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Paris IIC session: transcript and slides

  • To: "iic-consultation@xxxxxxxxx" <iic-consultation@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Subject: Paris IIC session: transcript and slides
  • From: Kieren McCarthy <kieren.mccarthy@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 18:29:48 -0700

The transcript for the dedicated two-hour session given to the Improving 
Institutional Confidence consultation can be found online.

It can be found at: https://par.icann.org/files/paris/ParisWSJPA23June08.txt

And all the slides used during the session can be found at: 

The transcript is republished below for reference and review. The slides are 
attached as a PDF file.

 Workshop - JPA Discussion
 ICANN Meeting - Paris
 Monday 23 June 08

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming on time.  
>>We've been asked if we could just delay the start by one or two minutes to 
>>allow people from sessions that are just finishing next door to come in.  So 
>>if you would just bear with us for two or three minutes, we'll just allow 
>>those people to come in rather than start and be interrupted.
 But thank you for coming on time.

>>PAUL TWOMEY:   Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  We'll start this 
>>session now.
 My apologies, as you will have seen, we have been negotiating laptop formats.
 This session, I first would like to welcome people who are participating, both 
here and online.  And I'd like to recognize new people who are participating in 
this session and these agendas for the first time, and many in the business 
community who are participating.  So I'd like to say thank you to those people 
who are coming to this session.
 The format for this afternoon is, we have with us the drafting members of the 
President's Strategy Committee who have been involved with the working through 
and production of three papers that are now before the community to help guide 
a consultation process.
 I will take some time now to just give some history of the committee itself 
and what it's been working on, and then the chairman, Peter Dengate Thrush, 
will talk through in some detail of what is included in the action plan 
documentation.  Then importantly, we will then move to consultation.  We want 
to move to getting your ideas and your responses, how to make this as 
interactive as possible.  And Kieren McCarthy, the general manager of public 
participation, the famous man here in the black suit, will -- at least it looks 
black to me -- will help us in that process of ensuring proper engagement.  And 
this is the beginning of a process that will take us through to November or 
 So the focus of the work that's been done is, as the slide behind me says, to 
improve institutional confidence in the ICANN model.
 And I just thought I'd talk a little bit about the President's Strategy 
Committee and its origins.
 Just to give you clear who the drafting members of the President's Strategy 
Committee have been, the two co-chairs, myself and Peter, Raimundo Beca, 
Marilyn Cade, Pierre Dandjinou, Jean-Jacques Subrenat, and Yrjo Lansipuro.  
There are other members of the PSC.  And the PSC itself is an evolving body.  
But these are the key, if you like, drafting members who have been involved 
heavily in the documentation that's before you.
 To remind members of the community about the origins of the President's 
Strategy Committee, in December 2005 -- somebody made a phone call.

>>PAUL TWOMEY:   That's very weird.  This is not my phone, but the phone call 
>>is from Kieren.
 [ Laughter ]

>>PAUL TWOMEY:   We'll get to participate later.
 Good.  I love humiliating that man.
 Truly, I don't.
 The committee was established in December 2005, and the board resolution that 
established the committee read, "Whereas, the ICANN community could also 
benefit from the advice of a group responsible for making observations and 
recommendations concerning strategic issues facing ICANN.  The president is 
directed to appoint by 28th of February, 2006, a President's Strategy 
Committee, to be responsible for giving advice to the president and the board 
on strategy issues."
 I'd like to make a couple of points.  First of all, in ICANN, we have two 
types of committees.  We have board committees, and then, for some reason that 
goes way back into the deep, dark mists of time, we have president's 
committees.  So this is simply saying that this committee is not a board 
committee; it is a committee brought together to give advice to the board.
 And it is only to give advice on strategy issues.  It is not the final 
decision-making body.  So, again, what you'll hear today is a presentation from 
a group of people directed towards the best interests of our community for 
consultation, but only to give advice.  And let me be quite clear, the final 
decision-making body on such matters is the ICANN board under the ICANN bylaws 
and the various laws that apply to ICANN.
 Since 2006, the PSC has done research on various options for ICANN.  Some of 
the issues that have come up in the discussions was an issue around legal 
status and identity for ICANN.  And just as an aside, that partly came up also 
as an issue when -- some issues around recruitment and limitations on 
recruitment of staff, and rationales like that.
 Regional presences, related issue about where we are numbers of regional 
presences.  Those are some of the sorts of issues, but not all the issues.  A 
lot of issues that also emerged have dealt with such things as international 
translation, and a lot of it have been about mostly accountability.  And we'll 
hear a lot more about accountability and transparency from Peter.
 We conducted online consultations and workshops with the community.  And the 
committee itself has published three reports, one in December 2006, one in 
March 2007, and November 2007.
 So during this period, there has been a lot of input from various members of 
the community.  We have run online townhall meetings on a range of issues.
 So the piece of work that Peter will be talking to and the topics in front of 
us concerning transition are just a natural evolution and a subset of issues 
that the PSC has considered to be and has put to the board at various times for 
comment and advice.
 And in March 2007, the board directors actually recognized the recommendations 
on issues around ICANN status, legal identity issues, and asked for further 
data on recommendations and conducted it in consultation with the community and 
an evaluation and analysis of implementation and implications.  Part of that 
work is being incorporated in this materials that Peter will refer to and which 
we will also be talking about between now and Cairo.
 So at present, we're -- so building on that -- basically, that framework of 
discussion that had taken place of issues, of consultation, the committee also 
built on the consultation process initiated by the United States Department of 
Commerce as part of its joint partnership [sic] agreement midterm review.  
There were 176, I think, 171, 176 documents or proposals that came up through 
that process.  And the committee did a pretty thorough investigation and 
examination of those responses.
 At the end of that consultation, at least public consultation process, the 
ICANN chairman asked the PSC to facilitate discussions with the community about 
ICANN's transition to the private sector or transition to private sector 
management of the DNS, should I say, and requested an outline or plan for 
developing a transition framework.
 The wording at the end of this slide will need to be changed.  It's not 
sufficiently careful.  It's not a transition to the private sector.  It's a 
question of managing the transition to private sector coordination and 
management of the DNS as foreseen by the white paper process and the first 
memorandum of understanding.
 So I think the key point that we wish to make here is that we'd like to hear 
your initial input on the proposals for discussion.  We want to get a reality 
check on the consultation process itself.  And we want to let you know about 
all the ways to take part in that discussion.
 Peter will now -- co-chairs will now swap hats, and will talk through the 
issues of consultations.  And then after that, we will call up the other 
members of the drafting set of the committee.  And we shall then move into open 

