Re: [gnso-review-dt] Comment on newest revision of the Westlake review

[Avri Doria <avri@xxxxxxx>]

Hi,

I agree with Chuck's history.  We have had double voting, either
directly by giving the 2x votes before the 'improvements' or indirectly
in the 'improved' GNSO by having half as many people have an equal vote
due to complicated formulas few, well maybe Marika, Glen and he rest of
the staff, remember without a cheat sheet.  In fact so complciated it is
included at the bottom of each meeting's agenda.

As to the second point about this being fair.  While it may be good for
business, I am not sure the rest of the community is as certain of its
fairnness.  If one thinks about contracts as ICANN' method of
'regulating', giving the regualted half the vote is extraordinary.

But I understand the CPH wanting to keep the status quo  It is very much
to their advantage. I don't expect that to change in my lifetime.

avri

On 04-May-15 18:04, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
>
> Philip,
>
>  
>
> I disagree with your argument and history in your fifth point about
> the balance between the houses.  In the original DNSO, there was no
> balance.  Non-contracted parties outnumbered contracted parties 5 to
> 2.  That resulted in contracted parties having negligible impact even
> though they were required to implement consensus policies and hence
> could be heavily impacted by them.  It was a terrible model from a
> business point of view.
>
>  
>
> This was corrected in the first GNSO reform.  That is when the balance
> of voting was instituted.  That principle was simply continued in
> later reforms.  The balance of voting existed before the bicameral
> house model was implemented.
>
>  
>
> Finally, I don’t think that the reason for balanced voting has changed
> at all.  If either contracted or non-contracted parties have a voting
> advantage, then an imbalance will be created that unfairly favors one
> side and lessons the chances for all parties working toward meaningful
> consensus.
>
>  
>
> Chuck
>
>  
>
> *From:*owner-gnso-review-dt@xxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:owner-gnso-review-dt@xxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *BRG
> *Sent:* Monday, May 04, 2015 4:57 AM
> *To:* gnso-review-dt@xxxxxxxxx
> *Subject:* [gnso-review-dt] Comment on newest revision of the Westlake
> review
>
>  
>
> I would like to thank Westlake for the latest report and make the
> following 5 comments and recommendations.
>
> *1. Page 14 preamble on structure**
> *"Many people commented on the GNSO’s structure and complexity and
> argued that these needed to change. We do not consider that the GNSO’s
> structure is perfect, or that it cannot be improved, but, having
> analysed the issues in some detail, our view is that the structure of
> the GNSO is not the main cause of its most pressing challenges.
> In addition, the current structure of the GNSO has been in place for
> only about three years."
> This comment is misleading.
> The 2 House structure was implemented in 2008. That is 7 years ago.
> Do Westlake mean the current form of the PDP and Working Groups?
> This is different.
> *Please change the text to clarify.**
> *
> *2. The "pressing challenges" and recommendations 36 - 41.**
> *These all focus on diversity.
> They are  fine recommendations but NOT ones that addresses the issue
> of structure. *Please change the text to clarify.*
>
> *3.ICANN Board**
> *In its resolution of 28 September 2013 the ICANN Board stated:
> "*GNSO Structure is unlikely* to accommodate the anticipated new
> stream of stakeholders resulting from the expansion of the TLD space.
> The GNSO Review will be an important vehicle for considering and
> addressing this issue. The unbalance that is already occurring needs
> to be addressed by the GNSO Review. ”
> *Why is this Board resolution not addressed in the report?**
> *
> 4. Page 14: "Many people commented on the GNSO’s structure and
> complexity and argued that these needed to change"
> *Why is the opinion of "many people" not addressed in the report?**
> *
> 5. Understanding the past and the present.
> Little attempt to analyse the lack of relevance* today of the 2 Houses
> structure has been made.
> *Why is this?**
> **See below for a snip from the BRG survey submission
>
>
> Philip Sheppard
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> *EDIT FROM BRG PAPER AND SURVEY SUBMISSION*
>
> The 2008 GNSO reform created two Houses within the GNSO: the
> Contracted Party House and the Non-Contracted Party House. Put simply
> there is a suppliers House and a users House. And those Houses were
> given equal votes. This was a change from the GNSO of several separate
> Constituencies. This created a 4-tier structure.
>
>  
>
> The rationale for the 2008 reform was threefold.
>
> a) Separable interests.
>
> There was a belief that the underlying user groups and supplier groups
> had separable interests that could be divided into six separable
> entities (registries, registrars, business interests, intellectual
> property interests, internet service providers, non-commercial interests).
>
>  
>
> b) Commonality.
>
> The rationale for the two Houses was that suppliers are impacted
> economically by policy and may be impacted in the same way: and users
> are impacted in a variety of ways by policy and may be impacted in the
> same way.
>
>  
>
> c) Balance between the Houses.
>
> There was a belief that the interests of users and suppliers should be
> balanced.
>
>  
>
> _Issues_
>
> In 2014, everything has changed. The rationale has changed. Indeed,
> the current structure creates new conflicts of interest.
>
>  
>
> a) Separable interests.
>
> While different interests continue, it is no longer true that the
> separable interests are accurately reflected by the six separable
> entities (registries, registrars, business interests, intellectual
> property interests, internet service providers, non-commercial
> interests). There are two reasons for this.
>
> §         Conflicting relationships. There is a complex web of
> relationships that overlap and conflict within the six groups. A
> typical .brand registry may be simultaneously: a Registry, a Business
> Constituency member, an Intellectual Property Constituency member, and
> have a contractual relationship with other generic registries for
> back-end services.
>
> §         What is commercial? The old division within the users House
> between commercial and non-commercial is no longer relevant. Just
> within the 400 .brand registry applicants, some 15 are not-for-profit
> organisations representing some $69 billion in annual turnover. Two of
> these are current BRG members.
>
>  
>
> b) Commonality.
>
> The commonality assumption was historically questionable.
>
> The commonality of interests within the old groups has changed.
>
> §         It was _never_ true that users within each House acted as if
> they were impacted in the same way by policy. There has often been
> disagreement between commercial and non-commercial users, and between
> types of non-commercial user. This has been seen most clearly on
> issues connected with crime prevention (such as accurate Whois records
> and a difference of opinion on the balance of freedom of speech versus
> crime prevention).
>
> §         It is _no longer_ true that Registries are impacted
> economically by policy in the same way. The 400 .brand Registries will
> have a different view on many policy issues to the 800 generic
> Registries. This divide will be most clear where there is a choice
> between the costs imposed by a policy and the benefits of that policy
> such as crime prevention. In such a choice, generic registries and
> brand registries will typically have different opinions on cost versus
> benefit.
>
>  
>
> c) Balance between the Houses.
>
> There is no objective reason for the current balance of votes.
>
> §         The belief that the interests of users and suppliers should
> be balanced was predicated not on an external objective reason but on
> an internal compromise. In the 1999 Names Council a number of groups
> self-formed. These groups became the Constituencies of the GNSO. These
> groups in 2008 were charged to agree GNSO reform but they disagreed.
> The Houses concept was a compromise proposed to overcome this
> disagreement by severing the link between seats and votes. It was
> adopted out of expediency.
>
>  
>
> d) Unnecessary complexity of Council /House /Stakeholder Group
> /Constituency
>
> §         The Houses structure has made voting unnecessarily complex.
>
> §         Post 2008, for some groups Council changed from a 2-tier to
> a 4-tier structure. This has created unnecessary complexity and
> duplicated meeting agendas.
>
>
>  
>



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