RE: [gnso-arr-dt] Permanent Review Team Process

["Gomes, Chuck" <cgomes@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I think you raise some critical issues Bill.

Chuck 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-gnso-arr-dt@xxxxxxxxx 
> [mailto:owner-gnso-arr-dt@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of William Drake
> Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 2:09 AM
> To: Tim Ruiz
> Cc: gnso-arr-dt@xxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [gnso-arr-dt] Permanent Review Team Process
> 
> 
> Hi Tim
> 
> On Apr 16, 2010, at 12:09 AM, Tim Ruiz wrote:
> 
> > This also allows more applicants to be considered by the Selectors.
> > Otherwise, I am concerned that the only applicants we will get are 
> > those pre-ordained by the SGs - others won't see the point. 
> This also 
> > seems more fair to those that do bother to go through the 
> application process.
> 
> I understand your thinking now and appreciate the suggestion. 
>  How would you respond to the counter-arguments, e.g. that 
> such an approach would
> 
> 1.  Vest all responsibility for deciding who represents the 
> GNSO community in the selectors rather than the community 
> itself, and thus leaves us all without a voice in the 
> process.  How would this square with the aspiration to follow 
> bottom up democratic consensus-based procedures?  Would we 
> agree to follow this model for other kinds of decisions in 
> ICANN, and if not, why would it then be right here?
> 
> 2.  Relatedly, dump all the work on the selectors, rather 
> than aiding them in sorting through potentially largish 
> pools.   In order to know that they're picking people the 
> community supports, wouldn't they have to do extra cycles of 
> back channel consultation, which would make the process less 
> transparent?  Or would we just trust them to pick optimally 
> on their own, even though they may not know the candidates, 
> their particular expertise, the issues of particular concern 
> to GNSO that its reps would have to carry into the process, etc?
> 
> 3.  Politicizes the whole process by promoting asymmetries in 
> potential influence and representation.  Let's say that a 
> particularly well resourced SG decides great, we'll put 
> forward ten names in order to up our chances.  Other SGs 
> might feel like this is rather unfair if they cannot muster a 
> similar number of candidates.  To avoid that, they'd have to 
> put in a bunch of effort beating the bushes and badgering 
> their people that please, we need more bodies to offset SG 
> x's undue advantage.  Could be a bit of a drain and 
> distraction on volunteers who are already often hard pressed 
> to keep up with all the work going on.
> 
> To me, giving each SG one guaranteed nominee creates a level 
> playing field among SGs and eliminates an additional level of 
> unnecessary political drama within ICANN, ensures broad based 
> representation in the nominee pool consistent with the AoC, 
> and puts the responsibility for deciding who should represent 
> the community in the community's hands, rather than in the 
> hands of just two people who may not be attuned to our 
> internal conditions.  And the fifth slot allows people who 
> aren't connected to or wouldn't be selected by the SGs to 
> have a fair shot.
> 
> But that's just me.  If everyone else feels differently and 
> we're able to get community consensus on an alternative 
> model, then let's do that instead.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Bill
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>