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks, Paul, and good afternoon, everyone.  Before I 
>>begin my presentation, I'd just like to confirm that throughout the work of 
>>the President's Strategy Committee, we've within very well supported by 
>>staff.  And I'd just like to mention general counsel, John Jeffrey.  John, 
>>could you stand up so that people can recognize you.  A lot of the questions 
>>that we have been discussing need legal analysis, and John and John's team 
>>have helped with that.
 And also Paul Levins, who you have already met in a numbers of capacities.  
Paul, could you stand up.  And ably assisting Paul is Maria Farrell.  So -- 
 So -- and Theresa Swinehart -- thank you, Paul -- from the international 
relations -- vice president of international relations.
 So what you're looking at, and Paul and I, really, as just the spokesmen at 
the moment for a large group who have been working, as Paul has said, for a 
number of years.  And since the joint project -- the JPA midterm review, much 
more seriously on this particular issue.
 So let me get to what we've done for you recently.
 We've produced three different documents at different levels of complexity.  
The first one, which was intended to be the simplest, most obvious strategic 
document for presentation to ministers, chairmen of boards, groups that didn't 
have the time to dive too deeply into the analysis, is the action plan.  And 
I'll be taking you through that.  But that sets out in five key steps what we 
actually think we need to do.  And we supported that, for those of you who have 
much more time and want to analyze the issues more deeply, a more detailed 
paper discussing the issues and the background and giving references.  And we 
see that document as -- we see all of these as living documents.  And this one, 
in particular, to be expanded as more relevant and other research is done.
 And then we've included an FAQ, a frequently asked questions, document, 
because those of us who have been living with this for a long time understand 
completely acronyms like MOU and JPA and IANA and even ICANN.  But we don't 
want through the use of those acronyms to exclude anyone, particularly 
newcomers to the debate.  And so we've published a set of simple question and 
answers.  What is the IANA function?  What is the Joint Project Agreement?  
What is the contract?
 So let's start with the transition action plan.  This, as I said, was intended 
to be simple, straightforward, and a strategic outline of what we think we 
needed to do to move from the current state where we have a Joint Program 
Agreement with the Department of Commerce to the time after that has expired.  
And in summary, we said, well, we think we should divide this period up into 
two phases, a phase now that will finish at the end of the year, which is 
primarily a thinking and discussing and designing phase.  And if we can get 
agreement on where we're going and have finished our thinking and designing by 
the end of the year, we should then spend the time in the next year, in 2009, 
leading up to the period of transition and the implementation phase.
 And then the other thing we've tried to pay considerable attention to and 
input from Kieren, who you'll hear from later, we want to make sure that on 
this issue, we consult even more thoroughly, ever more widely, than we do on 
any other -- on other issues.
 Now, that's quite an ask, because we do have a comprehensive consultation 
program on all issues.  But this particular committee thinks that this 
particular issue deserves particular consultation.  And so we have discussed a 
number of mechanisms for that and a number of steps for participation by the 
 So we're presenting those, and we want your feedback.  We want this to be an 
interactive session.  Very shortly, when we finish this rather high-level and 
probably slightly rushed presentation of the papers, as Paul said, we're going 
to invite the committee on stage, and we want to turn, then, this into a 
townhall debate with free flow from the community and the members of the 
 The second document we have entitled improving institutional confidence.  And 
that takes each of the issues and explains them a little bit more, but has a 
series of recommendations.  And it also contains some proposals for discussion.
 Now, we have three fundamental questions that we ask all the time in relation 
to this.  And have we asked the right questions and have we got the right 
answers and how do we consult about implementation?
 So we need you to apply those questions to everything we do.  And, in 
particular, we have asked some detail questions about some of the mechanisms 
we've proposed in this paper.
 And then I've mentioned the FAQ.  It's supplementary and explanatory.  And if 
things emerge from this discussion and we find that there are other questions 
that keep being answered, we'll add that to the FAQ.
 So let's get to the meat, the substance, of the action plan.
 And what we've done set out what we think are the five key elements of the 
plan.  And then we go forward and explain them slightly.
 The overwhelming message that we have got from everyone as we do this is that 
ICANN, going forward into the future, must be safeguarded from capture.  The 
institution, the mechanisms, the processes, and, therefore, the outcomes, must 
not be subject to domination by any particular group or groups, any particular 
groups such as a single government or a group of governments, some individuals, 
some corporations, or a single corporation.  We must have systems that ensure 
that the multistakeholder model is preserved and protected against capture and 
 So we'll be asking you later on to think about the various forms of capture 
that might happen and how we might prevent them.
 Turning that around into a slightly more positive tone, how do we ensure that 
we maintain an open forum in which all voices can be heard and where all 
decisions are made in accordance with the best interests of the community.
 And then the second message that's come through very strongly, and it's not a 
new message for us, because it builds on one of the principles that ICANN was 
founded on, is that we need to maintain, enhance, insist on accountability of 
those processes and of the people making those decisions and executing them to 
the entire stakeholder community.
 And in doing that, we need to preserve one of the key elements, which is the 
transparent bottom-up process development.
 The third thing is, we need to make sure that the ICANN of the future meets 
the needs of the future.  There can't be any sense that what we are simply 
executing is the 1998 plan -- I think it's fairly obvious that we're not.  The 
corporation has grown substantially and the conditions have changed in many 
ways in terms of the structures that we've developed.  But we need to be more 
positive than that.  We need to make sure that we are looking forward and 
ensuring that the structure we create meets the needs of the global Internet 
 And then the last two are relatively consequential on the first, but, 
nevertheless, just as essential.
 Clearly, for us to do anything, particularly meet the objectives listed above, 
ICANN needs to be financially and operationally secure.  If we don't have the 
budget, then we can't have the outreach and we can't hold the meetings.  We 
can't pay the staff to do the research and carry on the program.
 So although there was a time when Internet and money was a bad thing, at least 
in relation to the kind of policy development work that ICANN has to do and the 
role that it has to play, we need a secure funding supply, we need proper 
financial management, and general financial security.
 And the same thing is true of the organization.
 We are, for example, about to open a new gTLD process.  We need to make sure 
that every kind of thing we do like that is done by an organization that's 
resilient enough, resourced enough and mature enough to handle the actual work 
that it's required to do.
 And then finally, in doing that, the organization needs to be founded on 
proper organizational principles, and meet high standards.  And these, in the 
end, come down to such mundane things as making sure that proper minutes are 
kept, bills are paid on time, all the ordinary things that keep a corporation 
running properly.
 But if we don't pay some attention to those, then we may well pay the 
 So those, at a very high level, are the kinds of things that we think the 
transition needs to accomplish.
 Let's start looking at some of them in a little bit more detail.
 We asked ourselves and we are asking you now, what are the kinds of threats 
that the organization of tomorrow and post transition and into the future has 
to meet.
 One of the suggestions that we have had, which is building on the current or 
present situation, we need to make sure we have suggested that we always have 
consensus or supermajority requirements for policy-making.  In other words, we 
need to make it clear that it's the entire group, or a substantial and defined 
proportion of the group, that makes the decision, to avoid being captured or 
taken over by any narrow, sectarian kind of interest.
 So consensus or supermajority rather than thin majorities.
 And the groups themselves that make those decisions, they need to be broad and 
diverse, and they need to be made up of the people who are affected by the 
policies concerned.
 So large and diverse constituencies.
 All of the people involved in a particular issue need to be there when the 
discussions are taking place.
 The other thing that we think is important is something that we have always 
had, by virtue of our founding and registration in the United States, is to 
maintain a presence in a jurisdiction with strong anti-trust law.  Now, this is 
a competition law concept.  And those of you who are not lawyers may like to 
understand that when you are regulating or making rules governing the conduct 
of various parties, you need to make sure that there is a proper balance 
between the interests of the suppliers of the product and the interests of the 
consumers of the product.
 And what we can't have is any situation that allows all of the suppliers to 
get together and, for example, put up the prices, or all the consumers to get 
together and demand particular services and lower the prices.
 So the market functions properly when it is well organized.
 And to ensure that happens, we need to have registration in a place where 
there is that kind of competition or, as the Americans call it, anti-trust law.
 We also need to make sure that what we could is done openly and transparently 
so that there is a proper trail, a proper record of decision-making, who 
attended the meetings, what was the agenda, were the minutes taken properly, 
who said what.  Was there a minority view, was it given proper weight.  All the 
things we do reasonably well, I think, at ICANN need to be maintained and 
improved and kept at the highest possible standards so we don't have people 
meeting in corridors or back rooms and coming to private decisions which then 
affect other people who weren't present.
 And a particular mechanism that we have suggested is perhaps the players in 
these discussions might have to have some limitations on where they take place 
-- where those players participate.
 For example, is it appropriate for a large commercial entity that has the 
capacity to be a registry, a registrar, a registrant, to take part in 
discussions in all three of those communities?
 Possibly it is, but is it appropriate for them to vote in all three of those 
jurisdictions, all those places?
 And it could be more complicated.  Such an organization may, for example, also 
be acting in managing a ccTLD.  Should they also have a vote and participation 
in the  ccNSO?
 So we think we may need to look at our rules for where participants can 
participate, and in particular, where they can vote.
 Accountability -- oh.
 You will only be able to speak to me in English from now on.
 We know that we need to maintain and strengthen, where appropriate, the 
accountability mechanisms in ICANN.  And we have suggested two particular 
improvements that don't currently appear in the ICANN situation.  And let me 
just take a kind of inflammatory example to make this point.
 There was a considerable amount of community disquiet over a number of votes 
that the board took in 2006 and 2007.  You all know what they were, and if you 
don't, it doesn't really matter because the point was that the community was 
very dissatisfied that its ultimate decision-making authority was not properly 
accounting for the views of the community.
 There are accountability mechanisms in ICANN, and they are primarily resort to 
the ombudsman, an application for independent review and a request for 
reconsideration.  And what those events demonstrated to the committee is we 
needed more and better accountability mechanisms.
 Let me confirm that the board has undertaken to review those mechanisms in any 
event, and that will happen as part of the ordinary review that's going on, for 
example, of the other institutions in ICANN.  The President's Strategy 
Committee has suggested two new mechanisms which can be implemented within time 
for the transition period.  And the first one of those is to require the board 
to reexamine a decision that it's made.  This is not to reconsider it under the 
reconsideration policy, which is very limited and only applies to the extent 
that any new information can be brought to the attention of the board.
 This is different.
 This is, to the board, "We think you have got that wrong.  We want you to go 
back and do it again, from the beginning."
 Now, the board operates at all times under all the obligations that you would 
expect of a board, duty, loyalty.  And I can tell you personally that all the 
directors that I know and have worked with take all their obligations very 
seriously and try their hardest to come to a decision that they think is in the 
best interest of ICANN.  And under the normal corporate rules, you would not 
want your board to be held to ransom by any particular portion of a community 
that was dissatisfied by an outcome.
 So we think reasonable that any request to the board of this sort to 
reconsider something from the beginning, with all the consequences that has on 
all the parties that have been waiting for a decision -- for example, take new 
gTLDs.  Imagine if we had to stop the new generic top-level domain process and 
go back and start that again.  So you will understand that we think that there 
should be quite a high threshold before this mechanism can be activated.
 And the mechanism we have suggested is that two-thirds of the support 
organizations and advisory committees should vote and should achieve a 
two-thirds majority to call for reexamination.
 So that's on an individual issue.
 But there may come a time, for example, after a reexamination where the board 
again, to speculate, got it wrong.
 There is currently no mechanism for expressing confidence in the board, 
particularly in any way that results in the board being expelled or fired or 
 To most of us, including those of us who hold seats, that seems unusual and 
not as accountable as we would like.
 So we have suggested a mechanism, again with a very high threshold, that if 
three-quarters of the voting bodies reach a three-quarters majority vote, that 
the board should be fired.
 Now, we haven't gone on to consider mechanisms for that.  We have done some 
legal analysis which shows that we can set up a mechanism to fire board members 
individually.  We may look at a way of doing that only collectively, because 
some of us are concerned that we don't want individual board members to be 
targeted by the community.  It should be, we think, an all in or all out.  But 
that's an implementation thing we have to look at.
 Nor have we looked very much at what would the consequences be of firing the 
board.  We suspect that we may have to keep on a small committee of the board, 
and the obvious target would be the executive committee.  The board -- some 
board needs to stay on to make sure that staff gets paid and the CEO can carry 
on with the work, but that committee could be charged with immediately 
conducting elections to replace the board.
 So we think that that's what the community wants, is tighter accountability 
mechanisms on decisions, and finally, the ability to unseat a board that it 
thinks is not responding properly.
 Globalization.  The Internet is growing enormously all over the world.  I was 
talking to my friends from dot CN, Chinese registry, who told me they have just 
gone past 12 million domain names, so China, within a month or two, will 
probably surpass Germany as the largest of the country code registrations.  And 
you won't be at all surprised to know that that kind of growth has been going 
on in China and there are many other statistics that point to that.
 Similarly in India.
 So we need to ensure that the Internet organizations of the future meet all of 
the globalization trends.
 At the same time, we want to suggest that we confirm headquarters in the 
United States, and that's for a number of very practical reasons.  And these 
are set out elsewhere.  But, for example, we have at the moment tax-free status 
by virtue of our relations in the United States.
 We also have well over a thousand contracts that are based in U.S. law, and a 
number of other advantages including headquarters and staff.
 But we're not sure if -- we are sure we need more than that for the future, 
and we have explored the possibility of setting up, for other administrative 
purposes, different legal subsidiaries of ICANN in those jurisdictions that are 
 This will allow us to have other contracts, other arrangements.  And Paul 
mentioned some of the difficulties of staff and visas and bank accounts, et 
 So if we are going to be a global organization, we need more.
 And in addition to the legal entities that we may set up, we also need to make 
sure that we maintain physical presence, staff and officers, in those locations 
that require it.  So that's the operations around the globe.
 And wherever we are, at all of our offices, at all of our meetings, on our Web 
site, in all of our communications, we need to make sure that we are doing the 
obvious things to be global, which includes multilingualism, interpretation and 
translation services.
 So those are probably the key kind of elements.  The rest, as I said, are 
slightly consequential, but still important.
 To be financially secure, we need to be exploring alternative sources of 
 We also need to build on all of the steps that we have developed over the 
years to ensure that international organizational best practices are achieved.
 And we must never lose sight of the fact that we are responsible for 
coordinating the essentially resources to keep the Internet running.
 There has to be a constant focus on a secure and stable operations, and the 
specifics that we talk about here are improving the efficiency and 
responsiveness of the IANA function, including through recent developments to 
automate steps in that process.  And we also want to begin the discussions that 
are necessary to transition aspects of root zone management from VeriSign, 
which is currently under contract to do those to the U.S. government, to ICANN, 
which is what is set out in this contract that I have on the screen.
 So there's some tripartite discussions that need to commence on that.
 So now it's probably time to invite members of the committee to come forward 
and help Paul and I and the community in analyzing, answering, and discussing 
the questions that we have raised.  And perhaps even more importantly, asking 
the new questions and finding out what other issues we need to deal with.
 Yrjo, Jean-Jacques, Raimundo, Marilyn.

>>PAUL TWOMEY:   Peter, perhaps I can just point out that Pierre Dandjinou, who 
>>is another member of this committee, is actually in transit.  We expect him 
>>to arrive during the session.

