Re: [gnso-vi-feb10] Another angle on allowing VI/CO
- To: Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [gnso-vi-feb10] Another angle on allowing VI/CO
- From: Antony Van Couvering <avc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2010 17:20:15 -0700
In Saxony they speak German; in Bangkok they speak Thai, along the Nile they
may speak one of ten different languages. Building a single registrar to
service these different communities will be difficult and will definitely
create a bad user experience.
Now, what happens if one of those registries decides to pull out?
On Apr 21, 2010, at 8:00 AM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
> With the 15% cap, assuming .bankok was not satisfied with the local
> ICANN accredited registrars, and any other ICANN accredited registrars
> which passed the .bankok OT&E, perhaps because they are all lame, or
> stupid, or ineffective, or charge high prices making .bankok less
> competitive than it's plan requires with .asia and .south-east-asia
> and ...
> ... then finding six other registries, where ever they happen to be,
> in Saxony selling .ddr, in Africa selling .nile, ... , is sufficient
> for .bankok to create, with those six other registries which are
> unhappy-with-their-available-registrar-choices, a registrar these
> seven registries manage, and may be happier with because this registrar.
> With the cap at 5%, it takes 21, with the cap at 10%, it takes 10,
> with the cap at 30%, it takes 3 plus 10% by a 4th party, with the cap
> at 50%, it takes 2, and with the cap at 100%, it takes just 1.
> The number of registry participants sharing the control of a registrar
> that is as effective as, or more effective than, the other registrars,
> is what we are picking when we pick a cap on ownership or control.
> Of course, in theory, the registry shared registrar could be less
> effective, but there's not a lot of motivation to create a worse-then
> registrar as an alternative to existing registrars. And in theory, a
> registry could make a 15% investment in a registrar 85% controlled by
> an investment banker more interested in selling .com. Again, there's
> not a lot of motivation to create a worse-then registrar as an
> alternative to existing registrars.
> So the question, as Alan just pointed out, is where in this range of
> equal participants in the control of a registrar created to provide
> the first registrar, or to provide competition to existing registrars,
> for the same number of registries, is there either "more risk" or
> "less known"?
> What is the risk of adverse behavior by the registrar with 20
> independent, equal votes forming its decision making process? How
> about 10? How about 5? How about 2? And if only 1?
> And, as Alan has pointed out, there are proposals that include, or
> offer as an exclusive alternate, to ownership and control caps, other
> exception mechanisms to Recommendation 19. Some use numbers, one uses
> time. And here to, the issue with any cap on number or years is what
> does a cap provide, as an answer to either the "more risk" or the
> "less known" question.