[gnso-ff-pdp-may08] Suggestion: Stopping fast flux doesn't cure the common cold

[Wendy Seltzer <wendy@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Many of the harms listed under "who is harmed by fast flux" (398 and
following) appear to be generic harms, that may be perpetrated on the
Internet or off, via fast flux or by other techniques.  I would suggest
distinguishing betweens those that are unique to fast flux attacks (if
there are any, such as particular aspects of the harm to hosts
compromised into herds, or to network providers), versus those that may
be facilitated by using fast-flux techniques or networks as a substrate
(e.g., fraudulent transactions) but would continue to be a problem even
if fast flux were ended tomorrow.

We do not want to imply that stopping fast flux would eliminate the need
for other anti-abuse or law enforcement work, nor to exaggerate the
benefits of this attack technique to would-be malefactors.

Thanks,
--Wendy
-- 
Wendy Seltzer -- wendy@xxxxxxxxxxx
Visiting Professor, American University Washington College of Law
Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet & Society
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/seltzer.html
http://www.chillingeffects.org/
https://www.torproject.org/