 It will be great to have him on board.
 Well, let's begin with this topic.
 ICANN could make bylaw amendments requiring a specific prohibition against 
voting by the same individual or organization in more than one of the related 
advisory or Supporting Organizations.
 Should it do so?
 Is there a view of a panelist who wants to say something about capture?  And 
is there a response from the audience as to whether or not this is the kind of 
thing that would help capture by an individual and movement, a government, a 
corporation, a tribe, a coalition?
 You have to hold the button, I think.  Hold the button.

>>MARILYN CADE:   What -- I'd like to talk to the second bullet point first and 
>>then address the first bullet point.
 It's my observation, as someone who has been involved in ICANN before the days 
it was even called Newco, that is involved in the community, that one of the 
things that really contributes to trust is when people speak clearly and 
directly, but also when they acknowledge what their interests are.
 And I think that, in this community in particular, with the diversity of 
interests that people bring and the diversity of perspectives they bring, and 
as we are working together to make a number of very critical decisions, parties 
need to keep in mind that they are here because they have an interest, and they 
need to declare it.
 And I particularly have been concerned that sometimes we forget to do that 
when we are talking about decisions.
 We forget that we need to declare our interests.  We need to tell others what 
our concern is or what our business interest is or what other kind of interest 
might advantage us by nature of the decision we're making.
 I think the world, in looking at ICANN, will only trust it if it understands 
that of course parties have interests, and that's why they are working there, 
but they are they have acknowledged those interests, and then it will be the 
diversity and breadth and depth of participation that ensures that the 
decisions are balanced, and that even if you have an interest in the outcome of 
a decision you are working on, that there still is going to be a check and 
balance there to protect against capture.
 So let me address the issue of parties participating in multiple entities and 
perhaps being able to capture a decision or process by doing that.
 That was a fear from the very beginning.  We talked a lot about that in the 
days when we set ICANN up.  And we did recognize that it was very possible that 
a company or an association would have a legitimate reason to participate in 
different parts of ICANN.
 I could even use an example of, for instance, someone could be on the board of 
ICANN, be a very deeply technical person, who had the kind of expertise that 
led to them being invited on the SSAC, for instance, or to be the chair of a 
 What I would like to see us talk more about is how we, perhaps, create some 
safeguards so that we can allow participation, but perhaps limit the number of 
times that entities or people vote.  So that although you can participate in 
multiple parts of ICANN, you can only vote once.
 And hear from the community about their thoughts about that as a potential 

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you, Marilyn.  Is there anyone from the floor 
>>who wants to comment?  I see someone at the back.  Jeff, it looks like you.  
>>Can we adopt the usual process?  You stand up, attract attention, one of the 
>>staff will come to you with the microphone.  And could you begin by speaking 
>>slowly, certainly more slowly than I do, so that the scribes can keep up, and 
>>could you begin by announcing -- you saying your name and affiliation.

>>JEFF NEUMAN:   Sure, my name is Jeff Neumann and I work at NeuStar.  NeuStar 
>>is an example of an entity that you had raised, Peter, in an example that 
>>serves both as a gTLD registry as well as a ccTLD registry.
 I think that we have every right to participate in both organizations.  We 
have different communities that we are accountable to.  And I think if there 
were any kind of restriction on the votes that we had, I think our contractor, 
in our ccTLD, would not be too thrilled with that approach.
 I think it's all on the roles that you serve, large organizations serve in 
different capacities.  I don't think that anyone on the GNSO or ccNSO thinks 
that NeuStar has the ability to or the desire to capture either of those 
 So I don't think that's a concern.
 My point is that you really need to not create a rule based on a perception of 
what, in theory, could at some point in time happen, but need to look at the 
reality of the situation before making any kind of pronouncement.

 For the record, I don't think NeuStar is trying to take over ICANN.  Paul, why 
don't you respond.

>>PAUL TWOMEY:   Jeff, thanks for the response.
 I do think one of the things that the committee is wanting the community to 
think about is what is a 20-year stable outcome?  And the 20-year stable 
outcome question also has to be married to changes that the people in the 
community have asked for.
 So this particular point also marries with other changes.  Particularly the 
question of changing the accountability of the board to being open to votes 
from the Supporting Organizations and committees for reconsideration of a 
decision and potentially for spilling of the board.
 Now, even in the last 24 hours, I have had members of the -- broadly the 
contracted parties community, if you want to put it that way, shared with me 
concerns about that proposal because they fear it could be gamed.  And they 
could draw scenarios where it could be gamed by people who had interests in 
various support.
 So I am not trying to in any way diminish your observation.  I am going to put 
the challenge back.  I am going to say, okay, we're going to have to talk 
through whether you actually can have one and have the other.  And that's part 
of our challenge.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Maria, can you come forward to the hand here?  Thank 
 Jeff, just before we leave that point, the obvious point, though, is we can't 
design an organization that relies on the goodwill of any of the particular 
parties not to take advantage of a whole lot of holes in the rules.  So there 
is kind of a balance, isn't there? Obviously we have to be practical and real.

>>ADAM PEAKE:   Adam Peake from an organization called GLOCOM in Tokyo.
 My only concern about capture is really -- and thinking about what it might be 
in 20 years' time is that some of the ICANN constituencies need to grow in 
terms of membership.
 I was thinking about an example of a large telco that might have a vote 
through the -- or an influence, sorry, not a vote, through the ASO, where it 
would be, for example, in the APNIC or LACNIC one of 500 or 450 members.  Yet 
in an ISP constituency within the GNSO, it would be a much larger -- well, it 
would have greater influence because the constituency itself is much smaller.  
There may only be 20, 30, 40.  I don't know the number of members and I don't 
wish to imply that.  Maybe 50 members now.
 So the weighting of vote and the weighting of their influence is much greater 
because the constituencies haven't grown as largely or to be as large as we 
probably hoped they would be by now.
 So if you want to avoid capture, help grow the constituencies so that an 
individual vote or an individual's influence is lessened.  That's the only 

 Anybody on the committee want to respond to that?  If not, David.

>>DAVID APPASAMY:  David Appasamy, Sify Technologies here on behalf of the 
>>International Chambers of Commerce.  And I am very happy to tell you that 
>>Secretary-General Guy Sebban is also here.  It's a reflection of how 
>>seriously we take this process.  And may I on behalf of business congratulate 
>>you on the kind of thought that has gone into all of this.
 We do appreciate that ICANN is moving towards better governance.  And I see 
this as a vital part of that process.  And it's also good to know that a lot of 
language that is being used is becoming more business friendly.  Till now, the 
whole process has been primarily technical, and the technical community has 
been very comfortable with that.  And we have been learning as we go along.
 I think as we go further, it would be good to recognize that global business 
is one of the largest stakeholders in this process.  And we welcome any 
opportunity to engage with ICANN even further going forward.
 Thank you.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you, David.  And thank you for those words.  
>>And also welcome to the Secretary-General.  It's a pleasure to have you here.
 I see a hand right behind you, Maria, in the center there.

>>ROB HALL:   Hi, my name is Rob Hall with Momentous.  I think, Peter, I agree. 
>> I just want maybe summarize what some of the others are saying.
 I think the key to this is, if I use your example of tribes, it's very easy to 
tell a conflict when it's corporations and individuals through disclosures, et 
cetera.  It gets a lot harder when you start looking at large groups that may 
organize rather informally or formally.  For instance, the tribe of -- I will 
use intellectual property organization.  So if the I.P. tribe tried to take 
over a constituency, for example, or the Canadian tribe tried to, the key there 
is it's very hard to tell who is who and, even with conflict statements, 
 So I think one of the things you have to do is make sure that you have the 
ability to see when this is happening and detect it through disclosures and 
openness and transparency.  But you also have a mechanism for the rest of the 
community to quickly act and undo it.
 So I'm often thinking about, with elections and that, can there be capture and 
that type of thing.  People tend to stand on the sidelines and watch until they 
are needed to act.  And as long as there is a mechanism to see it occurring and 
act and reverse it or change it, I think that's some of the keys we have to 
make sure we deal with.  But in.  But in general, trying to put in place 
mechanisms to restrict it when it may never happen often get very -- you tend 
to tie yourself in knots trying to make that happen.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Rob, thank you for that.
 I just wonder whether you agree with me that we haven't really got the a 
proper mechanism for looking.  You said it's all very well if you can see the 
capture coming.
 You will remember, as I do, when we first put together the application to form 
the ccTLD constituency in the DNSO, you were in Berlin and Santiago putting 
those applications together, and all of those bylaws, we well remember, were 
carefully scrutinized by the board of the day, because the board was building 
these different constituencies and was examining the bylaws.
 And the CC application, as I recall, got sent back and had to be changed.
 Now, we seem to have moved on from those days and there isn't any regular 
examination, it seems, of the constituencies, of the bylaws.
 Marilyn, you started with the point about conflict-of-interest statements.  
Who is it that should be checking and monitoring and enforcing and making sure? 
 Who should be acting as the internal watch guard on this kind of thing?  Have 
you got a view about that, Rob?  First of all about whether it should be done 
at all.  Once we have set up the constituency, should we just let them go?  Or 
should we audit them occasionally to make sure that we like their practices?

>>ROB HALL:   I think the answer is twofold, perhaps, Peter.
 So, first, the constituencies, as I understand it, are created under the 
bylaws of ICANN.  So I would suggest that ICANN has some duty to occasionally 
monitor their individual bylaws, and their individual practices.
 So I think, one, it needs to be reviewed occasionally.  I think it's 
important, though, that the entire community be able to see what the makeup of 
a constituency is, and whether it has, indeed, be captured or is subject to 
 So I don't want to use any specific examples, but I think it's very important 
that each individual constituency publish what its rules are for membership, et 
cetera.  They be reviewed by the board who created them and authorizes them, 
and, in fact, the SOs would be the same thing, not as the constituencies.
 But I think it's also important that we make it available to a wide -- as wide 
a possible number of people, these conflict statements or these policies of 
inclusion as to who can be a member of what.
 You know, taking NeuStar's, for example, the fact that they're two members in 
two constituencies that are huge, you know, have a wide variety of membership, 
doesn't, in my mind, create any type of conflict.  They've declared that 
they're in two.  And the fact that they are one vote of hundreds of thousands 
is irrelevant to capture.  If they were ten votes out of 15, then it's a 
problem.  So, again, size of constituency, size of voting body, that type of 
thing matters.  But the transparency to the entire community, so anyone can 
stand up and say, "Hey, I think that's an issue.  We should look into that 
more."  But then you need the mechanism to be able to deal with it and look 
into it.  And ultimately, I think that's the ICANN board at this level.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks, Rob.  Anyone else want to comment on either 
>>of these two points?  Is there something that we have missed?  Some glaring 
>>hole we need to fill?  Former councillors of the GNSO.  Milton and Steve.

>>MILTON MUELLER:   Should I go?


