ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/internet-drafts/draft-bambenek-doubleflux-
01.txt
I can't find reference to or recall any mention of this proposal.
This internet draft ( Intended status: Standard ) briefly describes single
and double flux in a manner consistent with SSAC's definitions and then
proposes the following:
3. Recommended Changes
In order to mitigate the threat of double flux service networks
a variety of changes to the standard are proposed. The changes
will affect a variety of levels so that if some of the changes
are not implemented at certain levels, some protection will be
afforded to consumers through the other levels.
3.1. Changes to Registrars
Domain registrars SHALL limit the rate at which changes can be
made to authoritative DNS servers for domains within their control
to one set of changes per 72 hours. They SHOULD also allow for a
"backout" to the previous settings in the event of errors. This
backout will move the settings back to the previous nameserver
settings and reset the clock for 72 hours. This will prevent
malicious individuals from constantly changing their DNS records
to avoid takedowns.
3.2. Changes to Authoritative DNS Services
During startup, DNS services SHALL check both the TTL for NS
records and check the TTL for the A records associated with the
NS record. If the TTL is set to a value below 86400 (24 hours) it
SHALL override the setting to 259200 (72 hours) and record an
entry in the system logs to that affect. A value MAY be specified
within 24-72 hours that will work, but values under 24 hours
will default to 72 hours.
3.3. Changes to DNS Resolving Services
DNS servers that are non-authoritative but performing queries on
behalf of local clients SHALL examine the TTL of the NS record and
if applicable, the A record for the cooresponding nameserver.
If either non-cached TTL comes back with a value of less than
12 hours, it SHALL be discarded and return an error giving no
information to the requesting client.
3.4. Changes to DNS Clients
DNS clients SHALL examine returned values for all nameserver
lookups for NS records (and cooresponding A records for those
NS records) for TTLs less than 12 hours. If a non-cached result
of a query comes back with a low TTL, it SHALL be discarded with
no IP address returned to the requesting application.
I suppose a "PREVENT THEM ALL" approach has the merit of making the issue of
the purpose of double flux networks moot, doesn't it?