Comments on Module 4 DAG Version 3
Module 4 4.1.3If there is a self-resolution of a string contention and an opportunity arises for re-crafting the application as a joint venture, ICANN’s position is to not accept such a solution on the grounds that there will be material change in the documentation and this will cost more money than the original application fee covered and the joint venture should apply with new fees at the next round, if there is one (the applications terms in Module 6 suggests that there may not be a next round). In such an event the joint venture will include at least two original applicants who have each paid at least $185 000, of which $60K each is “risk reserve money” (as per Cost Update document) and both (or more) of these now-joined applicants will traverse the rest of the long road to delegation as a single entity (and so costing less) as opposed to two or more (and so costing more). Moreover peace would have been made between two warring parties. ICANN’s financial argument for throwing the joint venture seems illogical and inconsistent.
4.2 Criterion 4In the community evaluation process 2 of 16 points (with 14 being needed to pass) is given to Opposition from relevant parties – even a single opposition knocks of a point. One can assume almost always that the process included a standard applicant (i.e. non-community) who is awaiting the outcome. This standard applicant almost certainly wants the community evaluation to fail and could use this opposition step to knock of 2 points and brink the community applicant to the brink of failure single-handedly. This would make the community evaluation process almost pointless. Since the total number of domain names needed on Planet Earth is likely to be finite (despite all current indications to the contrary) the domain name market is a zero-sum game. When a new gTLD is issued, any and all existing TLD operators – ccTLD or gTLD – particularly in the same script, will lose potential customers. So it would be in the interest of any and all existing TLD operators to file a community objection and often at least one (for example an existing ccTLD operator against a new government supported capital city gTLD) would even be viewed as “relevant opposition”. The appropriate measure would be that all existing TLD operators to be barred from opposing in any comparative evaluation.
4.3.2Until a final exact Registry Agreement is published and guaranteed to be the one that will be signed in the event of delegation, there should be no commencement of the application period or payment of application fees. Such an agreement should guarantee in writing and at the outset, that if the applicant jumps all the hurdles and is eligible for delegation according to the pre-published rules, Board approval and Department of Commerce introduction of the TLD into the root is certain.
Module 4 .doc