>>MILTON MUELLER:   I think it's something of an oxymoron to talk about capture 
>>at the constituency level.  Constituencies don't make the policies.  The 
>>GNSO, as a whole, makes the policies.
 You know, a political scientist is going to tell that you in any constituency, 
there's going to be some kind of a political equilibrium in which some people 
pretty much are in control at some level, okay.  Not in the sense that they are 
locking people out.  That's bad.  That should be stopped.  But there's going to 
be a dominant viewpoint, and that dominant viewpoint is going to get its view 
through that constituency.  And if there's not a dominant viewpoint, if the 
constituency is constantly at odds with each other, they're not going to be 
very effective in the policy-shaping process.
 Where you want to guard against capture is at the GNSO level or the council 
level, and particularly people in charge of the administrative details of what 
working groups get formed, how results are reported, who reports to the board.  
Those are the areas where you have to look for dominance and capture.
 And I think if you spend your time looking for micromanagement of constituency 
matters in an attempt to so-called stop capture, you might be wasting -- losing 
sight of the forest for the trees.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks, Milton.  I'm sure you're right in relation to 
>>the policy issue.  But the other side of this, of course, is that we want 
>>inclusiveness in outreach.  So if we've got a constituency that is supposed 
>>to be, for example, for the ccTLD managers and the incumbents make rules that 
>>keep out all other ccTLD managers from Australia and New Zealand, well, then 

>>MILTON MUELLER:   (inaudible).


>>STEVE METALITZ:   Thank you.  Steve Metalitz with the intellectual property 
>>constituency.  I'm sure Rob was only using I.P. as an example in his tribe 
>>example.  But I think relevant to this issue, I think our constituency, the 
>>intellectual property constituency, has helped to be a bulwark against 
>>capture of decision-making processes within the -- within the supporting 
>>organization that we're part of.
 And picking up on the statement from the ICC, I totally agree that -- and I 
think it's reflected, in fact, in the President's Strategy Committee report, 
there's a very important paragraph about the importance of strengthening 
outreach to business, improving business user input, engaging private sector 
representative organizations.  And I applaud that.  I think that's a very 
important element here.
 I think it's ironic, though, that we're having this discussion at a time -- 
during a week when the board is considering a proposal that would drastically 
reduce the role of our constituency, of the business constituency, of other 
constituencies not under contract to ICANN, drastically reduce our role in 
helping to prevent capture, in helping to try to come to sound policy decisions.
 There is an alternative to this proposal.  It is supported not only by my 
constituency, the business constituency, and others, but also by the 
noncommercial constituency, whose representative spoke a moment ago.
 So I hope that in the atmosphere that is generated by these positive 
statements in the President's Strategy Committee about the importance of 
business users, and the importance of addressing freedom from capture, I think 
you are asking the right question here, I hope that the board will give very 
serious consideration to this alternative, which we feel quite strongly will 
better serve these goals, and will also help to achieve what the ICC member was 
talking about.
 If we are able to have a more balanced system within the GNSO, I think the 
chances are good that we will have greater business participation.  If we 
don't, I think the outcome will be the opposite, and I don't think that's good 
for ICANN.
 Thank you.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks, Steve.
 Interesting to see what the board does, won't it, with that decision later in 
the week.
 I don't want to --  Want to flog this.  We seem to have covered this area.  
Let's have the last two.  I'm really interested to hear whether you think we've 
got this right or wrong.  Have we missed some obvious issue about capture?  And 
I really don't want to turn it into a discussion about the vote in relation to 
 Let's have the current hands that are up, and then we'll move on.
 Let's hear from someone who hasn't spoken, first.  There were two just behind 
you, Kieren.
 Jeff, we'll get back to you if we can.  I don't want to cut you off, but you 
have had a turn.

>>VITTORIO BERTOLA:   Thank you, I'm Vittorio Bertola.  I guess everyone knows 
 First of all, I think that this is an important problem.  But you maybe have 
to broaden it, because capture is not just, I mean, in people moving from one 
to the other constituency.  It happens in other cases.  And I think the issue 
is maybe about transparency.  So the best remedy is increasing participation 
and increasing transparency.
 But I wanted to make a point that in some cases, actually, having a people who 
have a foot in one or more constituency is actually what you want.  Because I 
am worried that by exacerbating the division of people and entities into 
constituencies, you are actually encouraging them to think only of their narrow 
interest and conflict, and this is what we saw also during the GNSO review 
 So there are places of the ICANN infrastructure where you should really look 
for people who have direct connections with more than one constituency, and 
then they can be the bridge-makers along the different interests.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks, Vittorio.
 I think, Maria, down here there were a couple.  Thank you.

>>Steve Delbianco, with Net Choice Coalition.
 I did submit comments in January on the JPA's midterm review where I called 
out the significant risk of capture.  And the type of capture that I tried to 
highlight in my comments was capture of ICANN's agenda by governments who 
preferred to have a -- less of a private sector role in the management of the 
DNS and more of a governmental role.  That was a specific kind of capture.  And 
I appreciate that the PSC has inserted some measures in there with respect to 
ccNSO voting and the like.
 But part of the threat has to be recognized as not coming from within ICANN, 
but from the outside.
 What started at the World Summit on the Information Society and then 
transitioned to the last two meetings of the Internet Governance Forum, first 
in Athens and then last fall in Rio, I think demonstrates that there are some 
governments, influential governments, with a growing degree of influence, who 
would prefer that governments have a far greater role in management of the DNS 
than they have today.  And the challenge that probably should be anticipated 
and described in this transition plan is the challenge for ICANN to stick to 
the DNS management technical mission, and thereby avoid stepping on the 
sovereign power of governments, but at the same time, avoiding the 
Balkanization of the Internet by allowing the split of the root, will change 
and forever, I think, ruin the Internet experience that we're seeking.  And at 
the same time, ensure that we get cooperation from the law enforcement elements 
in all of the nations of the world to ensure the integrity of the user 
experience on the Internet to avoid phishing and pharming and scams and 
squatting.  So the balance, I think, of maintaining that relationship, that 
testy relationship with governments, where they participate but may not 
dominate ICANN and at the same time ensure their cooperation on avoiding a 
split root and their cooperation on law enforcement.
 Thank you.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you for those comments.  And thank you also for 
>>making submissions in the JPA review, which -- along the same lines.  Rob, I 
>>think we've had a turn.  We're trying to get some new voices before we go 
>>back and give people a second turn.
 Maria, can you deal with that young man in the front row.

>>PHILIP SHEPPARD:   That description, I'll hold that dear.
 Philip Sheppard, from the business constituency.
 Peter, you asked us to react to the proposal that you've just gone through.  
I'd just like to give a warm endorsement from my own personal perspective.  
This seems to be exactly the right direction to go.
 If ICANN is to be serious about being a holder of public trust, about being an 
ethical organization that is fit for purpose, then this is precisely the sort 
of structural change and proposals we would like to see.  I commend you very 
much for doing that.
 There was a comment earlier from the back of the hall about perception and 
saying should we be reacting to perception.
 Well, I've had very similar  similar discussions with a European commissioner 
in other advisory capacity on precisely this issue.  And I think we need to be 
aware that the perception certainly in matters of public interest and ethics is 
actually an enemy on the road.  It's not a friend, typically.  But, 
nevertheless, perception is there.  And perception is something that we need to 
react to.
 So if, as a serious, you know, international organization which has a high 
public profile, we do not react to perception, we are doing ourself a great 
disservice.  So I think it is absolutely essential to be aware that you react 
to what is both the reality out there, so you put structures in place to do 
that, but you also address negative perceptions, valid or not, that are out 
there, simultaneously.  And I think this is a very good start in precisely that 
direction.  Again, I commend you to that.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Any more -- let's have one more on this capture 
>>issue.  Thank you.

>>WERNER STAUB:   Does it work?  My name is Werner Staub.  Just make this 
>>comment about capture and the instruments that have been used against it.  
>>Some of them have already been there, and we sometimes forget them.
 The open mike, for instance, is an instrument against capture.  But the open 
mike is, of course, like any other thing, very strongly dependent upon the 
forms of communication.  And in this meeting, we just diminished the 
effectiveness of the open mike by removing the queue.  If people can see the 
gestures in addition to what people say, they can more easily understand.  If 
people queue up in front of a mike, we can see who is there, and this is -- 
this facilitates communications.
 We had the similar test that was done last time when the board, instead of 
sitting in front, was sitting behind, you know, just like anybody else, and 
everybody would see the backs of the heads of the board members.  This was not 
very helpful.
 So I would encourage you to think of all forms of communications.  They are 
the real protection against capture, people who are not English-speaking, who 
are not so easily able to participate, they must very strongly rely on these.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you for that.  Let me just confirm my own 
>>support as chairman for the open mike and also for the practice of the board 
>>concentrating while submissions and comments are being made and paying 
>>attention to that.
 Is there anything else on this?  If there isn't, I would ask you all to think 
hard about this as we open the formal consultation.  Kieren will be telling you 
how to participate.  This is, obviously, a crucial area that we want some 
comfort on.
 Let's move forward to the accountability proposals.
 Now, I mentioned -- I mentioned these two mechanisms that currently are not in 
the bylaws.  One is the concept of reexamining a particular vote and decision 
by the board, with a high threshold.  And the other is the ability to remove, 
to fire, to spill the board with a three-quarter majority vote of the voting 
 Any reaction to -- what is the reaction to instituting that?
 Comments from either the committee, or are you happy with the current 
situation that I've just had my term renewed for three years as a director and 
there's nothing you can do about it?  I mean, tell me.
 We have the rules, of course, the California legal rules, so if a director is 
-- goes insane or goes bankrupt or commits an act of fraud, we have the very 
obvious mechanisms that have almost got nothing to do with performance in the 
ICANN sphere.
 What's the reaction to the fact that, at the moment, directors, once elected, 
are very hard to remove?

>>MILTON MUELLER:   I like the concept.  I'm not sure about the implementation. 
>> It seems a bit precipitous, for example, to have a choice between completely 
>>demolishing the board.  And one of the things that IGP proposed was that the 
>>supporting organizations could remove their three board members in a vote of 
>>no confidence.  That would be both easier and less disruptive of the entire 
 I mean, removing the board entirely and reconstituting it sounds to me like a 
pretty precipitous action, and the debate around that would revolve not so much 
around whether the board did something bad, but about how much it would 
destabilize the organization.
 I think you want something in between there.
 And here I'm going to ride Don Quixote's donkey for just 30 more seconds.
 Again, the ultimate accountability check on the board that would allow users 
to have full input would be to have them be elected again and not go through 
this highly indirect NomCom process which, you know, nobody really knows how 
anything happens except for the people on the NomCom.
 So you're always talking about participation, but participation is costly and 
time-consuming, and voting is not.  And not that every member of the board 
should be elected by the public, but if it were, you'd have an ongoing form of 
accountability to the public that would be much better, in my opinion.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks, Milton.
 Marilyn, did you want to respond to a portion of that?

