RESPONDING AND MORE SUPPORT FOR THIS CHARTER

[Ralph Yarro <ralph@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I am responding to the comments of Sanford Duryee, at

http://forum.icann.org/lists/cyber-safety-petition/msg00282.html.



Mr. Duryee refers to the CSC charter, section 2.2.1, providing for a

meeting of CSC members during ICANN public meetings.



There are many constituencies.  Each of the separate constituencies has

its own internal meeting during ICANN events.  Such meetings have been

part of the ICANN public meeting days for years.  No ICANN policy

decisions are made at these individual meetings.  Besides, the CSC

membership "reflect(s) the functional, geographic, and cultural

diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and

decision-making."  See the member roster at

https://st.icann.org/data/workspaces/ncsg-commons/attachments/cybersafety_constituency_proposed:20090323232038-0-23383/original/Membership%20Roster%20(23%20Mar%202009).pdf



Dr. Duryee also refer to subsection c., which permits the replacement

of a member of the executive committee “who prevents the execution of

tasks and duties required by this Charter."



The executive committee (EC) mentioned is the internal administrator of

just this constituency.  The EC of the CSC must adhere to its own

charter.  Each of many constituencies has its own EC that administer its

separate charter.  Constituencies are like separate states, each of

which can send a representative to Congress.



Then representatives from each constituency come together in the GNSO

council.  The councilors work together to establish working groups on

particular issues and drafting committees.  They evaluate this work and

vote upon recommendations.  The ICANN Board considers the

recommendations and makes a decision “applying documented policies

neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness."



For good or for ill, the ICANN model is already based on separate

constituencies representing different kinds of stakeholders.  ICANN has

specifically requested the formation of many new constituencies as part

of the GNSO restructure.  The CSC is only one of those.  It will impose

no different financial burden and have no greater influence than any of

the other constituencies.



Next Mr. Duryee refers to section 5.1.2 (Ineligible Organizations) and

complains that commercial interests cannot be members of the CSC.  The

CSC is within the non-commercial users’ house.  There are also

commercial users’ constituencies, and suppliers’ constituencies,

etc.  ICANN rules specifically prohibit commercial entities in the

non-commercial stakeholder house, no matter what our charter provides.



Finally, Mr. Duryee refers to section 9.1.1 (Recruiting Emphasis) and

suggests that, “The CSC intends to dominate ICANN with a membership

unable to fulfill the Corporation's mission, which is ‘related to ...

technical functions.’”  First, there is no chance the CSC will

dominate anything.  Second, these charter provisions have been reviewed

by ICANN staff and fall within the ambit of the intended restructure of

the GNSO.



Ralph Yarro