RE: [gnso-irtp-b-jun09] Identifcation
- To: "Michele Neylon :: Blacknight" <michele@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "IRTP B Mailing List" <Gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: RE: [gnso-irtp-b-jun09] Identifcation
- From: "Erdman, Kevin R." <Kevin.Erdman@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 3 May 2010 15:39:15 -0400
Comments on Michele's comments below.
Regarding proposed augmentations, 3.2 should be augmented to allow for the
Registrar to file within a time period of discovering a change in the domain
operation and 3.4.1 should also include a provision requiring an explanation
by the Registrant for any eTRP made after the 60-day Transfer Lock as to why
the hijacking was not discovered within the 60-day time period.
Kevin R Erdman T: 317.237.1029 | F: 317.237.8521 | C: 317.289.3934
Intellectual Property, Internet, and Information Attorney, Registered Patent
BAKER & DANIELS LLP WWW.BAKERDANIELS.COM 300 N. MERIDIAN STREET, SUITE 2700 |
INDIANAPOLIS, IN 46204
[mailto:owner-gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Michele Neylon ::
Sent: Monday, May 03, 2010 12:34 PM
To: IRTP B Mailing List
Subject: Re: [gnso-irtp-b-jun09] Identifcation
On 3 May 2010, at 17:24, Erdman, Kevin R. wrote:
> Hi All,
> Following up on my thoughts about busting the eTRP and addressing the
> identification issue, I find that they are somewhat related. Here are a
> couple of thoughts to stir up the crowd for tomorrow's call.
> Suppose someone hijacked a high volume web site, but did not disrupt the
> traffic. Say hijacker A hacks into and changes the Registrant from
> BigCompany to individual A, but keeps the traffic running as usual.
> BigCompany never thinks to check the Registrant status, and 65 days after
> individual A hijacks the domain it is transferred to another Registrar.
> at day 70, individual A starts to disrupt traffic to BigCompany's domain,
> BigCompany tries to invoke eTRP. The new Registrar and the old Registrar
> would look to individual A as the Registrant and would not recognize
> BigCompany as the Registrant. True that Registrant could use UDRP to
> the domain if trademark rights were involved, but eTRP would not be
Yes, but that kind of scenario could probably be dealt with in a totally
>>From the perspective of the Registrant, they are a hijack victim that just
discovered the hijacking. Any hijack can be dealt with by litigation, so if
we are proposing an eTRP to handle a situation where a Registrant can try to
get an immediate return of a hijacked domain that they just discovered.
> On the subject of identification, I think that we are focusing on the wrong
> issue. The issue is who is the true Registrant, not who is the individual
> corporation listed on the Registrant line.
How can you differentiate between them?
>>Using an automobile analogy, a person possesses a car and uses it with the
keys. The key holder may be the title holder, or the key holder may be making
payments to the title holder. The hijacker hotwires the car and drives it
away. We want to return the stolen car to the key holder (or maybe we want
to return the car to the title holder?). In the domain world, I believe that
Registrars would like an easy way to confirm who the Registrant is through an
ICANN defined procedure rather than relying on national law (and whose
national law, the law of the Registrar or the law of the nation where the
Registrant claims to reside?). I think this is an important distinction,
because lots of WHOIS information does not exactly comport with the actual
ownership/use of domains.
> If in the Registration process
> the Registrar gave the Registrant a token that would uniquely identify the
> holder as the domain owner, then the Registrar would not need to comply
> any local law on proving identity. In the situation above, the old
> Registrant could present the token to show that at one time it was the
> Registrant and invoke the eTRP. Thus, rather than relying on local law to
> provide a way of verifying identity why couldn't we propose that the
> Registrar implement a token system for verifying Registrant status?
I can see problems with that
First off, say I register a domain name for a friend on my a/c with registrar
X. Using your process then you would see me as being the registrant and not
If my friend prefers to use registrar Y and moves the domain there (with
updated details at some point) then I'll still have your token ...
Or how about I register a domain and then sell it to someone else. Instead of
transferring the domain to another registrar the new holder moves the domain
to their account with the current registrar.
Also, what happens if an employee registers a domain using their personal
details and then corrects the error (or similar)?
>>There are potential problems with token administration, but at least it
would be an ICANN defined process (which would hopefully use technology
Registrars are familiar with) rather than relying on checking out passports
and corporate certificates from lands far and wide (which I would assume
would not be within the expertise of most Registrars). A quick on-line
urgent return mechanism needs a quick way for a Registrar to determine if the
filing documents are in order. Using the car analogy, the requestor must
show that they had the keys. During the Registration process, would it be
possible or practical to deliver the token only to the Registrant and not to
the Administrative Contact?
> There might then be an issue of false identification, but that is for a
> different discussion...
> Kevin R Erdman T: 317.237.1029 | F: 317.237.8521 | C: 317.289.3934
> Intellectual Property, Internet, and Information Attorney, Registered
> BAKER & DANIELS LLP WWW.BAKERDANIELS.COM 300 N. MERIDIAN STREET, SUITE 2700
> INDIANAPOLIS, IN 46204
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:owner-gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Matt Mansell
> Sent: Monday, May 03, 2010 6:43 AM
> To: Gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [gnso-irtp-b-jun09] Identifcation
> Hi All
> I've just been listening to last week's call in prep for tomorrow's.
> Apologies were sent but not noted. I wanted to add my thoughts re
> I personally think it's a mute point. If a bad actor wants to commit
> fraud in stealing a name he is equally more than capable of providing
> faked identify. We see plenty of it as I'm sure everyone does and its
> increasingly hard to spot.
> Essentially, without some sort of in-person, original documents process
> (Like applying for a Birth Certificate or Passport in the UK) I don't
> see how this can add any value, especially in digital form. We must
> remember that the receiving registrar will by virtue of fraudulent
> c/card data have the best checks they can already to verify the identify
> of their account holder. No registrar wants to unduly incur the costs of
> handling a chargeback or potential un-recoverable product costs. To put
> any liability on the registrar or registry to identify a transferee
> further will not reduce theft, particularly high value theft.
> Rgds, Matt
> Matt Mansell
> Mesh Digital Ltd
> Tel: +44 (0)1483 304030
> Fax: +44 (0)1483 304031
> Mbl: +44 (0)7715 168077
> Web: http://www.domainmonster.com
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Mr Michele Neylon
Hosting & Colocation, Brand Protection
ICANN Accredited Registrar
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