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Re: [gnso-ff-pdp-may08] RSA Summary Data
- To: Rod Rasmussen <rod.rasmussen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [gnso-ff-pdp-may08] RSA Summary Data
- From: Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2008 07:43:28 -0400
Rod,
Yinon's used "country determined by the domain registrar's location". I
suspect he means "registrar" in a sense other than what is customary in
ICANN policy discussion, possibly meaning the location of the registrant
(or the technical or administrative contact). As dubious as the value of
that particular representation may be, taking the location of the
registrar of record for the location of a domain registered through that
registrar seems peculiar to me, unless the point is the legal regime to
which the registrar is subject, which is necessarily outside the scope
(sorry) of the ajurisdictional (or crypto-Californian jurisdiction via
ICANN's choice of incorporation) nature of GNSO policy.
There is something I didn't expect to see in Yinon's data, a
distribution by registrar not simply defined by total market share. In
the registries question, other data showed com/net/cn/org/info/biz or
there abouts (from memory), or to a first approximation, total market
share. I suppose the existence of a village in Romania and other actual
clusters of people engaged in network exploits may be manifested in the
marketing footprints of various registrars, rather than what barriers
they present to attempts to acquire a resource at less than cost.
Because we work in domains, not "attacks", could you add a note that
translates Yinon's metrics into metrics we can use?
Eric
Rod Rasmussen wrote:
Folks,
Finally got permission from the powers-that-be at RSA that this can be
released and included in the public report appendices - with
attribution to RSA of course. More body-of-knowledge stuff to add to
the overall picture here. Thanks to Yinon Glasner of RSA for pulling
this data together from their databases - I know all too well how hard
it can be to get summary data from a database designed to run
anti-crime operations!
Best,
Rod
Rod Rasmussen
President and CTO
Internet Identity
1 (253) 590-4088
Begin forwarded message:
I hope this is of use, although the numbers are quite crude. I'll
start with some definitions and constraints related to the data:
- Most of the figures here are aggregated, and include
Fast-Flux attacks, Rock attacks and other phishing attacks which are
hosted on Botnets
- "Phishing attacks" – a "phishing attack" was counted as a
unique URL that targets a specific brand. For example – a single Rock
Phish domain, as you most definitely know, usually targets several
brands. Under the same domain, 5 different URLs can host attacks
against 5 different brands. So – we counted it as 5 distinct Rock
Phish attacks.
- In some cases I counted domains rather than "attacks". A
domain is, well, simply a domain… J
- Data range is January 08 – June 08
- In general, I think it will be very useful for you to say
that in usual months, Rock and/or Fast-Flux attacks constitute more
than 50% of all phishing attacks
*_And now, the figures:_*
1. The number of Rock Phish *domains* detected:
Jan
403
Feb
443
Mar
450
Apr
420
May
461
Jun
190
2. The number of Fast-Flux / Rock Phish / Botnet
phishing *attacks* detected:
Jan
770
Feb
1158
Mar
1408
Apr
1647
May
1866
Jun
608
3. The number of brands targeted by Fast-Flux / Rock /
Botnet-hosted attacks – 40
4. The list of top-20 registrars where Fast-Flux / Rock /
Botnet phishing domains were registered in 2008 + *the number
of* *attacks* hosted on these domains. Top-20 registrars were
measured by the number of *attacks*, not domains.
Now.cn
1031
Eurodns.com
809
123-Reg
536
WildWest Domains
505
Key Systems
502
HKDNR
406
Melbourne IT
325
PublicDomainRegistry
305
Dot.tk
291
Register.com
273
Network Solutions
264
Today Nic
251
eNom
161
Nic.St - ST Registry
150
Yahoo
137
Tucows
133
COMMUNIGAL COMMUNICATIONS LTD
117
IA Registry
115
Bizcn
96
Online SAS
5. The list of countries where Fast-Flux / Rock / Botnet
phishing *attacks* were hosted (country determined by the domain
registrar's location):
United States
2413
China
1481
Germany
482
Luxembourg
472
United Kingdom
452
Hong Kong
406
Tokelau
228
India
196
Australia
173
Sao Tome Principe
149
Afghanistan
148
Israel
139
France
128
Canada
114
Netherlands
83
Ukraine
63
Spain
56
Belize
41
Kyrgyzstan
39
Turkey
36
Switzerland
25
Taiwan
22
Belgium
19
Sweden
17
Estonia
16
I hope this helps,
*Yinon Glasner* | Fraud Intelligence Business Analyst, OTMS
| Identity and Access Assurance Group | **RSA, The Security Division
of EMC** | Phone: +972.9.9728158 | Please note that my email address
has changed to _yinon.glasner@xxxxxxx <mailto:yinon.glasner@xxxxxxx>_
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