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Re: [gnso-ff-pdp-may08] Domain takedown through 100% automation - kicking the hornet's nest of controversy

  • To: joe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Subject: Re: [gnso-ff-pdp-may08] Domain takedown through 100% automation - kicking the hornet's nest of controversy
  • From: Marc Perkel <marc@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sun, 03 Aug 2008 13:42:13 -0700




Joe St Sauver wrote:
Dave mentioned:

#It's not the automation itself that some registrars may find worrisome, #it's the non-zero probability of false positives that some registrars #may feel calls for a human decision. I'm not suggesting that the human #factor is infallable, but that the human decision may say, "before I #take down ebay.com, even if every marker in the universe of possible #markers says this is bogus, I'm going to make a call". Perhaps you #could program an automaton to think like this, but I think it would be #harder and more expensive.

As I've previousl mentioned, I too like human participation in the
decision making chain, but a lot of automated checks CAN be easily
built into the process, and routinely are for things like anti-spam
(or potential anti-fastflux) services.
I'm not saying the humans be excluded. What I'm saying is that under some circumstances that the registrar can choose to use automation if they want to and use it in cases where that are 100% sure.

For example, you mentioned ebay.com as an example of a domain that
would merit extra decision making care, and we all instinctively
grok that, but we can actually lay out specific criteria that could
be used to mechanically send up a "red flag" including things like:
If I were writing automated takedow software for a registrar eBay would not be able to be taken down due to automation. In face I would probably restrict automation to domains under 2 weeks old. Mostly focused on domain still in the "tasting" period. I also doubt ebay would be using fast flux.

-- is the domain from a TLD that is known to have its own aggressive
   security policies and controls in place? For example, is the
   domain from .mil? No, it's not in this case, but if it were, that
   would be enough to trigger extra review.
I'm not suggesting automated takedown be required. I'm saying that it should be allowed should registries/registrars choose to do it.
-- is the domain on various rankings of "top sites"? For example,
   just to check one such list, Alexa's, eBay is #18 (see
   http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/top_sites?lang=none&ts_mode=global )
   which would, in and of itself, be sufficient IMHO to flag this
   domain for extra review before any action were to be taken
I would say that any domain more than a month old or has prepaid more than one year should be excluded from automated takedown.
-- if you google for the domain, is it prominent? (in ebay.com's
   case, at 220 million hits, I'd suggest, "Yes", again triggering
   extra review)

-- is the domain one that has been around for some time? (in ebay.com's
case, its provenance dates to 04-aug-1995, again potentially triggering extra review)
Mostly focused on new domains. Aren't new domains usually used for abuse?
-- are there indicia that the domain is one where the registrant wants extra scrutiny applied before changes are made? yes, in
   ebay.com's case, the domain has been set to "clientDeleteProhibited,
   clientTransferProhibited, and clientUpdateProhibited" status,
   again potentially triggering extra review)
If there are any factors that would indicate that the domain could be a false positive then humans should be involved.
I would also expect to see 3rd party domain reputation services to take an active role in this area, whitelisting or bonding
domains against allegations of abuse, just as services of that
sort have emerged for the convenience of email senders and
receivers.



I am a huge fan of creating white lists.

But - here's what I'm really saying. Generally a fast flux domain that is driven by a spam campaign has certain identifiable characteristics that only spammers do. It is likely that most of these fraud campaigns can be identified through automation. What I'm suggesting is that in the cases where automation is in the 100% accurate range and the domain if very new (hence the damage from a rare false positive is very low) that registrars be ALLOWED to use automation if they CHOOSE to do so. I'm not suggesting that anyone be REQUIRED to use automation.

I also suggest that registrars share common tools and technologies so that registrars don't have to individually figure out what works. The idea here is to make life easy for registrars.




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