An Inappropriate sTLD Proposal
Comments on Mobi JV?s .mobi Proposal It is quite possible (though noted experts have expressed doubts) that the establishment of a TLD for use by mobile devices would be technically harmless and even useful to the public. And if so, the proposed Mobi JV would likely be an appropriate registry operator for an unsponsored TLD. But Mobi JV is surely not an appropriate sponsoring organisation to receive any significant delegated policy-making authority over a sponsored TLD. When ICANN delegates to a sponsoring organisation the authority to establish policies, ICANN loses the ability to set policies that differ from those the sponsoring organisation sets. In the three existing sTLDs, this creates few problems because the sponsoring organisations are truly representative of their communities and not motivated in any way to act contrary to those communities interests. Such is not the case, however, with Mobi JV. Mobi JV would be operated under the control of and in the interests of its investors. The proposal notes that initially this includes only three participants in the mobile-device community (though ones with great economic power), and suggests that several other companies may join. But even participation augmented by additional investors would be quite narrow in the context of the overall field of significantly interested parties. No significant, truly neutral consortium (and not even Symbian, which Nokia also dominates <http://www.symbian.com/about/ownership.html>) appears to have endorsed Mobi JV as an appropriate maker of policies for this TLD. Very significant manufacturers and operators are absent.! The assertions that Mobi JV itself adequately represents the defined community simply cannot be credited. The proposal states that two advisory groups would be established, but they would have only advisory authority. As acknowledged in the ?Policy-Making Process? section, ?Mobi JV?s Board of Directors will ultimately make the policies for the .mTLD domain based on appropriate and timely input from [the advisory groups, management, and other sources].? Other experiences in the DNS undercut any notion that ?advisory boards? lacking decision-making authority result in the community being truly represented. Delegating any significant authority to Mobi JV would be dangerous. On its surface, Mobi JV is a for-profit entity that will be motivated to create policies that benefit its investors. This would be similar to turning over all policy-making authority over .com to VeriSign?a step initially proposed by the NSF but so unacceptable that five years ago ICANN was created to serve the policy-making function. But even more perniciously, Mobi JV would also be motivated to establish policies for .mobi that favor its investors in ways not reflected in their dividends. One can easily imagine, for example, that rules for screen-width rules might be established that work for Nokia equipment but not for Ericsson or Motorola. While designation of a TLD operator or sponsor inevitably creates some degree of market power over the TLD, ICANN should be very careful to avoid circumstances in which that market power can be leveraged into a monopoly position outside the TLD. As reflected in its articles of incorporation, after all, one of ICANN?s founding goals is to ?enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets?, not to create monopolies in markets that may to!
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DNS. The policies over which Mobi JV wishes to assume authority should not be placed in the hands of a for-profit organisation that serves a narrow class of investors that will be motivated to benefit their own businesses at the expense of others. That authority should be in the hands of an organisation that is truly representative of the entire affected community, such as ICANN or an appropriate broadly based standards organisation.
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