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RE: [SPAM] RE: [gnso-irtp-b-jun09] For your review - draft IRTP Part B Initial Report

  • To: "'Erdman, Kevin R.'" <Kevin.Erdman@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Subject: RE: [SPAM] RE: [gnso-irtp-b-jun09] For your review - draft IRTP Part B Initial Report
  • From: "Michael Collins" <mc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 13 May 2010 10:01:59 -0400

All:

I apologize for being such a pest. I just cannot help myself.

I would like to use Kevin's example to revisit another issue that I brought up 
before. I think that we are discussing some important measures to reduce 
unauthorized changes of Registrant and/or unauthorized inter-registrar 
transfers. However, by our work on ETRP, we recognize that hijackings will 
likely still occur.

If a registrant change occurs before an inter-registrar transfer, as in Kevin's 
example, the hijacking victim cannot use ETRP or TDRP to recover the domain 
name. The hijacker is the registrant at the time of the inter-registrar 
transfer not the victim. Am I missing something?

Best regards,
Michael Collins
+1. 407 242 9009 mobile

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx 
[mailto:owner-gnso-irtp-b-jun09@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Erdman, Kevin R.
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2010 6:39 PM
To: James M. Bladel
Cc: IRTP B Mailing List
Subject: [SPAM] RE: [gnso-irtp-b-jun09] For your review - draft IRTP Part B 
Initial Report


James and all,

If we cannot go beyond 60 days, then the potential problem is that the
hijacker of the high traffic domain hacks in and changes the Registrant and
transfers the domain to another Registrar while keeping the DNS stuff the
same.  The prior Registrant may not notice as the traffic continues to inure
to its benefit, then at day 65, the hijacker redirects the DNS for its own
purposes and the prior Registrant finds out it has no domain.  The proposed
alternative window for the ETRP would provide the prior Registrant a
procedure to quickly recover the domain once the high volume traffic
diversion occurs.

I understand that currently, the vast number of cases would not need more
than 60 days.  However, assuming the ETRP is well used, then every educated
hijacker will do as I propose above.

What is the time frame in the RAA for demarcating the end of the PTRa's
responsibility?  Perhaps tracking this time period would be better for
counsel to consider rather than a limitless time frame, but one that would
still somewhat deter the use of the scenario above.
_____________________________________________________________________________
___________________________
Kevin R Erdman  T: 317.237.1029 | F: 317.237.8521 | C: 317.289.3934
Intellectual Property, Internet, and Information Attorney, Registered Patent
Attorney
BAKER & DANIELS LLP WWW.BAKERDANIELS.COM 300 N. MERIDIAN STREET, SUITE 2700 |
INDIANAPOLIS, IN 46204





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