Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure

[<mortenla@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

While I agree there is a clear distinction between law enforcement and a  
bank's role in addressing the phishing and fraud activities, I feel there is 
also a clear need for bank's anti-fraud (as well as other large companies who 
are frequently spoofed by fraudsters) to have access to registrant information 
in WHOIS. While law enforcement's objectives are tyically centered on 
investigating, aprehending and prosecuting the fraudsters, those activities 
take months or even years. The ant-fraud groups are primarily interested in 
getting fraudulent sites shut down quickly.

There simply are not enough law enforcement agents around to quickly work on 
shut-downs and many (at least here in America) won't take any action unless  
the banks/companies can show that a large loss has already ocurred.  

Most responses by victims to a fraudulent web site happen within the first day 
and so it is critical to get the fraudulent site shut as quickly as possible to 
minimize the risk to the consumer. It would be great if all of the ISP's and 
hosting companies out there would seriously investigate and shut down a 
phishing site, when they are notified but very frequently, they are not 
responsive. In those cases, it's often much easier to contact the owner of the 
site (who  often are unknowingly displaying a the phishing site because of a 
misconfigured/compromised web server or application). Without access to the 
whois information, it is very difficult to get the fraudulent sites shut down.


Lane Mortensen
--------------------------
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
 

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx <owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx>
To: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx <gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx>
CC: gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx <gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Fri May 11 21:10:05 2007
Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure

Dan, Palmer and all,

  Palmers comments and/or observations regarding Banks are not
accurate nor appropriate for Whois data.  Law enforcment cannot
rely on banks to do their "Leg Work" so to speak, and very few
do.  Law enforcment do use some bank data on customers for
financial investigative evidance with a warrant as required
by law in most US states and federal statute.  

  Dan's remarks have merit from where I sit as to ICANN
acting as a law enforcment or investigative agent for same.
ICANN is not suited for such a function in regards to Whois
data, nor should it be.  Incidently the Whois was never
intended as a law enforcment tool, and should not be used
as such other than incidentally.  However law enforcment
in the course of an investigation should be able to obtain
"Any" Whois data via jurisdictional due process.  Ergo
a search and sezier warrant or an equivalent dependant on
nation of origin, resaprocity, ect..

Regards,

Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
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Information Network Eng.  INEG. INC.
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Registered Email addr with the USPS Contact Number: 214-244-4827