>>MARILYN CADE:   I did.  I wanted to ask one question -- and the answer --
 The answer -- you answered part of the question, so let me just ask the half 
you didn't answer.
 This is a two-part step, it seems to me, as we've talked about it in the PSC.  
And that is that, you know, right now, the present accountability mechanisms do 
not actually allow you to change a decision of the board.  It only allows you 
to complain about process.
 So step number one in this -- in the proposed additional approach is that if 
there's sufficient concern on the part of the supporting organizations and the 
advisory committees, and they manage to organize themselves -- and I can tell 
you that is not going to be easy, and I do think it would have to be -- it 
needs to be a very hard step for the community to take this step, there really 
needs to be a driving reason that would cause the supporting organizations to 
take the time to do the outreach to be able to make this decision.  So I think 
it ought to be hard to do.
 So I'm interested in hearing more about that.
 But the first step, actually, allows you to challenge a decision of the board, 
to create a situation where the board is put in a situation of being given a 
vote of no confidence about their decision, not about the process, but about 
the decision.  So maybe I could just ask Milton if he had any direct comments 
on that part of it.

>>MILTON MUELLER:   Quickly, yes.
 I think substantive disagreement and checks and balances on the board could be 
-- are a valuable step.
 And regarding the other thing about the barriers, how hard it should be, the 
problem with having -- requiring all SOs to agree to do something is that the 
politics of each of these SOs is so different, so that something that totally 
outrages the GNSO community, for example, you know, the ccNSO may be completely 
indifferent about it.  Or they may like it.  It may be that the board is 
playing one against the other.
 So the idea of making all of the SOs be required to do -- to have any kind of 
an accountability check seems to me too high a barrier.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you, Milton.  I'm going to hear from Ron in a 
>>minute.  But Paul wants to comment on that.  And then I have Bertrand on the 
>>speaking order and then back to Mike Palage.

>>PAUL TWOMEY:   Milton, I wonder if I can pick you up before you leave, just 
>>exactly what you just said.
 I think the committee's had a lot of discussion around this.  We're really 
interested to get more dialogue on the terms that you have just started, on 
this issue of board accountability.
 There was -- we have issued a document, which is actually, I think, 12 or 16 
pages long, which actually already outlines the accountabilities of ICANN and 
the ICANN board and includes a number of things which are in law, which, for 
some people, they don't necessarily fully comprehend.
 One of the things that's emerged out of this issue of the board is that the 
board members have an accountability to the organization as a whole through 
fiduciary obligations.  And there's a question about whether you make the board 
a board or you make the board a parliament.  And part of the challenge -- where 
a parliament clearly is a representation for interests.  And part of the 
difficulty of thinking through this issue of whether you can spill the whole 
board or you just spill parts of the board really does come down to 
interpretations of fiduciary obligations.
 When we have done -- asked the outside counsel and others to do analysis of 
this, they've all come back saying that the model that exists in other 
corporations is a spilling of the whole board.  There are instances where 
shareholders would change their representative.
 But for, you know, broad votes of no confidence, it's a broad vote of no 
confidence in the whole board.
 And so we're struggling with that challenge, which is, how not to build an 
incentive to make board members lose their accountability to the organization 
as a whole and be completely preoccupied only on their representation or 
political alignment with their supporting organization.
 So this is an open question.  We want to keep the dialogue on.  But some of 
the things we have been struggling with.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks, Paul.  I think we've got Ron Andruff at the 

>>RON ANDRUFF:   Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  Ron Andruff, RNA partners.
 I wanted to pick up on something that Milton said and also mention by my 
Indian colleague, which is on target but a little bit to the side of it.  And 
that has to do about the aspect of business being very critical to the Internet 
and how important the business -- how important the Internet and business are 
 From this point of view, one of the frustrations I think we see with the 
Nominating Committee today is that we have a very qualified board in terms of 
lawyers, security experts, in terms of academics, and so forth.  We need more 
-- maybe we need more balance with regard to having more business 
representation and more business understanding, or understanding of business on 
the board, so when there are delays, whether it be for new top-level domains or 
whatever, how that impacts business as a whole.  Because it's that business 
driver that funds the -- ultimately funds the ICANN budgets, by business being 
there, that funds the budgets.
 So I think it's just an important aspect of balance as opposed to removing 
people, let's think more about how we would balance that with a broader 
 Thank you.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you, Ron.  I think we were down to Bertrand in 
>>the front row and then Mike.

 I'm Bertrand De La Chapelle, I'm the French representative in the GAC.
 Just on the question of accountability, without discussing really in detail 
the appropriateness of the two measures that are being proposed, it's only part 
of the accountability mechanism as a whole, of course.  And nobody believes 
that, to take an example we all know, that the transparency of the American 
democracy is basically funded and shared only by the impeachment procedure.
 It's great that there is impeachment.  But we believe that the main point that 
we have to address is the full process itself.  And the accountability should 
be not only, of course, at the end of the process, when a decision is taken, 
but also, and probably more importantly, at each step of the process, which 
means that the general policy development mechanisms is an integral part, if 
not the essential part, of the transition.
 And just one quote regarding the capture.
 I think the expression that would be more representative, most representative 
of what we all want to achieve is to make this organization as resilient to 
capture as a whole as the Internet itself is.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you, Bertrand.
 We have one other back at the mike and then I'm going to come to the front to 
Jean-Jacques and then to the front of the audience.

>>MICHAEL PALAGE:   Thank you.
 My question, Paul, thank you for that explanation regarding the removal and 
how that is involved in the industry and procedures.
 My question is, would it be possible to have a mechanism where -- and please 
don't take this question in the wrong capacity -- but to have a vote of no 
confidence in just the CEO instead of the entire board, but to just look at the 
CEO himself?  Because, again, you are -- you serve in an ex officio capacity on 
the board.  Would that be sort of one mechanism for the community to perhaps 
send a signal that they're not happy with the direction of where the 
organization is going, and trying to then -- as opposed to trying to go after 
the whole board.  Is that an option that is available in other capacities?

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   I would be -- I would be unhappy with it.  Again, 
>>it's got nothing to do with the present CEO.  The CEO is really responsible 
>>to the board.  If the CEO is making a mistake or you've got a problem with 
>>the CEO, the -- the people to tackle about that are the board.  They're the 
>>ones who approved the actions and found them and who hire and who retain and 
>>who coach.  If they're getting that wrong, then you've got a problem with the 
>>board, not so much your CEO.  Not only that.  The CEO normally has very much 
>>less ability to defend themselves against the processes, because they are a 
>>staff member as well.  So although they are mixed board and staff, they're 
>>primarily staff, and that puts them at a significant disadvantage in 
>>participating in the organization's political processes.
 So that's a very quick reaction, Mike.  If you've got a political problem, I 
think you go to where the politics are, not to where the staff are.
 Bertrand, I just wanted to respond to your very good point that there is much 
more to accountability than simply two mechanisms.
 We do mention two more, of course, in the paper.  One of them is the 
recommendation that we continue with the existing reconsideration, et cetera, 
of all the organizations.  And perhaps that's the place to pick up the point 
that Rob hall and I were discussing earlier.  Maybe those reviews need to look 
very carefully at the actual functioning in terms of the bylaws and their 
exclusion mechanisms which I don't think the reviews have looked at.  The other 
thing we also have is the recommendation that we substantially enhance the 
compliance mechanisms so that when we go to the trouble of creating a policy 
process and we set up some contracts based on that, that they really have to be 
strictly and promptly enforced so that we are responding, you know, accurately 
and accounting to the community for the operation of those processes.
 Now, there needs to be more than those.  But I was interrupting -- Ray.

>>RAY PLZAK:   Ray Plzak from ARIN.
 I would like to expand on your remarks, Peter, and support them.
 The CEO in this case is hired by the board, and therefore is accountable and 
responsible to the board.  And, therefore, it would be a decision of the board 
as to whether or not the CEO is actually performing in accordance with the 
wishes of the board and the broader wishes of the community.
 So I think that trying to send a message to the board by removing the CEO is 
not the appropriate thing to do.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Jean-Jacques?  And then --

>>JEAN-JACQUES SUBRENAT:   I'm the only French member of the structure.
 Just a few words.
 Peter has just said what I wanted to say.  There are several mechanisms, not 
just the maximum price approach, for spilling the whole board.
 I've only been on the board myself for a few months.  And I'd like to give you 
my overall impression.
 I don't know many organizations, regarding of their legal status, who have so 
many strata, so many levels of verification, by the public, by stakeholders and 
so on, people who can look at what's being done by the organization.
 So these measures that our committee is suggesting have a particular benefit, 
and that is that in extreme cases, we can have the entire board resign.
 But, of course, none of us want to see that actually happen.
 There are many other measurements, and I think what we need to do is perhaps 
fine-tune the measures we already have.  Thank you.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   I've got Wolfgang, I think, in the front.  And then 
>>we'll come back to some of the round two speakers.

>>WOLFGANG KLEINW�CHTER:   I want to add just a minor point.  When we are 
>>speaking about the board, I think the --
 Okay.  My name is Wolfgang Kleinw�chter.  It's already there.  I'm from the 
University of Aarhus.
 And I was thinking about accountability and the board.  I would broaden the 
view and to include also the councils, and probably, in further perspective, it 
could be possible that there is a greater division of labor or the 
decision-making capacity between the board and the councils.
 And while I fully support what Paul has said, that the board is not a 
parliament, but, you know, acts as a whole, though the councils could be 
different.  Because say you represent different constituencies.  So that means 
you could have probably even more flexibility in these questions.  If you try 
to look -- or to see the whole problem on different layers, that you have very 
specific procedures, you know, for the board and also for the councils, you 
know, and it's much easier sometimes for the board if you redelegate 
decision-making to the council, because the knowledge, the expertise, and also 
the constituencies which have to find the consensus, let's say, in the 
traditional way of trying to get the right votes together to get a majority, 
you know, it's just an option for further thinking.  So it's not the right 
moment now, because we have different priorities.  But this discussion has 
encouraged me to add this five cents to the debate.
 Thank you.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you for that.
 Rob, we'll make you the last one on this, and then we'll move on.

