Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 14:39:22 -0400 (EDT)
From: Jose Nazario <jose@xxxxxxxxx>
To: Mike O'Connor <mike@xxxxxxxxxx>
cc: Joe St Sauver <joe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: fast flux data for ICANN
X-Antivirus: AVG for E-mail 8.0.138 [270.4.10/1551]
On Mon, 14 Jul 2008, Mike O'Connor wrote:
- the scale and scope of fast-flux activities (ie, what percent of IP
addresses, and what percent of domain-names are used for fast-flux?)
ATLAS measures fast flux botnet membership via active polling of the
domain names. that said, ATLAS sees ~3000 unique IPs for those
addresses every 24 hours or so.
ATLAS is currently tracking ~6400 fast flux domain names.
both values are sub 1% for their entity class. even if we're off by
a reasonsable factor of 10 it's just not a "big" problem in terms of
populations.
active polling gives us between 1 and 5 % botnet visibility for
botnets using fast flux (a small minority of all botnets) when we
compare actve botnet measurements vs DNS-based methods.
- the impact of fast flux (how many networks, businesses, etc. suffer
harm -- and what kind of harm)
there are at least two sides to the "harm" question: infected
machines participating in the fast flux network and victims who
click the links to go there (ie folks lured in by the storm worm
campaigns). the latter is well measured by various groups. the
former is something we can eastimate in ATLAS.
here's top 20 ASNs by infected bot count in the past 24 hours:
150 | AS7132 SBIS-AS - AT&T Internet Services
121 | AS8708 RDSNET RCS & RDS S.A.
117 | AS8402 CORBINA-AS Corbina Telecom
88 | AS9121 TTNET TTnet Autonomous System
72 | AS5617 TPNET Polish Telecom's commercial IP network
57 | AS8997 ASN-SPBNIT OJSC North-West Telecom Autonomous System
53 | AS13184 HANSENET HanseNet Telekommunikation GmbH
50 | AS8615 CNT-AS CNT Autonomous System
50 | AS8551 BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS Bezeqint Internet Backbone
50 | AS4766 KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom
47 | AS9304 HUTCHISON-AS-AP Hutchison Global Communications
47 | AS12714 TI-AS NetByNet Holding
43 | AS4837 CHINA169-BACKBONE CNCGROUP China169 Backbone
43 | AS3209 Arcor IP-Network
36 | AS9829 BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone
36 | AS6830 UPC UPC Broadband
36 | AS1680 NetVision Ltd.
32 | AS6746 ASTRAL ASTRAL Telecom SA, Romania
32 | AS3320 DTAG Deutsche Telekom AG
none of these stand out as a big corporation like microsoft or GM
(as opposed to consumer broadband).
based on these numbers i would say the scale of the problem just
based on populations is small.
i think there is more to it than that, including dollar values,
stress on the infrastructure, facilitating spam and fraud, etc.
-------------------------------------------------------------
jose nazario, ph.d. <jose@xxxxxxxxx>
security researcher, office of the CTO, arbor networks
v: (734) 821 1427 http://asert.arbornetworks.com/