[gnso-arr-dt] Draft ARR Letter

[William Drake <william.drake@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hello,

Hope everyone's week end is going well...Following consultation with Caroline 
and Zahid, below is a short initial draft that tries to take on board the 
various points people have made on the call and online.  If it misses anything 
or you'd prefer other wording, have at it and edit/amend/substitute to taste.  
If I recall correctly Chuck said we should get this to Council by Wednesday, so 
we have a couple days to whack it around...

Cheers,

Bill

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The GNSO Council largely supports the approach outlined in the draft proposal 
on the Affirmation Reviews Requirements and Implementation Processes.  In the 
hope of strengthening the processes and ICANN’s ability to satisfy the AoC 
requirements, we would like to offer the following observations and 
recommendations.


1.  Size and Composition of the Review Teams

The draft argues that, “there is no doubt that the review teams should be kept 
small. This self-evident assumption is confirmed by the volume of literature on 
group dynamics.  [sic] Also, the optimal size of working, consensus-based 
groups is often considered to be between six and eight individuals.”   
Accordingly, the draft recommends teams of that size.  We have four concerns 
with this approach. 

First, a broader review of the relevant literatures---e.g. on negotiation 
analysis, collective action, and international cooperation---would reveal that 
the relationship between group size and effectiveness is highly indeterminate.  
Indeed, whether collaborative decision-making processes succeed or fail depends 
on a variety of contextual and other factors that are wholly unrelated to group 
size.  Second, larger groups successfully undertake consensus-based work in 
ICANN and related institutional settings all the time, and the review teams are 
likely to include people from the community that have participated in such 
efforts and understand what is required to achieve productive and 
well-supported outcomes.

Third, what really is self-evident is that the review teams will need to 
perform a great deal of work on demanding schedules.  This is especially so 
with regard to the first review on accountability and transparency.   Even with 
the envisaged staff support, the members of very small teams would likely be 
hard pressed to manage the work loads alongside all their other 
responsibilities.  Designating alternates might reduce the risk of any members 
proving unable to fully participate or handle the tasks at hand, but relying on 
alternates could raise other process management issues.

Fourth, selecting just one member from each relevant of the AC/SOs (or less, in 
the case of Security, Stability and Resiliency team) seems especially 
problematic.  In particular, it would greatly reduce the teams’ ability to 
leverage the available expertise, fail to reflect the community’s diverse 
interests and experiences with respect to the issues under assessment, and 
hence could reduce the degree of “buy in” on the final products.  These 
concerns are particularly acute with respect to the GNSO, which comprises four 
broad stakeholder groups that have unique roles and perspectives and that could 
be mostly deeply impacted by the results of the AoC reviews (e.g. on such 
issues as competition and consumer trust and choice, WHOIS, and the policy 
development process).   [To add, per Chuck?:  It might also be noted that GNSO 
registrants pay fees that fund well over 90% of ICANN's activities.]

Accordingly, we suggest that the review teams be expanded to twelve to fifteen 
members, and that the GNSO be allocated at least two slots [Zahid suggests "two 
or even three"] on each team, including for the one for Security, Stability and 
Resiliency.  We recognize that these revisions would have budgetary and 
operational implications, but we are convinced that they are necessary to 
fulfill the AoC mandate and to ensure high-quality and broadly supported 
outcomes.

Given the important roles they will play in the process and the importance of 
engaging specialized expertise from across the community, we also suggest that 
AC/SOs be able to suggest Independent Experts for consideration by the 
Selectors.

Finally, we would appreciate any clarification as to the evaluation criteria 
that will be used to select from the pool of nominees. This will better enable 
the GNSO to undertake its own assessment of candidates and to maximize 
nominees’ degree of fit with the desired skill sets and expertise.

 
2. Communication and Coordination with the Community

We agree with the draft that Review team members are not to “represent” 
particularistic interests, and that they should be broadly neutral and focused 
on the collective good of the ICANN community as a whole.  Participants must 
have the operational autonomy needed to function in this manner, and should not 
be unduly influenced by the immediate debates and sources of contention that 
arise across the ICANN ecosystem.  But at the same time, it would be 
undesirable for the teams to work in hermetically sealed boxes cut off from the 
community, or to rely only on the public comment periods for input on the 
review processes.  A mechanism should be established to allow an appropriate 
measure of two-way communication when needed.

The GNSO Council therefore proposes that review team members drawn from the 
AC/SOs be mandated to periodically update their nominating bodies on the main 
developments and issues of direct relevance to them.  In parallel, these team 
members should be able to solicit inputs from their SO/ACs when this would be 
helpful, and be prepared to pass along unsolicited inputs that their nominating 
bodies agree would be particularly important to take under consideration.  
Obviously, any such communications would need to respect reasonable 
restrictions like the Chatham House rule, and the SO/ACs should be expected to 
exercise prudence and to only make use of the opportunity when it is necessary 
to support the teams and/or convey major concerns.


3.  Support Teams

Even if the size of the review teams is expanded per the above, managing all 
the work envisaged over extended time periods will be very challenging. As 
such, it is reasonable to expect that there will be instances where some 
task-specific support may be needed, e.g. with data collection, that would 
impose a substantial burden on both team members and the staff.  One way of 
addressing these challenges would be to constitute a support team for each 
review that can be turned to for targeted assistance.  Such teams could drawn 
from the pools of nominees that were not selected for review team membership.  
If those pools were not sufficiently robust or did not offer the specialized 
expertise needed, the SO/ACs could suggest additional names for consideration 
by the Selectors.  [Zahid suggests: "Adequate staff support would also be 
necessary and appropriate administrative costs associated with intensive staff 
support should be allocated to the work to be undertaken by the review team.]


4.  Operational Considerations

The GNSO Council wishes to comment on three elements of the draft concerning 
the working methods and conduct of the review teams.

First, we would like to emphasize the importance of employing quantitative 
performance indicators that are as objective and measurable as possible and are 
sensitive to ICANN’s particular characteristics.  In parallel, it is essential 
that the qualitative indicators and associated methodology effectively draw on 
the range of expert analysis and capture community members’ actual experiences 
with the respective processes and issues.  Designing and employing these 
indicators in a neutral, balanced and scientific manner will be a significant 
challenge, but it is also a prerequisite for evaluative fairness and good 
community receptions of the reports.

Second, while the review teams must conduct their own exercises and come to 
their own conclusions, it important to recall that ICANN has long undertaken a 
range of process assessments that could be drawn on, some of which are ongoing. 
 In this connection, we note in particular that AOC 9.1.e) calls for an 
assessment of the policy development process.  The GNSO is of course actively 
engaged in such an effort in the context of its current restructuring and 
respectfully suggests that the results of our assessment be given full 
consideration in this review.

Finally, we would much appreciate clarification as to how consensus in the 
decision making process will be defined.

 
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William J. Drake
Senior Associate
Centre for International Governance
Graduate Institute of International and
 Development Studies
Geneva, Switzerland
william.drake@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
www.graduateinstitute.ch/cig/drake.html
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