>>ROBERT HALL:   Thank you, Peter.
 It comes back to what we were talking about earlier, Peter.  And this question 
that you're asking goes right to it, of we talked about capture, and 
immediately devolved down into the constituency level and the GNSO level.  But, 
really, it's the board that is the organization that we must worry about most.  
So in answer to the question of reconsideration request based on merits, I 
think the answer to that must yes.
 When you pick a board, you're looking for intelligent people that you can put 
evidence of a point or a matter in front of and they make an intelligent 
decision.  I think so far, ICANN has been able to get to that.
 When the board stops functioning is when the community or someone needs to be 
able to replace the board, but it should never be done -- and we have to be 
very careful not to do it -- on an individual level.
 So if a board is split, you don't want a community to be able to shoot at one 
or two members and say, I don't agree with their vote, let's remove them and 
get our own party on.  The last thing we want to do is have political parties 
on the board and have under -- we want independent and intelligent people who 
can make a decision based on evidence and.  And the GNSO and other 
organizations are to give them that evidence so they can make a decision.
 So I would support that the ultimate sanction must be the removal of the 
entire board to make sure it is so nauseating for us to pull that trigger that 
it's not just, hey, I can take out the one person I don't like or the two 
people I don't like by organizing a community of people to speak out against 
them.  So it must be a high barrier that we never, ever, hopefully, want to 
hopefully pull that trigger.  And then the question becomes who can pull the 
trigger?  Is it the community?  Is it a third party that reviews it that's 
independent?  Is it the board itself?  The board may get into a situation where 
it cannot function and decides we must act ourselves, and hopefully that would 
be the ultimate ability, is for the board to say we are in a state where we 
cannot function as a board and we need to replace ourselves.  But the last 
thing I would think we would is to be able to single out one or two board 
members.  This board must function and must carry out their fiduciary  
responsibility of their organization.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks, Rob.  I think I agree with everything you 
>>said.  Just to explain, of course at the moment the board could do that 
>>because board members could resign if it got to a state of being 
>>dysfunctional.  Please, again, think about that and make submissions if you 
>>get some more ideas.
 Okay.  Globalization.  ICANN should have global legal presences in addition to 
its headquarters established in the United States.
 This is the subsidiary question.
 Something that Paul spoke about earlier on about often coming down to some, 
what looked like on the outside, very minor issues but in the end can be major 
disruptions to the organization in terms of banking, receiving money in one 
jurisdiction, having to transfer it to another.  Salaries, visas, staff, 
 Any comments on that?  Members of the panel?

>>JEAN-JACQUES SUBRENAT:   I will speak now in another quite well-known 
>>language.  At least I'll try, without too much of an accent, I hope.
 Well, internationalization, is that the proper word, first of all?  Should we 
talk about globalization?
 Actually, globalization is here upon us already.  So I think that whatever 
word we choose to offer you for debate, the idea is that we have to endow ICANN 
with all the appropriate tools to meet its global challenge.
 I think that is of the essence.
 How we do it can be discussed, but I think that the general aim is quite clear.
 So I think that we can derive one or two ideas from this general statement, 
provided you are in agreement with that.  If you are not, I am glad to hear 
from you.
 The first is that we have to look into the future.  Internationalization is 
one of the greatest features of the future.  It is this globalization.
 The multiplying of users, but also the infinite variety of usages or users 
which can be made of the Internet.
 So in order to prepare for that very great change, I think it is only fair 
that we think very strongly about diversifying -- is that the right word? -- 
the presence of ICANN and what it does in the world.
 Presence?  What does that mean?  Well, it means people, it means perhaps 
offices, it means operations, outreach, et cetera.
 So we had some very interesting discussions on the board about the use of the 
word "internationalization" versus other possibilities.  So for lack of 
anything better, at the time being we use that word.  But you see the meaning 
is really to allow -- to enable, actually, ICANN to meet its global obligations.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Merci, Jean-Jacques.
 A comment from Yrjo.  Thank you.

>>YRJO LANSIPURO:   Thank you.  I would lake to add something that the -- when 
>>we speak about globalization or internationalization, what it is not meant to 
>>mean.  And that is an intergovernmental structure.
 We all know the debates that were held at the WSIS, and I think that we have 
advanced pretty far from those days.  Also, among the governments, there was a 
question about capture by governments, and I would just say that I haven't 
detected, after WSIS, the second phase, so much of those conspiracies anymore.  
Actually, the Internet Governance Forum has provided a good framework where 
governments gradually are adapting into this multistakeholder mode, where they 
certainly are participants, not trying to capture anything.
 Coming to this -- what this globalization should be, basically in the very 
simple terms, when the Internet has changed, of course, from something that was 
there for hundred million and is now for 1.4 billion, in simplest terms, the 
question is to match, somehow, the institutional arrangements to that 
development -- institutional arrangements of ICANN to that development.
 Thank you.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you, Yrjo.  And I can ask now Raimundo on the 
 Thank you.

>>RAIMUNDO BECA:   I will be speaking in French.
 Not only because of the pleasure in speaking my second language, but also to 
make the point.  And that is that if we are talking about globalization, then 
the issue of languages is vitally important.
 We have to be able to express ourselves in the language that we master the 
best.  And that's why I have decided to speak in French.
 Having said that, I have two comments to make on this issue.
 My first comment is linked to the fact that ICANN's job is to manage global 
resources, a resource which is global.
 This means that we have to be able to handle the global nature of this 
resource that we are supposed to manage.
 Secondly, when we talk of globalization, we should remember that globalization 
is not only a geographical phenomenon of a representative of one country being 
present everywhere in other countries, but also it has a regional dimension, 
which is also very significant.
 As the world stands today, there are regions which have, with their certain 
cultures, certain shared legal structures, et cetera, and we are lucky enough 
to have a very strong universal footprint.
 When you look at the documents in your folder that deal with the documents we 
are discussing today, this regional footprint, such as the RIRs, which deal 
with regional TLDs, regional domain names, with all of these different bodies, 
and with the IANA which coordinates these, you can see the importance of this 
regional footprint.
 But you also have the ccTLDs.  Some are stronger than others.  Others have -- 
some have regional agreements.
 So some of the ccTLDs have more influence than others.  Some are asking for 
more support than what they currently receive.
   The organizations of users and other bodies are starting to gain an 
importance, but again, they are conditioned by globalization.
 They must be able to continue with this process.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Jean-Jacques.  I have one with Kieren down there, and 
>>then we will come back to Paul.

>>BILL GRAHAM:  Thanks, Peter.  Bill Graham with the Internet Society.
 I guess, first off, I would really like to congratulate the PSC for its work.  
I think the documents that are posted are really useful.  They are very clear 
and understandable, and I think the questions for the consultation are very 
well put.
 I don't completely agree with the direction all of them are going, but I think 
they are provocative and I think they will produce some really useful answers 
that can be helpful input going forward.
 I have to say this one point is the one that mystified me the most.  It's not 
as well elaborated, I guess, in the presentation as to what the driver for this 
is, and precisely how it would work.
 I am having some trouble visualizing it.  And one of the concerns I have about 
this certainly has nothing to do with globalization.  I think ICANN has to do 
whatever it can to be seen to be serving the needs of people around the globe.  
But it's the notion of the global legal presences that troubles me a little 
bit.  And I preface this saying that I am not a lawyer.  But having observed 
lawyers and legal systems in conflict over a few years, I really worry about 
the possible implications of establishing multiple legal presences and having 
to deal with multiple legal regimes in the unhappy example of something that 
comes up where there's a conflict.
 So I would just like to flag that and hear some comments on it, if I could.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Paul, I think, may, in fact, be ready to respond.

>>PAUL TWOMEY:   I couldn't have asked for a better segue to what I was going 
>>to say, so thanks for that.
 I think there's a separation in this proposal between two concepts.  One is 
the further deepening of ICANN's globalization, and a I think is a statement 
which is reasonably in accord with many in the community that ICANN needs to 
increasingly be available to be able to serve its community.  It performs a 
global function, but nevertheless has to interact with people who live in 
geographies and time zones.
 And so aspects of what it has to do has to be able to live with that reality.
 So that's one element of it.
 But let's come to the specific element of legal identity, which I think is 
your question.  Why separate legal identities.  And this is where I will be 
administratively frank.  We will not shift our headquarters from the United 
States.  We presently do operate some offices, and will shortly be opening 
other -- some more, or one more, at least, in other countries.
 The process of establishing those is not an easy process to establish a 
subsidiary entity of a California not-for-profit public benefit corporation.
 And to deal with such issues as your requirements under government pension 
laws, your requirements under how the tax -- whether the tax office in one 
country reflects the same view as the other tax office.  So it's not an easy 
thing to do.
 So that's the first series of things.  And this is probably true for any 
jurisdiction.  I am not saying this peculiarity is about the United States.  
I'm saying it's the same for my home country or your home country. We would 
have the same sorts of things.
 The committee actually asked some two years ago a process for outside counsel 
to do a review of this.  There was an actual review of 18 jurisdictions to 
basically ask that question which says is there something peculiar or when it 
comes to trying to draw out a global footprint, is there anything particularly 
peculiar to this problem we are facing.
 And there is a distinction between if we were a for-profit county.  I can tell 
you in my home country, the process of going through being a nonprofit entity 
and getting set up as a uniquely international presence is significantly more 
burdensome than it is if you are a for-profit corporation where it's actually 
very easy.  It's a two-day process.
 So part of what we have faced here have been those sets of issues.
 The other sets of challenges we have faced frankly has also been recruitment 
of staff.
 So we actually manage staff recruitment in some pretty interesting ways.  We 
have staff on board who, frankly, we cannot send to the United States, neither 
there fault nor anybody else.  Their countries have requirements for visas with 
the United States and vice versa which makes it actually quite difficult.  They 
can only visit the U.S. twice in a two-year period before they have got to 
renew visas.  These sorts of issues emerge.  Again, it's not something which is 
peculiar to the United States.  I am not trying to say this is somehow evil 
thing of the United States at all.  I am trying to say this is a phenomenon 
that would occur wherever we have an initial base.
 But we have faced some particular administrative issues, as we grow the base, 
about this.
 Now, what the committee asked two years ago was council to start a process of 
evaluation to ask this question:  Is this a uniquely American problem or have 
we got some other -- is there something else here?
 That process has uncovered that there are -- that overwhelmingly, the problem 
we are facing in the U.S. is a problem we would face with other normal -- other 
normal legal identity, but that there are a couple of jurisdictions that have 
recently moved to create a new form of legal identity called an international 
nonprofit organization identity.  Quite specifically an international nonprofit 
organization identity, which partly, when we at least have examined them, look 
like they might help ease some of these particular administrative issues for 
building subsidiaries off, et cetera.
 We are just now raising the question whether we should add to our existing 
legal identity an additional partner to take advantage of that.  It's very much 
an administrative question.  It also deals with issues -- as I said, it deals 
with issues about visas, about people's abilities to come and meet with us, the 
ability about, particularly, ease of employment issues.  It's a range of 
administrative issues.
 And I would make the following further observation to a Canadian, is that we 
don't have a presence in Canada but we have been sued in Canada.
 So in other words, this issue -- One of the things we are conscious of is 
being where you are based has an issue for legal status, but nevertheless, we 
do business all around the world.  As a consequence, that as an impact on 
people's perceptions about lawsuits.
 We do want to keep reinforcing this issue.  The committee does not see any 
need -- indeed, it wants to reinforce that the headquarters of ICANN should 
remain in the United States and that there should be no instability given to 
the role of the legal contracts that are presently written out of the United 
States.  We have a thousand contracts with contracted parties that apply U.S. 
law, the application of U.S. anti-trust law on ICANN.  All of these issues we 
see as a positive.  So we are not trying to walk away from any of those sets of 
accountabilities.  We are just trying to say as the issue of deepening 
globalization function occurs, is there -- after this review, is there one 
other jurisdiction or potentially a jurisdiction that might give us further 
benefits in trying to do our task.  That's the simple question, and we have not 
yet come to a final conclusion.  We are looking for consultation.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Okay.  Thanks, Paul.  I think we are going to have to 
>>move on from that topic.  In summary, a U.S., California, not-for-profit is 
>>not the kind of vehicle you can take to the world as a mechanism for a global 
>>body.  But we can publish more of the detail that Paul has given some of 
>>about that.
 I would like to move on to the next topic, if I may, because I do want to give 
Kieren plenty of time to tell you about the consultation time line and the 
mechanisms for you to participate.  So let's move on to the last of the 
specific topics which is maintaining secure and stable operations.
 The first one that's up is the involvement that we think ICANN should be 
having as a thought leader in relation to security and stability issues.
 There are a number of references to this in the strategic plan.  We mentioned 
that we are conscious that this may be -- there could be issues of mission 
creep around this, but at the same time, ICANN is in a unique position to 
comment and to assist law enforcement and other agencies that are concerned.
 So let's throw the floor open to that.  Marilyn.

