RE: [gnso-review-dt] Comment on newest revision of the Westlake review

["Gomes, Chuck" <cgomes@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Philip,

I disagree with your argument and history in your fifth point about the balance 
between the houses.  In the original DNSO, there was no balance.  
Non-contracted parties outnumbered contracted parties 5 to 2.  That resulted in 
contracted parties having negligible impact even though they were required to 
implement consensus policies and hence could be heavily impacted by them.  It 
was a terrible model from a business point of view.

This was corrected in the first GNSO reform.  That is when the balance of 
voting was instituted.  That principle was simply continued in later reforms.  
The balance of voting existed before the bicameral house model was implemented.

Finally, I don't think that the reason for balanced voting has changed at all.  
If either contracted or non-contracted parties have a voting advantage, then an 
imbalance will be created that unfairly favors one side and lessons the chances 
for all parties working toward meaningful consensus.

Chuck

From: owner-gnso-review-dt@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-gnso-review-dt@xxxxxxxxx] On 
Behalf Of BRG
Sent: Monday, May 04, 2015 4:57 AM
To: gnso-review-dt@xxxxxxxxx
Subject: [gnso-review-dt] Comment on newest revision of the Westlake review


I would like to thank Westlake for the latest report and make the following 5 
comments and recommendations.

1. Page 14 preamble on structure
"Many people commented on the GNSO's structure and complexity and argued that 
these needed to change. We do not consider that the GNSO's structure is 
perfect, or that it cannot be improved, but, having analysed the issues in some 
detail, our view is that the structure of the GNSO is not the main cause of its 
most pressing challenges.
In addition, the current structure of the GNSO has been in place for only about 
three years."
This comment is misleading.
The 2 House structure was implemented in 2008. That is 7 years ago.
Do Westlake mean the current form of the PDP and Working Groups?
This is different.
Please change the text to clarify.

2. The "pressing challenges" and recommendations 36 - 41.
These all focus on diversity.
They are  fine recommendations but NOT ones that addresses the issue of 
structure. Please change the text to clarify.

3.ICANN Board
In its resolution of 28 September 2013 the ICANN Board stated:
"GNSO Structure is unlikely to accommodate the anticipated new stream of 
stakeholders resulting from the expansion of the TLD space. The GNSO Review 
will be an important vehicle for considering and addressing this issue. The 
unbalance that is already occurring needs to be addressed by the GNSO Review. "
Why is this Board resolution not addressed in the report?

4. Page 14: "Many people commented on the GNSO's structure and complexity and 
argued that these needed to change"
Why is the opinion of "many people" not addressed in the report?

5. Understanding the past and the present.
Little attempt to analyse the lack of relevance* today of the 2 Houses 
structure has been made.
Why is this?
*See below for a snip from the BRG survey submission

Philip Sheppard
---------------------------------------------------------------------
EDIT FROM BRG PAPER AND SURVEY SUBMISSION
The 2008 GNSO reform created two Houses within the GNSO: the Contracted Party 
House and the Non-Contracted Party House. Put simply there is a suppliers House 
and a users House. And those Houses were given equal votes. This was a change 
from the GNSO of several separate Constituencies. This created a 4-tier 
structure.

The rationale for the 2008 reform was threefold.
a) Separable interests.
There was a belief that the underlying user groups and supplier groups had 
separable interests that could be divided into six separable entities 
(registries, registrars, business interests, intellectual property interests, 
internet service providers, non-commercial interests).

b) Commonality.
The rationale for the two Houses was that suppliers are impacted economically 
by policy and may be impacted in the same way: and users are impacted in a 
variety of ways by policy and may be impacted in the same way.

c) Balance between the Houses.
There was a belief that the interests of users and suppliers should be balanced.

Issues
In 2014, everything has changed. The rationale has changed. Indeed, the current 
structure creates new conflicts of interest.

a) Separable interests.
While different interests continue, it is no longer true that the separable 
interests are accurately reflected by the six separable entities (registries, 
registrars, business interests, intellectual property interests, internet 
service providers, non-commercial interests). There are two reasons for this.
*         Conflicting relationships. There is a complex web of relationships 
that overlap and conflict within the six groups. A typical .brand registry may 
be simultaneously: a Registry, a Business Constituency member, an Intellectual 
Property Constituency member, and have a contractual relationship with other 
generic registries for back-end services.
*         What is commercial? The old division within the users House between 
commercial and non-commercial is no longer relevant. Just within the 400 .brand 
registry applicants, some 15 are not-for-profit organisations representing some 
$69 billion in annual turnover. Two of these are current BRG members.

b) Commonality.
The commonality assumption was historically questionable.
The commonality of interests within the old groups has changed.
*         It was never true that users within each House acted as if they were 
impacted in the same way by policy. There has often been disagreement between 
commercial and non-commercial users, and between types of non-commercial user. 
This has been seen most clearly on issues connected with crime prevention (such 
as accurate Whois records and a difference of opinion on the balance of freedom 
of speech versus crime prevention).
*         It is no longer true that Registries are impacted economically by 
policy in the same way. The 400 .brand Registries will have a different view on 
many policy issues to the 800 generic Registries. This divide will be most 
clear where there is a choice between the costs imposed by a policy and the 
benefits of that policy such as crime prevention. In such a choice, generic 
registries and brand registries will typically have different opinions on cost 
versus benefit.

c) Balance between the Houses.
There is no objective reason for the current balance of votes.
*         The belief that the interests of users and suppliers should be 
balanced was predicated not on an external objective reason but on an internal 
compromise. In the 1999 Names Council a number of groups self-formed. These 
groups became the Constituencies of the GNSO. These groups in 2008 were charged 
to agree GNSO reform but they disagreed. The Houses concept was a compromise 
proposed to overcome this disagreement by severing the link between seats and 
votes. It was adopted out of expediency.

d) Unnecessary complexity of Council /House /Stakeholder Group /Constituency
*         The Houses structure has made voting unnecessarily complex.
*         Post 2008, for some groups Council changed from a 2-tier to a 4-tier 
structure. This has created unnecessary complexity and duplicated meeting 
agendas.