-----Original Message-----
>From: Dan Krimm <dan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>Sent: May 11, 2007 7:32 PM
>To: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>Cc: gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
>Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure
>
>I'll let Eric speak for himself with regard to the email he receives, but
>the phishing scams I get are easily recognized and discarded.  (The first
>one I ever got -- before it had become prevalent, and before there was a
>word coined for it -- I was temporarily confused, but I was alert enough to
>check out the domain before supplying any info.  I have been personally
>immune ever since.)
>
>While I opt-out of all uses of my info by financial institutions that I can
>(and in California I can opt out of more than in other states or countries,
>because of consumer-friendly state regulation), I am still troubled by
>information collected by credit reporting agencies and other sources that I
>do not know about.  I refuse to allow DoubleClick to place cookies on my
>browsers.  And still I know this is not enough to be secure in the
>knowledge that data about me is not being used against my interests,
>usually by private entities out to make a buck.
>
>Banks already get a lot of personal information from their immediate
>customers.  There is no reason to give them unsupervised blanket access to
>all information in the Whois database about millions upon millions of
>people who are not their direct customers.
>
>Information used for legitimate anti-fraud efforts needs to be
>well-targeted as much as possible, and checks and balances need to be in
>place to assure appropriateness of access as a rule, since recourse is not
>always available in the case of abuse (and thus deterrence may be
>ineffective).
>
>If ICANN is not in position to become a fully-functional public law
>enforcement entity in and of itself, with all of the due process and
>accountability that such a role calls for (and it seems pretty clear that
>it is not), then that dynamic needs to be in the system somewhere, somehow,
>and it needs to be designed with some serious effectiveness, not just as a
>cosmetic ruse.
>
>Dan
>
>
>
>At 5:54 PM -0500 5/11/07, Hope.Mehlman@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>>Those 20 or so spam emails are likely phishing emails or scams. Banks do
>>not send spam emails. These emails you are referring to are not legitmate
>>emails, and this is exactly what banks are trying to prevent in order to
>>protect consumers from identity theft and fraud.  Your email highlights
>>how significant and prevalent this problem is. 
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>>  From: Hugh Dierker [hdierker2204@xxxxxxxxx]
>>  Sent: 05/11/2007 03:26 PM MST
>>  To: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>>  Cc: gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
>>  Subject: RE: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure
>>
>>
>>This really assumes alot.  Hypothetical "who done its".  Does not justify
>>giving out confidential information to banks.  I get 20 or so spams a day
>>from Banks. Junk mail another 5 a day- credit cards galore.
>>I do not buy that "banks" want my info for purely secure reasons.
>>
>>Eric
>>
>>Palmer Hamilton <PalmerHamilton@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>
>>Dan,
>>
>>The problem is a practical one. Law enforcement has limited resources.
>>We might wish that were not the case, but it is, and, realistically, it
>>will always be the case. Law enforcement, as I set out in my earlier
>>emails to Milton, expects banks to do the legwork before it will act.
>>Maybe it should be otherwise, but this is not the case nor will it ever
>>be the case. In various roles, both in government and working on the
>>side of government, I have spent years working on the side of law
>>enforcement. I think it is fair to say that law enforcement's approach
>>is virtually an immutable law of nature. And frankly from law
>>enforcement's standpoint, it must set priorities given its limited
>>resources.
>>
>>If banks do not have access to the necessary information, internet users
>>and consumers will be put at much greater risk. It would be nice to
>>think that banks and consumers could simply lodge a complaint and that
>>the complaint would be immediately acted upon. But this will never
>>happen. Law enforcement has too much on its plate. My banks can give
>>you page after page of examples to corroborate this. And remember for
>>every hour that passes, millions can be lost, including life savings.
>>
>>Please take another look at the example in my email to Milton involving
>>the local police in a foreign jurisdiction that finally agreed to act,
>>but only after the bank had exhausted all avenues and done all the
>>legwork. Realistically, absent bank access to the local address, it is
>>unknown how many innocent consumers would have suffered losses before
>>this fraudulent website was ever closed down.
>>
>>You are right that this is a question of balance. And I would argue
>>that consumer protection needs to be prominently considered, not
>>dismissed as unfortunate collateral damage.
>>
>>Banks are closely regulated and monitored entities with public
>>responsibilities. Those responsibilities are examined regularly by bank
>>examiners. As a result, I would submit, consumer protection ought to
>>prevail in light of the protections from a privacy standpoint in the
>>existing regulatory structure.
>>
>>Palmer
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx]
>>On Behalf Of Dan Krimm
>>Sent: Friday, May 11, 2007 3:43 PM
>>To: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>>Cc: gnso-whois-wg@xxxxxxxxx
>>Subject: [gnso-acc-sgb] RE: [gnso-whois-wg] Dutch Govcert procedure
>>
>>Palmer,
>>
>>If I may step in here (and shift this discussion over to the Subgroup B
>>list where it properly belongs):
>>
>>At 1:44 PM -0500 5/11/07, Palmer Hamilton wrote:
>>
>>>Just having the IP address and registrar is not sufficient. For
>>>example, one of my banks had a case in which it had to use local police
>>
>>>in a foreign country to visit the physical address of the website owner
>>
>>>to get the site taken down. The bank had tried to get the registrar to
>>
>>>shut it down without success. The bank had also tried to stop the site
>>
>>>with the administrative contact, the technical contact, the abuse
>>>contact, and the website owner, all with no success. The registrar was
>>
>>>also not interested in working with the local police, but the local
>>>police agreed to assist AFTED the bank provided the police the full
>>>WHOIS information plus a synopsis of its takedown efforts.
>>
>>So the question here is, when the bank is involved in valid efforts that
>>require access to Whois data that is designated as private there
>>certainly should be a process for that data to be engaged in the
>>process, so what should that process be? No one is suggesting that the
>>bank never get any such information whatsoever. But some of us are
>>suggesting that private entities should not get direct access to the
>>Whois data, but rather get information from formally accountable LEAs
>>who have direct access.
>>
>>It doesn't mean that private agents cannot contribute to the
>>investigation process, but that private agents need only be given what
>>they need in a particular context rather than being given the full range
>>of powers granted to publicly-accountable law enforcement. And, that
>>LEAs be responsible for providing appropriate information to private
>>agents that are participating in investigation processes. Once such a
>>policy is well-defined, it is possible to build technological systems
>>that adhere to those policies and operate efficiently without
>>unnecessary human intervention.
>>
>>And if ICANN jurisdiction is insufficient to resolve all structure
>>issues, that still may not be ICANN's responsibility to solve.
>>
>>At some point public law enforcement must step up to the plate to do
>>what needs to be done. ICANN cannot solve all the world's public
>>problems on its own, or even those problems that may relate tangentially
>>to the technical operation of the Internet. ICANN is not a proper venue
>>to determine and conduct public governance activities, or to authorize
>>private execution of public governance.
>>
>>
>>
>>>Having said this, the Dutch model could ultimately help fill a void on
>>>the international level by leveraging international pressure on
>>>recalcitrant governments. But again, this is not really an alternative
>>
>>>to what we are doing in Subgroup B, as I understand it.
>>
>>What exactly are we doing in subgroup B as you understand it?
>>
>>As I understand it, we are trying to reach some consensus on what GNSO
>>should recommend to the ICANN Board with regard to determining to whom
>>and how direct access to private Whois data under the OPoC paradigm
>>should be granted (by registries and/or registrars). This does not
>>speak to indirect access through authorized/certified LEAs.
>>
>>I have no expectation (or illusion) that what we come up with here will
>>create a perfect world. It will certainly continue to be systematically
>>imperfect from a privacy protection standpoint. If you are hoping to
>>find perfection, then that is undoubtedly beyond the scope of this WG or
>>Subgroup B.
>>
>>We are not in a position to dictate a comprehensive and airtight
>>resolution to the full complexity of issues here. So at least *that* is
>>*not* what we are doing here.
>>
>>Dan
>>
>>
>>
>>
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