>>MARILYN CADE:   I'd like to draw the community's attention to items 5.4 and 
>>5.5, 5.6 -- sorry, 5.4 and 5.5 for now.
 The committee is discussing this, and I will just say as a member of the 
committee that I am one of the committee members who would like to see a very 
clear discussion about what is ICANN's limited but critical role in this very 
important area.
 I do come from the business community, and the security and stability of the 
Internet is incredibly important to the -- for the Internet to fulfill the role 
that it plays today.  And we heard from the French Minister this morning.  I 
was recently at the OECD ministerial where there was lots of conversation about 
the Internet economy.  More and more we as users want everything to be online 
everywhere and to be where we are.  In an ever mobile environment we want more 
and more access to information, and we want more and more users to be reliant 
on this wonderful communication mechanism.
 But, there is a question that faces us about what is our role as ICANN.  What 
part of the focus on security and stability is ours?  And I think that's an 
important discussion that I really want to hear more from the community about.
 I know there's something there, but I want to hear more from others about it.
 Secondly, the other thing that's on my mind is the stability of the 
organization as we face what I consider to be a tsunami of operational demand 
in this next period.  And perhaps a tsunami of further change.
 I might disagree with one of my PSC colleagues.  I see a continuing appetite 
in a variety of circles to see a shift away from the Internet approach to doing 
things to perhaps a more regulated approach.  And I think that ICANN a going to 
need to remain stable through that period in order to fulfill its work.
 So I'm interested in hearing from all of you about how do you think -- what 
are the mechanisms we can do, what are the changes, what are your views, what 
are your thoughts?
 There are other points here that are also important, but those are two in 
particular that I would like to call your attention to.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Further from the floor?
 Well, I don't want to provoke -- Philip, is that a question or are you just 
stretching?  I see.  Microphone, please.

>>PHILIP SHEPPARD:   Philip Sheppard, business constituency, but probably 
>>talking in my own capacity.
 I think for a time, frankly, I have had a problem with ICANN's mission being 
security and stability.  It does seem to have origins in a very technically 
oriented view of what the Internet is about.
 I mean, the most secure and stable way the Internet could exist, arguably, is 
what we had at its very origin.  You know supplier, one contract, easy to 
manage, dead straightforward, addressing problems in the most simplistic way.
 It seems to miss, to my mind, where we may want to be today, where I would 
hope that ICANN's broader mission should be guardian of the public trust?  
Looking towards creating an Internet that is a safe and competitive place for 
businesses and users to do business and to communicate.
 So it's those sort of ideas.  It may not be perfect phrasing, but those sort 
of ideas that I would hope would be more factored into what the mission is 
about as opposed to something which seems to be extraordinarily technical and 
misses those somewhat higher level ambitions.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks for that.
 I am going to move, then, to, if I can, the last of these recommendations and 
one of them is the one that Paul has touched on.  Making it absolutely clear, 
for the continuity of the organization, and he has mentioned the contracts, 
that headquarters will remain in the United States.
 The other thing is to continue work on the e-IANA and other improvements at 
IANA, which we operate under a contract with the U.S. Department of Commerce.
 The last step is this implementing the root server management transition.
 Discussion on those?
 Question down the back.

>> My name is Mike Sachs.  I am from Belgium and I am a software developer.  
>> This is my first time at an ICANN meeting.
 There have been a lot of discussions about the board and different 
accountability issues, and those are great topics for ICANN as it transitions 
into a more mature organization.
 The thing that I haven't seen is a transition as it relates to the role of the 
U.S. government in ICANN.
 And so as far as I've seen or that I am aware of, there haven't been issues 
where the U.S. government has taken a role of micro managing operations of 
 So what's your role, or how do you see the topic of transition as it relates 
to the role of the U.S. government in ICANN?

>>JEAN-JACQUES SUBRENAT:   Well, Mr. Sachs, admittedly I have been on the board 
>>only for seven months, but I didn't realize that the USG was that clever that 
>>it was micro managing what the board was trying to do.  Sometimes with 
>>language which is not necessarily conducive to harmony with the U.S. 
 So I think that your question brings up actually two questions.  One is, is it 
a question of government involvement or is it a question of history?  I would 
say that for obvious historical reasons we all know, ICANN was born in the 
United States, and under California law, et cetera.
 So I would like you, in a way, to say in what you think -- in what way you 
think that it is captive and in what ways you think the internationalization 
program or globalization program which has been presented to you doesn't answer 
that question.
 Could you be more specific?

>> I'm sorry, I said I was not aware of any issues where the U.S. government 
>> had micro managed the board.  So sorry for that.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Okay.  We have somebody down the front.
 Maria?  Thanks.

>>WOLFGANG KLEINW�CHTER: Wolfgang Kleinw�chter again.
 I have a question, and this is when you speak about streamlining of the IANA 
function, what is your understanding of streamlining?  And before you answer, 
you know, I want to add a comment to the previous debate about globalization.  
My comment is that we should understand that globalization has a lot of 
 Doesn't it directly mean legal changes?  And we should be creative in creating 
some symbols which would then feed this call for a lot of constituencies that 
ICANN is more global, and not a U.S. company.
 And I think here, something can be done, probably without any effect of the 
established contractual and other arrangements.  So it's a question for 
brainstorming or something like that.  But the streamlining question is 
interesting for me, and we should be really aware that the JPA is a different 
thing than the IANA contract.


>>PAUL TWOMEY:   I think -- First of all, this set of wording comes from a lot 
>>of the comments that -- the committee hearing a lot of the comments that were 
>>made by a certain set of the respondents as part of the Joint Project 
>>Agreement midterm review.
 There was a certain set of respondents, mostly country code -- overwhelmingly 
country code operators who raised this issue.  And this is part of our 
community and we have a responsibility to be honest to that feedback that we 
have received, to be honest to that which was raised by them and to put it back 
as part of this discussion.
 The -- you talk about the streamlining.  There is -- there has bipartisan work 
under way that was initially requested, actually, by CENTR for moving to what 
was then called eIANA, okay.
 And this area here, which talks of streamlining it, this is verbs to cover 
that particular project, that particular eIANA project should continue.  That's 
what it's trying to address.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   And there's one down the back here, I think.  Thank 

>> Y.J. Park, Asian Internet user, -- is it echoing too much?
 I'd also like to accord the globalization efforts ICANN has made.  I would 
like to kind of recognize ICANN has made a tremendous job in implementing 
globalization.  But I also would like to draw attention to the globalization of 
ICANN has been focusing on the Europeanization rather than Asia and Latin 
America and Africa.  So we still have a lot of the work to do in globalizing 
the ICANN operations.
 So if we look at the staff of the ICANN, we can -- it's very difficult to see 
people from Asia and Africa and Latin America, and it is going to be, like, a 
challenge for ICANN to hire those -- the people from that constituency, and 
also, it would be more challenge for ICANN to establish the smooth 
communications with that constituency.  So I would really like to draw 
attention for ICANN's management to pay attention to those constituencies who 
right now, I mean, are having the most Internet users around the world, and 
which will be growing more and more.
 So it will be great to see ICANN's efforts to include people from that 
constituency in the future.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you, Y.J.  I'm going to close this topic down 
>>very shortly.  So if you have something to say -- I see Bertrand at the 
>>front.  Then we'll move to the next topic.

>>BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE:   (Speaking German).
 So -- I'm going to speak French just to please a number of people in the room.
 Could I say that French is not just for the benefit of the French speakers, 
however.  It is a sharing language.  And that is why, in France, we insist that 
the French language should be present, not because we're any better than the 
Germans, the Danes, or anyone else, but because this is a language that many 
people share and use.
 Now, we're reaching the end of this session, and there are many, many issues 
that we will not have the opportunity to deal with this time around.
 Could I say that in the report of the President's Strategy Committee, there 
are two levels.  And this refers to what Isabelle Graham was saying earlier.  
There's one level where we have the greater merit of having identified 
objectives that have now become common:  Noncapture, accountability, and 
 These, I think, are ideas that are -- can be -- that can be shared now.  But 
we have different visions of what lies behind these words.  They are shared 
terms, however.
 And could I end this point by making the link between this discussion and the 
discussion that took place before this one on institutional structures.
 Now, obviously, in this session, we cannot deal with the issue of the final 
institutional structure of ICANN, partly because we will have time during the 
coming year to discuss this -- that's why I normally speak English.  In fact, 
I'm speaking a little fast when I'm speaking French.  But bear with me.
 I wanted to mention our point of view that internationalization of ICANN is 
not just a matter of the physical presence, but also the structure.  We don't 
have a perfect definition of what that structure should be at this point.  And 
that relates to what Jean-Jacques has said on this point.
 But we're not talking about an intergovernmental organization.
 Just to pick up two points mentioned by the minister this morning.  First of 
all -- and this is a point that is addressed to a certain number of players, 
but is also addressed to the United States, it's an issue that we're dealing 
with here -- the objective we must pursue is that the institutional 
architecture that we adopt after the JPA must be acceptable not only to all of 
the players, but also considered by each and every one of those stakeholders as 
progress over the current situation, including for themselves.
 And I stress the importance of this point.  We do have a joint responsibility 
to find an architecture which everybody is happy with.
 The final point is that, in terms of our physical presence, we must not 
separate the idea of the introduction of the IDNs and the transition of ICANN.  
People think that these are two separate things, but they are not.  It is very 
important to set up in the various different regions -- and I'm talking about 
linguistic regions, not geographic regions -- structures which can deal with 
common issues and problems, what the minister talked about this morning as 
being a community of script.  And that must be taken into account when we're 
thinking about transition.  The physical establishments must also amount to an 
improvement in the management of what is becoming a multiscript space.
 Thank you very much.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you, Bertrand.  I really don't know what you 
>>mean by changes to the institutional architecture.  So I'll be very 
>>interested to receive written submissions on what's wrong with the current 
>>structure, which the President's Strategy Committee has been quite careful to 
>>say will be maintained.  We think that the balance of power and the balance 
>>of representation and the structures that were built over the last ten years 
>>really are something that should be preserved.  So the suggestion that we 
>>need to change any of the architecture is very challenging, very interesting. 
>> And I look forward to receiving that.
 Dennis, we'll make you the last on this topic.

