On the primary internal goals, their benefits, if any, and the advice of the GAC

[Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Kurt,

My initial notes concerned issues external to the proposed EOI model, 
the suggestion that traffic in "slots" has a security and stability 
consequence, the earliest date delegations could occur, and 
reconciliation with the zone file access model. A subsequent note 
addressed a single aspect of the proposed EOI model, the preference 
for compulsion, a method question, assuming the EOI serves an 
informational purpose.
In this note I address the central merit claims offered in support of 
an EOI.
Most of humanity now reside in urban areas. When network access is 
included, overwhelmingly, current and future registrants are residents 
of urban areas. This urban-favoring distribution is even more 
pronounced when business and institutions are considered.
As a matter of policy, ICANN can eschew contracting with the 
governments of urban areas and discard the metro/geo TLD model, or it 
can decide that their needs are substantially unmet and accept 
applications brought by municipal governments. The GAC has advised the 
names of cities and regions be protected from speculative acquisition, 
and be made available to the governments of those cities and regions.
The set of governments which have taken substantive steps towards an 
application is quite small, and the steps that municipal government 
make, which have a purely procedural cost, are more determinative of 
"intent" than any cash deposit intended to present agile speculators 
with some marginal cost on the resource they are likely to engage in 
speculation.
A similar general fact situation exists with cultural and linguistic 
institutions and the steps these have made.
To give examples I believe you already know, the Cities of Barcelona, 
Paris, New York, and the Scottish Government, the Welsh National 
Assembly, the Quebec Provincial Government, and others have taken 
substantive steps towards an application.
With this preliminary I hope I have made the central problem easily 
understood: what is the relationship between the EOI, under any of the 
proposed forms, and applicants which are fundamentally public 
government or public service?
Are we waiting to learn the names of cities, of autonomous regions, or 
cultural and linguistic groups? Will it come as a surprise us, the 
designers of the string evaluation module, that "Paris" exists? Is 
there any part of the problem which we, as designers of the evaluation 
process, need an EOI to be informed by?
The relationship between the EOI and speculators and domainers is 
plain. We, ICANN and those of us who have more access than some 
others[1] and think that RFC 1591's "duty to serve the community" 
language is still useful, need to know how many, how many by surprise, 
how many by auction, how many by ..., and what exploits, of trademarks 
holders, of unprepared communities (always keeping in mind that there 
are dozens of ccTLDs that are, in truth, captured for private profit), 
...
Restated, the EOI model proposed is aware of the existence of 
speculators attempting to limit the competition from other 
speculators, and domainers attempting to acquire control of 
registries, and properly so.
Unfortunately, the same EOI model proposed is indifferent to the 
existence of governments as the applicants. True, governments and 
cultural and linguistic institutions can send letters of intent and 
checks to Marina del Rey, but what information of significance is 
actually obtained?
Turning to the advice of the GAC, published today, it is prudent to 
defer what was problematic at best, and address the problem the EOI 
purports to solve, without the distraction of "solutions" and their 
advocates looking to solve just their problems, which are not the same 
as ICANN's problems.
Further, it is prudent to distinguish between public applicants which 
propose to create obviously overdue structure and richness, and 
private applicants which propose to create short-term exploits, and 
replicate the abuses of many of the COM/NET/ORG registrars in the IANA 
root.
It is imprudent to maintain any longer the claim that all applicants 
are alike, indistinguishable, and better deferred indefinitely, than 
allowed to commence registry operations.
Finally, there is the matter of the public communications period. 
Unfortunately, that water is now muddied, with what was a stable, if 
retreating scheduled date abandoned now to two unsupported belief 
systems, "soon" and "never".
In developing Step by Step, a proposal we presented to the Board in 
Sydney, to exercise the portion of the evaluation process for which we 
are collectively certain of, and incrementally start serving 
applications for which no objections exist, we did not consider the 
public communications period problem.
Here I wish to make an observation. Accepting the application for 
Paris, or Scotland will be "the shot heard round the world". There 
will be no problem informing governments, linguistic and cultural 
institutions, non-governmental organizations, internet users, and 
private, for-profit operators, that ICANN has a functioning new gTLD 
program. The model of delta-the-DAG-to-completion, then hold a three 
month paid media blitz, followed by a crashing crescendo of 
applications and their fees, evaluation staff hires, and a lot of 
blood in the water, may not be as safe, or as certain, as simply 
accepting the applications known to be safe.
I suggest that starting with Paris and proceeding methodically through 
the applications believed to be meritorious in their own right, from 
Scotland to Africa, and which are inherently safe with regard to the 
Four Over Arching Issues, and not dependent upon the changes proposed 
by the CRAI report's authors, ending the separation between registries 
and registrars or allowing single-registrant applications of arbitrary 
type, is the best course of action available to ICANN.
It will allow ICANN to move forward, a critical concern which may be 
under-appreciated by Staff, and Board, and simultaneously allow ICANN 
to hold an EOI which answers important unanswered questions: how many 
private for-profit actors? what business models and what associated 
challenges? what affect upon the Four Over Arching Issues? what 
dependencies on changing the separation between registries and 
registrars, or allowing single-registrant applications of arbitrary type?
This would:
	o remove any unfair first mover advantage of some ICANN 
participants[1] who will pre-empt the most valuable strings before the 
rest of the world is fully aware of the gTLD program;
        o prevent a speculative market for "EoI application slots"; and
	o equitably treat developing country applicants, and small non-profit 
TLD projects that none-the-less operate in the public interest.
While not all of CORE's partners in registry application are 
governments, or cultural or linguistic institutions, these are our 
core business (to make a small, non-governmental pun), and as a CORE 
employee I must point out the obvious material self-interest in this note.
Eric Brunner-Williams


[1] The Affirmation of Commitments states: “ICANN and the Department 
of Commerce recognize that there is a group of participants that 
engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users 
generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, 
and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, ICANN 
commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and negative 
effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial impact 
on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the 
systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.”