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Re: [soac-newgtldapsup-wg] Re: [] Updated Agenda for 27 January Consultation
- To: Richard Tindal <richardtindal@xxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [soac-newgtldapsup-wg] Re: [] Updated Agenda for 27 January Consultation
- From: Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2011 18:20:55 -0500
On 1/24/11 5:17 PM, Richard Tindal wrote:
The trademark community have supported a COI like the one currently in the AG
INTA, for example, asked that it cover "5 to 7 years of registry operation"
(rather than the current 3 years)
Thank you. I missed that.
I wonder how much of this is driven by their anticipation of defensive
registration.
It should be "none", since when the registry fails, all of its
registrations, of marks for publication, of marks for non-publication,
and near-marks, whether by marks holders or by marks squatters, also fail.
For applications with proposed registration policies which bar
non-community trademark registrations (those identified as
"community-based" which are structured to score 14/16), I don't see
how the marks holders have any interest in the longevity of their
investments, since they're not investing.
So if the registration policy does not allow the exploitation of
marks, and therefore drive defensive registrations, the marks interest
in a COI should be greatly diminished.
Like many of the costs built into the TLD evaluation process/ registry business
operations, the COI is supported by the trademark lobby. There are many,
many other
'protections' built into the process that add to applicant cost.
More please.
RT
Eric
On Jan 24, 2011, at 1:55 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Avri,
I haven't found an expression of the rational(s) for the COI, though the
addenda to Thursday's meeting provides a rational for the applicant's
affirmative act of providing a COI prior to the date of committing the
application.
As the COI committed resources are unconditionally granted to ICANN, which may be less
motivated than a community in the well-being of its registry, the "saving"
presumption may not be correct.
I haven't found a public comment requesting a COI like vehicle or offering a
rational for a COI like capability, so this appears to be the work of staff,
not the community, and staff's rational is not yet disclosed, though I've asked
(repeatedly).
Eric
On 1/24/11 4:37 PM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I though the issue was the time it took to save a failing TLD and how one might
go about that differently in some cases - especially the JAS defined case. I
did not think the issue was the time it took to actually die.
a.
On 24 Jan 2011, at 15:11, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Hi Richard,
... I assume the response will be that cash is the best form of security.
There are assumptions built into this.
What exactly are we securing? Is .shoe the same as .yiddish?
The former is a for-profit actor, possibly amounting to one person with
sufficient resources to cause a corporate shell to be created, a application
authored, and some service agreements entered into. The latter is the creation
of a linguistic and cultural community.
Does "fail" mean the same thing for both standard and community-based
applications?
Why are we securing? Did anyone miss .pro? Other than the consolidation issue,
did anyone care when .name was acquired by VGRS?
Why do we care, and why do we care for just 36 months? Are we moving the ".bug goes
.splat" moment out to 2015 just to move bad news into the future, or does 36 months
of buy something worth having?
Suppose no transition operator can be found, and no recovery from the
triggering cause occurs. What is the difference between running out of COI
budget at failure+36months and failure now?
I know you've looked at the time for a registrant to re-brand, which makes sense for the
.shoe registrants, but the .yiddish registrants don't have another generic label to
incorporate into their "brands".
Turning to the continuity-operator-also-failing, we know that at least one
existing ccTLD operator will apply for a gTLD. And they will use their existing
platform, and optionally (given the VI outcome), augment by one or more
registrars their existing set of capabilities.
Now suppose this gTLD registry "fails". How is this different from the second
(and subsequent) registries some ccTLD operators are now starting up through the ccTLD
IDN FastTrack, which provides them with one or more additional iso3166-equivalent
delegations?
If we don't care when a ccTLD registry fails, and we're not going to care when
a ccTLD IDN FT acquired registry fails, why are we going to care when a gTLD
acquired by a ccTLD operator fails, or be concerned that the ability of a ccTLD
operator to provide continuity operations may not exist?
If cash is the only reliable tool, then applications from ccTLDs, or which
propose to use ccTLDs as backends are problematic, since we don't take an
operational interest in these now, and any contract will only touch the gTLD
service surface of that ccTLD operator's capabilities.
Personally, I don't think applications by existing facilities-based ccTLD
operators are any less credible than applications by new for-profit registry
operators.
Finally, and to the JAS problem: should the needs-qualified applicants even
provide COI resources to ICANN? Shouldn't the diversity and competition
interests result in ICANN providing the COI resources to the applicants?
And so far staff haven't decided if they will respond.
Eric
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