>>DENNIS JENNINGS:   Thank you.  Dennis Jennings, ICANN board member.
 I would just like to speak to the specific suggestion in the top bullet there 
that ICANN should consider amending its bylaws to confirm that its headquarters 
will remain in the United States.
 I think this is quite inappropriate at this time and is the cart before the 
horse.  Such a preemptive move would preclude consideration of a variety of 
different institutional architectures, of different ways of representing 
stakeholders.  And I think that it may turn out that the best way to implement 
the post JPA transition ICANN is to do that.  But to do it now would be to 
preempt possible outcomes.  And that would be inappropriate.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you, Dennis.  The timing is obviously something 
>>that we should take into account.
 Alex, you're making such an attempt to participate on this question, I'll 
extend the speaking order.

>>ALEJANDRO PISANTY:   Thank you, Peter.  My name is Alejandro Pisanty.  I'm a 
>>former board member, a professor at the national University of Mexico.
 Briefly, after you have made the -- we have had the view of the whole thing, 
what remains with me is deep dissatisfaction with the discussion about capture.
 I think that capture is and is going to continue to be a very significant 
issue.  One has to look at the issue of capture from -- and capture prevention 
from the constituency level, from the nitty-gritty up, as well as from the top.
 We have seen several cases of attempts to capture surviving, attempts to 
capture.  During my period of the board, we dealt with some really serious 
ones.  We can still see constituencies that don't publish their members' lists. 
 And from there on, you have many forms of capture.
 The form of capture of a bully pulpit is out there.
 The form of capture of civil discourse not allowing to call a spade a spade is 
around there.
 A meeting of this size is not conducive to that kind of frank and open 
 So I think that an organizational climate that invites this much more open 
discussion and pointing fingers at where you see attempts of capture being 
started is very important, 'cause otherwise, you can only resolve them with 
very serious fights or with the kind of institutional crisis or political 
institutional crisis, to be more precise, that will come at the point where 
someone would ask to have a vote of nonconfidence on the whole board, or from 
supporting organizations against the board.
 For once, I agree with Milton, that kind of crisis is too big a thing T would 
consume several years of the organization's energy, and you need an 
intermediate step for that level.
 An alternative we've heard recently against the capture is quite the opposite 
of easy removal of the board.  And it probably can also be studied as an 
alternative for synthesizing ideas from there, which is actually making much 
longer and more stable tenure for board members and have them selected from a 
much more independent set, combining very independent board members, people who 
have -- are little beholden to specific interests with tenure, with some other 
board members that really do represent directly the interests that are -- and 
then you have very open statements of interest, may be an alternative to the 
issue of capture.
 I think in the 20-year run, the stability and security issue and all others 
are linked to the risk of capture.  And this -- I think that this session has 
really not dealt with all that should be, because, as I said, in civil 
discourse, you cannot point fingers.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks, Alejandro.  I just want to go back, I guess, 
>>Paul, I think you wanted to say something more about this issue, just a 
>>reminder that the improving institutional confidence document picks up, I 
>>guess, the kind of point that Steve Metalitz was making earlier, that the 
>>relations with the business community are a protection against capture, or 
>>one of them, and the document does call for a stronger relationship with the 
>>business community.
 Paul, did you want to come back and say something more about that?

>>PAUL TWOMEY:   Thank you, Peter.
 I just wanted to reopen agenda item number 2, strengthening accountability to 
ICANN community, because even since we've put these documents up, a number of 
people have raised, at least with me, some potential additional things that we 
could consider under this heading.
 I'm wondering -- I'm looking at Avri in the corner.  Yes.
 Avri, in particular, has raised one issue which I wonder if we should just 
give some opportunity for her to speak as a potential further concept.


>>AVRI DORIA:   Yeah, Avri Doria.  Am I on?  Yes, Avri Doria.  I'm, I guess, a 
>>professor at Lule� University and one of those NomCom appointees to the GNSO, 
>>people that don't get elected.
 One of the things -- one of the bedrocks that I've always felt of -- and it 
didn't quite fit in because we were talking about how we get rid of or how we 
reconsider.  But one of the things that I've always felt was sort of the 
bedrock in an ICANN -- and we mention it often -- is the multistakeholder, you 
know, representation.  And that includes a lot of elements.  One of those 
elements is very much the parity of the multistakeholders within that and the 
scope and the breadth of the multistakeholders.
 So, for example, when I'm looking at the multistakeholder, I do look for 
equality in a presentation of the resources and the amount one listens to the 
various stakeholder.  I also look at the fact that we have gaps in it.
 Now, this may be a strange thing for me to be bringing up.  But we have a 
Government Advisory Committee which represents the global interest of 
governments.  We have an ALAC, which represents the global interests of civil 
society.  And while sometimes I'd like to see more parity between them, that's 
a different issue.
 I don't see where we have the global business advisory committee, where the -- 
whether it's, you know, international business associations, international 
banking association, not those who are in the GNSO that I work with in the GNSO 
that are the contracted parties or those with contracts, but those that take a 
sort of global view of business in the same way that, you know, I work with 
organizations that take a global view of civil society, or those that take a 
global view of governments' interests, would also participate.
 So in looking at multistakeholderism, we normally have gotten to the point of 
viewing it as three stakeholder groups in advisory committees.  So I'm just 
wondering whether there's any possibility of sort of bringing up the notion of 
the advisory committee to, A, having parity between them, and, B, filling the 
gap for the business advisory committee.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thanks, Avri.  We're running out of time.  I've got a 
>>request for a very short intervention from Yrjo and a very short one from 
>>Marilyn, and then we'll move on.

>>YRJO LANSIPURO:   Just, briefly, as recalls the assertion that the 
>>headquarters should remain in the United States, this is one part of the 
>>statement.  And the other part is the establishment of additional legal 
>>personality in another jurisdiction.
 Thank you.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   And hopefully equally short, Marilyn.  Thank you.

>>MARILYN CADE:   I think it will be.  So I'm going to ask the community to 
>>think about the difference between participation and interaction versus 
 I'm a little uncomfortable with the idea that we would create even new groups 
that would only advise.
 What I think -- and I want to hear more from everyone -- is, you know, I'm 
seeing that the at large is interested in strengthening their participation and 
their interaction.  So I'd like to hear from those from the business community 
who might comment on the proposal there about what are the mechanisms by which 
they would see strengthening participation and interaction, and, you know, 
certainly the community will probably have lots of ideas about what the 
mechanisms might be.  But I just want to keep mentioning the words 
"participation" and "interaction."

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Okay.  Thanks very much.  I'm going to just draw your 
>>attention -- we haven't got time to discuss it, and that's appropriate, 
>>because the PSC has not actually resolved this issue.  We have been tossing 
>>around the idea of a special focus group or an experts advice group as part 
>>of our in- -- increasing our consultation.  I just put that up to show that 
>>the work is not finished on the committee, nor have we reached any of these 
>>conclusions easily.
 Input on whether you feel that expertise or focus groups on any of these 
issues would be helpful would be appreciated, and the comments.
 I've now got to hand over to Kieren, who is going to take us through the 
process, the timeline.  We really do want your feedback today as the start of a 
 Kieren, come and tell us how the process goes from here.  Thanks.

>>KIEREN McCARTHY:   Hello.  I'll try and be brief, because we're running 
>>slightly over.
 As Peter said originally, the plan is to have a very wide consultation, 
obviously, because of the importance of this and because it's vital that the 
community agrees with the way that ICANN moves forward.
 So what we largely have is two public comment periods for this before we need 
to -- the PSC needs to provide some documentation to the board.
 There's one comment period that's already open.  At the moment, it is open.  
And it closes the 31st, on 31st of July, at which point I will provide a 
summary analysis.  And then we'll go through and provide revised documents.  
And then we'll put out a second public comment period where you can comment on 
those revised documents.  And then we will have the Cairo meeting where we'll 
discuss that and then produce a final report.
 So that's a quick run-through of what the system will be.  The PSC is also 
thinking of looking at providing some townhall meetings.  Because otherwise we 
only have two physical meetings in that schedule.
 The second part, this is all on the Web site, which I'll talk about in a 
second, from the 7th to September to the 15th of October.  These are the time 
periods in which you will be able to respond.
 And that's -- the idea is to have the final public discussion in November.  
That's the Cairo meeting.  And then a final paper to the board in December.
 So what's the easiest way you can find out what's going on?  I've set up a 
single Web page that should have everything you need to know on it.  And it's 
very simple.  It's icann.org, slash, JPA, slash, IIC, "IIC" standing for 
improving institutional confidence.
 I'm going to put everything that happens there, so if you go to that page, and 
that's linked to on the front, if you have a look at the front of the ICANN 
page at the moment, the documents are linked to the public comment period is 
linked to.  We also have various other systems which are a newsletter, I've 
created a newsletter, which not that many people have signed up to at the 
moment.  I hope you will.  It's very easy.  You just give your e-mail address 
and you're signed up.  We have 42 people signed up at the moment.  We'll send 
you a newsletter every time something significant happens so you won't have to 
keep going back to the site.  We'll tell you.  If you want to find out what's 
going on, we'll tell you.  There's also an RSS feed, so if you prefer an RSS 
feed, we do an RSS feed every time something significant happens, whether it's 
a summary analysis, the announcement of a new meeting, we'll announce it.  
That's how you can follow it.  It should be fairly easy to get ahold of what 
we're doing at any particular time.  There's an e-mail address which is 
IIC@xxxxxxxxx.  If you have any queries or you're uncertain or you have a 
question or anything along those lines, we have a specific e-mail address just 
for this consultation.
 So if you go to that Web site, everything should be there.  I'm happy to take 
any suggestions or requests for how to improve that.  If you arrive at the page 
and you say, "I wish that was there," send me an e-mail.  And if it's useful, 
I'll introduce it.
 The one thing that I will strive for because of the importance of the 
consultation is that I'll try and direct everything into the two public comment 
periods.  So that's how I'd like to try and force everything into those public 
comment periods, because that's what, structurally, ICANN has done, so that's 
my intention.  If a lot of the community think it's better to try another 
system, then we'll try another system.  But that's -- you should be able to get 
hold of any information that you like as we progress with this.  And if you 
don't, then you have an e-mail address to send a request to.

>>PETER DENGATE THRUSH:   Thank you, Kieren.  And there's already a lot up on 
>>the Web site under this already.
 Thank you all.  We've got to close the session.  Thank you very much to 
members of the President's Strategy Committee for the work in getting us to 
this point.  Thank you all for participating.  Please stay on this topic.  Do 
file submissions.  And do watch what happens.  We appreciate it.  Thank you 
very much.
 [ Applause ]

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