In particular, it would greatly reduce
the teams' ability to leverage the available expertise, fail to reflect
the community's diverse interests and experiences with respect to the
issues under assessment, and hence could reduce the degree of "buy in"
on the final products. These concerns are particularly acute with
respect to the GNSO, which comprises four broad stakeholder groups that
have unique roles and perspectives and that could be mostly deeply
impacted by the results of the AoC reviews (e.g. on such issues as
competition and consumer trust and choice, WHOIS, and the policy
development process). [To add, per Chuck?: It might also be noted
that GNSO registrants pay fees that fund well over 90% of ICANN's
activities.][Gomes, Chuck] [I don't think there is anything to lose in
including this but will accept the will of the group.]
Accordingly, we suggest that the review teams be expanded to
twelve to fifteen members, and that the GNSO be allocated at least two
slots [Zahid suggests "two or even three"][Gomes, Chuck] [How about
something like this: ". . . the GNSO be allocated two to three slots"]
on each team, including for the one for Security, Stability and
Resiliency. We recognize that these revisions would have budgetary and
operational implications, but we are convinced that they are necessary
to fulfill the AoC mandate and to ensure high-quality and broadly
supported outcomes.
Given the important roles they will play in the process and the
importance of engaging specialized expertise from across the community,
we also suggest that AC/SOs be able to suggest Independent Experts for
consideration by the Selectors.
Finally, we would appreciate any clarification as to the
evaluation criteria that will be used to select from the pool of
nominees. This will better enable the GNSO to undertake its own
assessment of candidates and to maximize nominees' degree of fit with
the desired skill sets and expertise.
2. Communication and Coordination with the Community
We agree with the draft that Review team members are not to
"represent" particularistic interests, and that they should be broadly
neutral and focused on the collective good of the ICANN community as a
whole. Participants must have the operational autonomy needed to
function in this manner, and should not be unduly influenced by the
immediate debates and sources of contention that arise across the ICANN
ecosystem. But at the same time, it would be undesirable for the teams
to work in hermetically sealed boxes cut off from the community, or to
rely only on the public comment periods for input on the review
processes. A mechanism should be established to allow an appropriate
measure of two-way communication when needed.
The GNSO Council therefore proposes that review team members
drawn from the AC/SOs be mandated to periodically update their
nominating bodies on the main developments and issues of direct
relevance to them. In parallel, these team members should be able to
solicit inputs from their SO/ACs when this would be helpful, and be
prepared to pass along unsolicited inputs that their nominating bodies
agree would be particularly important to take under consideration.
Obviously, any such communications would need to respect reasonable
restrictions like the Chatham House rule[Gomes, Chuck] [Should add a
footnote to explain.] , and the SO/ACs should be expected to exercise
prudence and to only make use of the opportunity when it is necessary to
support the teams and/or convey major concerns.
3. Support Teams
Even if the size of the review teams is expanded per the above,
managing all the work envisaged over extended time periods will be very
challenging. As such, it is reasonable to expect that there will be
instances where some task-specific support may be needed, e.g. with data
collection, that would impose a substantial burden on both team members
and the staff. One way of addressing these challenges would be to
constitute a support team for each review that can be turned to for
targeted assistance. Such teams could [Gomes, Chuck] be drawn from the
pools of nominees that were not selected for review team membership. If
those pools were not sufficiently robust or did not offer the
specialized expertise needed, the SO/ACs could suggest additional names
for consideration by the Selectors. [Zahid suggests: "Adequate staff
support would also be necessary and appropriate administrative costs
associated with intensive staff support should be allocated to the work
to be undertaken by the review team.][Gomes, Chuck] [I am fine with
Zahid's addition.]
4. Operational Considerations
The GNSO Council wishes to comment on three elements of the
draft concerning the working methods and conduct of the review teams.
First, we would like to emphasize the importance of employing
quantitative performance indicators that are as objective and measurable
as possible and are sensitive to ICANN's particular characteristics. In
parallel, it is essential that the qualitative indicators and associated
methodology effectively draw on the range of expert analysis and capture
community members' actual experiences with the respective processes and
issues. Designing and employing these indicators in a neutral, balanced
and scientific manner will be a significant challenge, but it is also a
prerequisite for evaluative fairness and good community receptions of
the reports.
Second, while the review teams must conduct their own exercises
and come to their own conclusions, it important to recall that ICANN has
long undertaken a range of process assessments that could be drawn on,
some of which are ongoing. In this connection, we note in particular
that AOC 9.1.e) calls for an assessment of the policy development
process. The GNSO is of course actively engaged in such an effort in
the context of its current restructuring and respectfully suggests that
the results of our assessment be given full consideration in this
review.
Finally, we would much appreciate clarification as to how
consensus in the decision making process will be defined.
***********************************************************
William J. Drake
Senior Associate
Centre for International Governance
Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies
Geneva, Switzerland
william.drake@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
www.graduateinstitute.ch/cig/drake.html
***********************************************************
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