RE: [SPAM] RE: [gnso-irtp-b-jun09] For your review - draft IRTP Part B Initial Report
Hi Michael, I have been out of the loop a bit this last week so I may have missed something but I think that you have hit the nail on the head unless it is specifically called out within the ERTP that a change of registrant occurs within X [DAYS/WEEKS, etc] prior to the transfer. Otherwise, the transfer will appear to be within the IRTP. Barbara Steele Compliance Officer / Director of Policy Naming Services -----Original Message----- From: owner-gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Michael Collins Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2010 10:02 AM To: 'Erdman, Kevin R.' Cc: 'IRTP B Mailing List' Subject: RE: [SPAM] RE: [gnso-irtp-b-jun09] For your review - draft IRTP Part B Initial Report All: I apologize for being such a pest. I just cannot help myself. I would like to use Kevin's example to revisit another issue that I brought up before. I think that we are discussing some important measures to reduce unauthorized changes of Registrant and/or unauthorized inter-registrar transfers. However, by our work on ETRP, we recognize that hijackings will likely still occur. If a registrant change occurs before an inter-registrar transfer, as in Kevin's example, the hijacking victim cannot use ETRP or TDRP to recover the domain name. The hijacker is the registrant at the time of the inter-registrar transfer not the victim. Am I missing something? Best regards, Michael Collins +1. 407 242 9009 mobile -----Original Message----- From: owner-gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Erdman, Kevin R. Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2010 6:39 PM To: James M. Bladel Cc: IRTP B Mailing List Subject: [SPAM] RE: [gnso-irtp-b-jun09] For your review - draft IRTP Part B Initial Report James and all, If we cannot go beyond 60 days, then the potential problem is that the hijacker of the high traffic domain hacks in and changes the Registrant and transfers the domain to another Registrar while keeping the DNS stuff the same. The prior Registrant may not notice as the traffic continues to inure to its benefit, then at day 65, the hijacker redirects the DNS for its own purposes and the prior Registrant finds out it has no domain. The proposed alternative window for the ETRP would provide the prior Registrant a procedure to quickly recover the domain once the high volume traffic diversion occurs. I understand that currently, the vast number of cases would not need more than 60 days. However, assuming the ETRP is well used, then every educated hijacker will do as I propose above. What is the time frame in the RAA for demarcating the end of the PTRa's responsibility? Perhaps tracking this time period would be better for counsel to consider rather than a limitless time frame, but one that would still somewhat deter the use of the scenario above. ____________________________________________________________________________ _ ___________________________ Kevin R Erdman T: 317.237.1029 | F: 317.237.8521 | C: 317.289.3934 Intellectual Property, Internet, and Information Attorney, Registered Patent Attorney BAKER & DANIELS LLP WWW.BAKERDANIELS.COM 300 N. MERIDIAN STREET, SUITE 2700 | INDIANAPOLIS, IN 46204 Attachment:
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