RE: [gnso-consensus-wg] Nom Comm appointee roles
- To: "Avri Doria" <avri@xxxxxxx>, <gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: RE: [gnso-consensus-wg] Nom Comm appointee roles
- From: "Milton L Mueller" <mueller@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2008 19:04:59 -0400
I feel a bit wounded, but more puzzled, by your characterization of all
GNSO constituencies as a bunch of "insiders." The idea seems almost
laughably out of place when applied to the advocacy groups,
universities, nonprofit foundations and community groups of the NCUC. A
new, expanded NCSG and CSG also will have individuals, which further
opens them up.
I would like a better explanation from you of what Nomcom appointees add
to the mix that is not added by the presence of independent,
member-elected user interests in the form of Noncommercial and
Commercial Stakeholders Groups.
I would like for you to explain to me what makes Nomcom appointees less
"insiders" than the user constituencies, when they are heavily vetted
and selected in secret by people who have been appointed by, well, ICANN
insiders! (i.e., specially selected representatives of GNSO
constituencies, the Board, ALAC, etc.)
Let's face it. Nomcom appointees, at best, are the equivalent of
independent user representatives. But if we reform GNSO properly, I see
those kinds of voices getting into the GNSO Council via either of the
user stakeholder groups. The more I think about it, the more difficulty
I am having understanding the special status you attribute to Nomcom
appointees. My mind is not closed on this issue, but the case you are
making increasingly appears to be a weak one. Can you turn me around?
If the GNSO Council was a group of business supplier interests
exclusively, the idea of an independently appointed "public interest
ombudspersons" would make a lot of sense. But it seems to me that with
4, 5 or 6 each of commercial and noncommercial users interests
represented, the idea of GNSO becoming a cartel-like cabal that 3 Nomcom
appointees can save us from looks not very plausible.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-gnso-consensus-
> wg@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Avri Doria
> Sent: Sunday, July 13, 2008 1:09 PM
> To: gnso-consensus-wg@xxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [gnso-consensus-wg] Nom Comm appointee roles
> I do not agree with the conclusions you draw from your analysis.
> The main point is the nomcom provides the possibility for a tie
> breaker should the vote break along the contracted party - consumer
> lines. And I believe this is necessary.
> I also do not agree the it is sufficient to give the nomcom's outside
> voice a seat at the table while disenfranchising that voice. I
> believe that vote is critical in keeping the policy process from
> becoming, or looking like, a trust of insiders who are constantly
> trading advantage. I also believe that the logic that dictates that
> outside voices are legally necessary in the Board's decisions also
> pertains in the policy recommendation stage - especially since the
> GNSO can force by its supermajority, the board into a supermajority
> voting requirement.
> On 11 Jul 2008, at 18:05, Metalitz, Steven wrote:
> > Reflecting on our useful discussion yesterday re role of Nom Comm
> > appointees to the GNSO council:
> > One reason given was a tie-breaking role in voting. I went back and
> > looked at the "GNSO Council voting patterns 2005-2008" document
> > prepared
> > by staff in Paris. Of the "28 voting events taken by roll call and
> > showing identifiable votes per constituency, where the outcome was
> > unanimous" (these were the shaded entries in the document), I did
> > find any which would have been tie votes but for the votes cast by
> > Comm appointees.
> > I did find two votes out of 28 in which (if I counted correctly) the
> > Nom
> > Comm appointee votes created a 2/3 majority of those voting which
> > would
> > not otherwise have existed. Neither of these involved a
> > recommendation
> > being sent to the Board where the presence of a 2/3 supermajority on
> > the
> > Council would have made a difference. One was a vote on whether to
> > send
> > a letter regarding travel funding (3 Jan 08); the other was a vote
> > one of the two proposed formulations of the purpose of Whois, which
> > was
> > intended to guide future work on policy development but not (at that
> > point) to be sent to the Board (12 April 06).
> > It is always possible that councillors changed the votes they would
> > otherwise have cast to avoid having the Nom Comm appointees break a
> > tie.
> > I don't know any examples of that; perhaps some of the council
> > on this list do.
> > I found the council voting patterns chart a bit hard to follow (you
> > need
> > to double the votes in the first two columns to account for weighted
> > voting, abstentions are not noted, etc.) and I certainly might have
> > miscounted, so I would welcome anyone else checking my work, but
> > what I
> > saw suggests that the tie-breaking role of Nom Comm appointees has
> > been significant, at least for the past four years.
> > This leaves the role of these appointees in "bringing new voices" to
> > the
> > table, or in providing expertise that the Council needs but that
> > constituency reps cannot provide. As we discussed to some extent
> > yesterday, if these roles are important, we should consider whether
> > they
> > can be fulfilled in other ways, such as through representation of
> > At-Large on the Council, or through appointed experts who could
> > serve on
> > the council in a non-voting capacity.
> > Steve
> > -