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Re: [gnso-ff-pdp-may08] Fast Flux Definition - V4.1

  • To: Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Subject: Re: [gnso-ff-pdp-may08] Fast Flux Definition - V4.1
  • From: Dave Piscitello <dave.piscitello@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 08:02:50 -0700

I asked for an example.

I did not insist.

My query was genuine, since I honestly cannot conceive of a fast flux attack 
that has the impact/effect of the scale we are trying to address that can be 
executed without a very large number of hosts. I also cannot wrap my head 
around the notion that the majority of this very large network of hosts would 
be legitimate systems, running software that operators have installed 
willingly, with full knowledge that the software was going to be used to do 
something illegal or malicious.


On 7/29/08 9:41 AM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:



> Can you give me an real world example where the majority of systems
> used in a FF network are not compromised hosts?

How about a proof that no node in a "FF network" is not compromised?

The problem with insisting on examples, a point I attempted to make on a
sub-list, is that (a) not finding one does not mean there are none, and
(b) selective "prosecution" of "no hypothetical cases" may advantage an
advocacy position, but it doesn't meet the research goal the WG is
charged with, unless (c) something wicked unlikely occurs.

An advocacy position which is example rich isn't necessarily any more
correct for having examples.

Eric




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